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Abstract 
 
Canada is and will for the foreseeable future be a peaceful and prosperous liberal 
democracy whose Constitution Act, 1867, now 150 years old as of 2017, has become a model 
for the modern world. The Constitution of Canada has exerted considerable influence on 
other countries, particularly since the coming into force of its Constitution Act, 1982, which 
included the celebrated Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Just as Canada drew from 
foreign and international experiences in drafting its Charter, the world has learned a great 
deal from Canada, not only as to rights protections but also as to the separation of powers, 
the judicial function, and the structure of government. 
In light of these impressive achievements, an international symposium on the Canadian 
Constitution was held in Pisa at the Scuola Sant’Anna under the auspices of the Sant’Anna 
Legal Studies project and with the support of the DIRPOLIS (Law, Politics and 
Development) Institute at the Scuola Sant’Anna, the Canadian Embassy in Italy, and the 
International Association of Constitutional Law. This special issue collects some of the 
papers presented on that occasion. 
 
Key-words 
 
Canada, migration of constitutional ideas, comparative constitutional law, patriation, 
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1. Why a Special Issue on Canada? 
 
In Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?I, Peter Russell (1992) 
describes Canada’s long march to the “patriation”II of the constitution, the dramatic failure 
of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, and the difficulty of reconciling Quebec 
with the rest of the country since the sovereignty-association referendum in 1980. For 
Russell, Canada’s turbulent “constitutional odyssey” derives from its Burkean, not 
Lockean, culture of constitutionalism. With some noteworthy exceptions including 
patriation itself, Canadian political actors, Russell explains, have favoured incremental 
adjustments to their constitutional arrangements rather than a Lockean democratic 
moment in which a nation is forged and a people is created. In Russell’s analysis, Canada is 
a nation of nations, home to dissimilar peoples for whom the idea of an American-style 
sense of collective peoplehood is perhaps neither a priority nor even a possibility. And yet 
Canada remains today and for the foreseeable future a peaceful and prosperous liberal 
democracy whose Constitution Act, 1867, now 150 years old as of 2017, has become a model 
for the modern world. 
The Constitution of Canada has exerted considerable influence on other countries, 
particularly since the coming into force of its Constitution Act, 1982, which included the 
celebrated Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Just as Canada drew from foreign and 
international experiences in drafting its Charter, the world has learned a great deal from 
Canada, not only as to rights protections but also as to the separation of powers, the 
judicial function, and the structure of government. Canada, it turns out, exports much 
more than only hockey players and peacekeepers. 
 
In this spirit, we organized an international symposium on the Canadian Constitution. 
We held the program in Pisa at the Scuola Sant’Anna under the auspices of the Sant’Anna 
Legal Studies project and with the support of the DIRPOLIS (Law, Politics and 
Development) Institute at the Scuola Sant’Anna, the Canadian Embassy in Italy, and the 
International Association of Constitutional Law. 
The symposium offered a special opportunity for scholars from all around the world to 
gather to mark the Sesquicentennial of the Canadian Constitution. We invited participants 
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from all perspectives, including both critical and praiseworthy, to present papers on a wide-
ranging theme: “The Constitution of Canada: History, Evolution, Influence and Reform.” 
This special issue collects some of the papers presented on that occasion. It is true that 
important volumes have already been published on this anniversary.III But there 
nonetheless remains much to say about a Constitution that has had such a profound 
impact beyond its borders, particularly here in Europe, where many of the contributors to 
this special issue are based. We are especially pleased to have curated a genuinely 
comparative special issue of reflections on the Constitution of Canada. 
 
2. In this Issue 
 
The articles collected in this Special Issue fall under three themes, each reflecting 
peculiar characteristics of Canadian constitutional law in a comparative perspective. The 
first is Federalism, which James Gardner, Peter Price, and Davide Strazzari investigate 
from different perspectives and each with a different subject-matter focus, namely the 
structure of governmental power, the dynamic relationship between federal and provincial 
constitutions, and the evolution of the federal system on public policy, respectively.  
James Gardner’s article on “Canadian Federalism in Design and Practice: The 
Mechanics of a Permanently Provisional Constitution” deals with the federal structure of 
the Canadian Constitution. It focuses on the existing gap between constitutional design and 
practice in the case of Canada and highlights the strategies and tactics put in place by 
provinces to assert their authority to and against the federal government. The article shows 
that, by using tools like constitutional conventions and executive federalism, provinces 
have in fact created for themselves considerable leeway to get much of what they have 
wanted from the central government. The (unintended) consequence, however, has been to 
keep the Constitution in moving to and from ever-changing equilibria between the central 
and subnational governments. 
In his article on “Provincializing Constitutions: History, Narrative, and the 
Disappearance of Canada’s Provincial Constitutions”, Peter Price argues that the dominant 
narrative in Canadian constitutional discourse since 1867 has caused us to overlook the 
importance of provincial Constitutions. The result has been to minimize pre-Confederation 
Canadian history and, thus, the significance of the many constitutional communities and 
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identities shaping the original “dualist” view of the Constitution. Price traces this 
phenomenon to the increased weight assigned to written constitutionalism in the post-
Charter era—a trend that combines with the lack of codified provincial constitutions in 
Canada to make provincial constitutions much less important than they really are and 
ought to be. 
Davide Strazzari’s contribution on “Immigration and Federalism in Canada: beyond 
Quebec Exceptionalism?” aims to shed light on the balance of powers between the central 
government and the provinces in the specific and controversial case of migration policy. In 
his article, Strazzari demonstrates that since the 1991 intergovernmental agreement 
between the federal government and the government of Quebec on the issue (which 
allocated crucial powers to Quebec in matters of selection and integration of migrants), the 
federation has conferred more authority over immigration also to other provinces and 
territories, causing a shift from de jure to de facto asymmetry among provincial powers. 
However, as Strazzari clearly points out, while Quebec’s autonomy in migration may be 
constrained only by an Act of the Parliament, the delegation of powers over migration to 
the other provinces and territories is based on administrative agreements that can be 
unilaterally revoked by the federal government—as happened not too long ago in 2012. 
The second group of articles in this Special Issue contributes to the literature on the 
“migration of constitutional ideas”IV because it explores how Canadian constitutional law 
has travelled across borders. As one of the world’s most influentialV, the Canadian 
Constitution presents many avenues for research into how its doctrines, theories and 
innovations have been transplanted or adapted abroad. Leonardo Pierdominici’s article on 
“The Canadian living tree doctrine as a comparative model of evolutionary constitutional 
interpretation” analyses the influence of the “living tree” doctrine of the Supreme Court of 
Canada on courts that are traditionally engaged in transnational judicial dialogue and courts 
that are newcomers to this practice. 
In “Constitutional Judges and Secession. Lessons from Canada … twenty years after” 
Irene Spigno examines how the referendum has been used to address secessionist claims 
outside Canada in particular Italy and Spain. She draws in her article on the advisory 
opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada on Quebec secession. She inquires whether the 
principles articulated in that advisory opinion have been influential in the case law of the 
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Italian and Spanish Constitutional Courts, both of which have faced similar questions 
about secession. 
Similarly, the article by Francisco Javier Romero Caro on “The Spanish vision of 
Canada’s Clarity Act: From Idealization to Myth” begins with the advisory opinion on 
Quebec secession. He focuses on its legislative follow-up in Parliament, the Clarity Act, to 
explore the reasons for and the pitfalls of the “deification of this statute in Spain”. He 
argues in particular that the Clarity Act has been misinterpreted in Spain, with serious 
consequences for the treatment of secessionist claims in the Basque country and in 
Catalonia. 
The third group of articles in this Special Issue focuses on the enforcement of the 
equality principle in Canada, in particular on the protection of gender equality and women’s 
rights. Charlotte Helen Skeet’s contribution on “Franchises Lost and Gained: Post-
Coloniality and the Development of Women’s Rights in Canada” challenges the traditional 
understanding of the “continuous evolution” and strengthening of women’s political rights 
with reference to the pre-confederation history of suffrage in Canada as a case study. Her 
historical and legal analysis of the suffrage movements in the country show why the 
franchise was exercised more widely in Lower Canada and it also urges the recognition of 
the contributions to Indigenous peoples to the history of women’s rights in Canada. 
Valentina Rita Scotti’s article on “Women’s Rights and Minorities’ Rights in Canada: The 
Challenges of Intersectionality in Supreme Court Jurisprudence” tackles the issue of gender 
equality and minority rights with a careful study of the case law of the Canadian Supreme 
Court. After framing the debate on intersectionality in the Canadian context and after 
reviewing some of the main Supreme Court judgments on gender equality, Scotti then 
interrogates why and how intersectionality represents for Indigenous and Muslim women a 
source of double discrimination. 
 
What follows, then, is a fascinating, provocative and timely set of articles that raise 
important questions about, raise useful critiques of and where appropriate bring a certain 
amount of praise to the Constitution Act, 1867 as it marks its Sesquicentennial. We can only 
hope that the Canadian Constitution will continue to be a source of learning and 
inspiration in the years ahead. 
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 Giuseppe Martinico is Associate Professor of Comparative Public Law at Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna in 
Pisa. Richard Albert is tenured Professor of Constitutional Law at Boston College Law School. Antonia 
Baraggia is Postdoctoral Fellow in Constitutional Law at the University of Milan. Cristina Fasone is Assistant 
Professor of Comparative Public Law at LUISS Guido Carli in Rome. 
I Russell 1992.  
II “The word ‘patriation’, a genuine Canadian invention, refers to Canada’s final ‘bringing home’ of its 
constitution from Westminster, with full patriotic fanfare, on 17 April 1982. Although Canada enjoyed 
sovereignty since at least 1931, it nonetheless continued to depend on requests to the United Kingdom 
Parliament for making amendments to its constitution. The reason for this anomaly was clear: Canadian 
governments had proved unable to agree on an internal amending procedure by which legal changes to the 
constitution could be made at home without having recourse to Britain” (Milne 2004). 
III See, for example, Albert and Cameron (eds) 2017; Oliver, Macklem and Des Rosiers (eds) 2017. 
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In the introduction we discussed how this special issue was the product of a conference 
organized in Pisa on 24 May 2017. The conference was conceived as part of the Sant’Anna 
Legal Studies Project (STALS), a project on which we have the honour of coordinating 
with Giacomo Delledonne and Filippo Fontanelli. STALS was launched in 2008, with the 
creation of an online research paper archive; since then it has grown significantly, we have 
organized almost ninety international events on different topics, covering a broad spectrum 
of interests. Over the last few years the Scuola has invested significantly to achieve a 
constant growth in internationalising our activities; a process that has enjoyed a significant 
acceleration under the Presidency of Prof. Yves Mény. 
Along with Richard, Antonia and Cristina, the other convenors of this event, we 
thought that it might be a good idea to devote an international symposium to “The 
Constitution of Canada: History, Evolution, Influence and Reform”, by exploiting, so to 
speak, the chance offered by the 150th Anniversary of the Canadian Confederation. 
We decided to dedicate this event to the memory of Prof. Alessandro Pizzorusso 
(Bagni di Lucca 11 November 1931- Pisa 14 December 2015). He was an outstanding 
scholar, a giant in our discipline. 
Moreover and, perhaps more importantly, he was also a very humble person who 
always escaped celebrations, a role model for the younger generations. 
Alessandro Pizzorusso started work as a judge, and then became Professor of 
Constitutional and Comparative Law at the Universities of Pisa and Florence. He was also 
Emeritus Professor at the University of Pisa. He authored more than 1,000 publications in 
Italian, French, Spanish and English. His works were translated into many different 
languages. He covered a very wide spectrum of topics related to domestic, comparative and 
European constitutional law. He was also part of the Expert Group on Fundamental 
Rights chaired by Spiros Simitis, as such contributing to the progressive 
constitutionalisation of the EU, as that group put forward some very important 
recommendations for the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the Treaties. He was also member 
of the Italian Superior Council of the Judiciary, of the prestigious “Accademia Nazionale 
dei Lincei”, and of the International Academy of Comparative Law. 
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Among his works in English comes to mind in particular his article “Italian and 
American Models of the Judiciary and of Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparison of 
Recent Tendencies”, published in the American Journal of Comparative Law in 1990. He 
was also Editor of the Italian Studies in Law, with the specific goal of circulating the best 
outputs of Italian scholarship. 
We benefited from his superb intellectual and human qualities, immense legal 
knowledge and generosity. There is an anecdote we want to share with our readers and 
which is related to the genesis of STALS. As written, we wanted to launch the website and 
the paper archive at that time. 
STALS has been made possible thanks to the support of Emanuele Rossi and other 
colleagues at Scuola Sant’Anna. This project was modelled on the Italian Studies in Law, a 
sort of a yearbook series edited between 1992 and 1994 by Alessandro Pizzorusso and 
published by Martinus Nijhoff. 
In our view STALS had to be (and to a certain extent is) a sort of follow up to the 
Italian Studies in Law project, but with a huge difference, as STALS relies on an electronic 
platform.  
It was no coincidence, therefore, that we asked Alessandro Pizzorusso to launch the 
STALS website with a paper of his; we understood that his contribution was a sign of 
continuity with the experience of Italian Studies in Law.  
We immediately contacted Alessandro Pizzorusso and he decided to give us a paper 
entitled “Common constitutional traditions as Constitutional Law of Europe?”. 
In the paper you can find the essence of his way of understanding European Law; a 
sort of huge space that can be filled, fed and enriched by comparative law. This is also the 
idea behind one of his books, Il patrimonio costituzionale europeo (“the European 
constitutional heritage).  
Indeed, European constitutional law was one of the many fields in which Alessandro 
Pizzorusso wrote fundamental pieces, teaching us the importance of comparison in 
European studies. 
His interest in European law may have been due to his connection with Mauro 
Cappelletti (he moved to Florence to replace Cappelletti as, among other things, Director 
of the Institute of Comparative law of the University of Florence); perhaps in this 
experiment of legal and cultural coexistence he found a natural follow up to his works on 
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linguistic and cultural diversity. He wrote extensively on linguistic minorities and in these 
works it is also possible to find some references to Canada. As an example, in a piece 
published in the Boletín Mexicano de derecho comparado in 2000, he briefly dealt with 
Ford v Quebec (AG), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 a very well know decision of the Canadian 
Supreme Court in which legislation restricting the use of commercial signs written in 
languages other than French was struck down. The Canadian Supreme Court 
acknowledged the violation of the freedom of expression as enshrined in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Prof. Pizzorusso had many contacts in Canada as well, 
José Woehrling and Prof. Andrée Lajoie, among others. He always shared his network with 
us and this testifies again to his generosity.  
Always thanks to these contacts we had the privilege of meeting another giant of 
comparative law, another gentleman, Prof. Patrick Glenn who passed away some months 
earlier than Alessandro Pizzorusso.  
We mention this because Patrick Glenn wrote our second STALS research paper, 
another jewel entitled “Doin' the Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal Traditions”. 
However, if we only recall Alessandro Pizzorusso’s scientific guidance then we would 
not get the entire picture, as his greatest legacy to the academic community was his 
incredible generosity and immense respect for students, colleagues and members of the 
administrative staff.  
Our sadness really goes beyond the power of speech, we cannot contain what we feel; 
we miss him greatly, and the unfinished conversations we had started with him. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the interaction between constitutional design and practice through 
a case study of Canadian federalism. Focusing on the federal architecture of the Canadian 
Constitution, the paper examines how subnational units in Canada actually compete with the 
central government, emphasizing the concrete strategies and tactics they most commonly 
employ to get their way in confrontations with central authority. The evidence affirms that 
constitutional design and structure make an important difference in the tactics and tools 
available to subnational units in a federal system, but that design is not fully constraining: 
there is considerable evidence of extraconstitutional innovation and improvisation by 
governments. Furthermore, changes in practice initiated by Canadian subnational actors have 
produced changes in the allocation of national and subnational authority that are plausibly 
characterized as constitutional in magnitude. The paper concludes that the design of the 
Canadian federal system may inadvertently undermine its capacity to stabilize itself at any 
particular point of constitutional evolution, making it ‘permanently provisional.’ 
 
Key-words 
 
federalism, Canada, constitutional law, constitutional design 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the classic model of constitutionalism, a constitution is understood to be a permanent 
article of positive law containing a set of fixed instructions issued by a popular sovereign to 
its governmental agents. To ensure that constitutional commands issue only from the 
popular sovereign – to prevent the people’s agents from changing their own instructions – 
constitutions are deliberately ‘entrenched.’ That is, the constitution is rendered presumptively 
permanent by making it difficult to change, and by ensuring that the people remain the sole 
ultimate source of amending authority. This largely static model comports well with the 
philosophical premises of contractarianism, which holds that political legitimacy is founded 
on the consent of the governed (Locke 1690), and thus tends to conceive of a constitution 
as fixed and permanent – ‘established in its entirety at a definite time and place’ (Griffin 1996: 
2124), at the moment in which consent was granted.  
In sharp contrast, the constitutions of federal states are almost universally viewed as 
dynamic and continually evolving. Among those who study federalism, there is remarkable 
consensus on this point. ‘[F]ederal systems,’ according to Arthur Benz (2008: 1), ‘are highly 
dynamic.’ ‘The various parts of the system,’ M.J.C. Vile (1961: 3) observes, ‘are in continuous 
interaction.’ On account of this property, Carl Friedrich (1968: 7) claimed, ‘[f]ederal relations 
are fluctuating relations in the very nature of things.’ In short, according to Benz and 
Broschek (2013: 2), ‘federal systems are permanently in motion.’ Most importantly, what 
moves in federal systems, according to Judith Resnik (2014: 368), is the most basic, defining 
feature of any federal regime: ‘competencies are always in motion, and in more than one 
direction’ (emphasis added).  
This evolution, moreover, takes place without popular intervention by means of formal 
constitutional amendment. Consequently, as Edward McWhinney (1962: 12) wrote more 
than a half-century ago, in all federal states there is a ‘contrast between the constitution as 
originally written and the actual working constitution.’ This contrast can be severe, and thus, 
in federal systems, ‘[t]he written constitution . . . is of limited use in explaining how the 
federal system works’ (Erk 2006: 456).  
Why does this happen? Why would constitutions of federal states depart so dramatically 
from the classic conception of constitutional fixity? Granted, the classic theoretical model 
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tends to overstate the case for constitutional stability. More than two centuries of experience 
with democratically adopted constitutions have taught that constitutions are capable of 
evolving though mechanisms other than formal amendment – so-called ‘informal’ methods 
of constitutional change. For example, constitutions can change informally through judicial 
reinterpretation (Ackerman 1991). Informal constitutional change can also be driven by 
changes in the governance practices of constitutional officers (Gardner 2016). Some scholars 
argue that the forces of informal change are sufficiently strong to conclude that ‘[a]ll 
constitutions change continuously’ (Oliver and Fusaro 2011: 424).  
Even if this is correct, scholars of federalism seem nevertheless to believe that the rate 
and magnitude of change of federal constitutions far outstrips the degree of normal evolution 
in constitutions creating other kinds of states. They argue, in effect, that change – including 
change of core structural aspects of the constitutional scheme – is built into federal systems 
in ways that lack a counterpart in constitutions of nonfederal states. If true, what might 
explain this phenomenon? 
One possible explanation – and the one I wish to explore here – has to do with the 
method of entrenchment employed by federal constitutions. The conventional design 
approach to constitutional entrenchment involves little more than erection of a highly public 
expectation of compliance: the popular sovereign commands and its servants obey. This 
relatively static command-and-control approach, however, courts a significant risk: it offers 
few resources to guard against a failure of obedience by government officials. James Madison 
called this the problem of ‘parchment barriers’ (Madison 1787-1788: No. 48). On Madison’s 
account, governments are run by human beings; human beings are subject to temptation; 
and the accumulation of power is an attractive temptation that few officials can be expected 
permanently to resist. Constitutional entrenchment, Madison agreed, is necessary, but it 
cannot occur dependably through the mere issuance of commands. 
To deal with this problem, Madison proposed a radically different solution. If political 
institutions are vulnerable to human ambition, Madison argued, then ‘[a]mbition must be 
made to counteract ambition’ (Madison 1787-1788: No. 51). If entrenchment cannot be 
achieved statically, then it must be achieved dynamically, through construction of an 
equilibrated system in which strong forces align in well-balanced opposition. This task is 
accomplished through a careful division of power, undertaken against a background 
assumption that power holders will attempt periodically to expand their domains. At the 
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same time, other power holders will have an equally predictable propensity to defend their 
own domains against encroachment. Such a system is highly dynamic; it creates a kind of 
permanent contestation among holders of official power. If the system works well, 
constitutional limitations on government power are entrenched by maintenance of a dynamic 
equilibrium at the desired design parameters (Schwartz 1989: 35; Ordeshook 1993: 204). 
Federalism is such a system. By definition, a federal constitution (1) creates a national 
government; (2) recognizes the permanence and autonomy of subnational units; and (3) 
allocates to each level some measure of power (Elazar 1966). The existence and authority of 
the two orders of government is then made permanent through entrenchment: the federal 
plan ‘freezes a particular allocation of authority between provinces and the center’ (Levy 
2014: 345). This end is achieved, however, not simply through an initial textual allocation of 
competencies followed by an expectation of obedience – through the creation, that is, of 
parchment barriers. In the Madisonian model, each level of government is endowed with 
powers sufficient to allow it monitor and check the abuses of the other: ‘The different 
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself’ 
(Madison 1787-1788: No. 51). Thus, the stability of the constitutional plan depends upon 
the capacity of each order of government to ‘control’ – or at least to influence and obstruct 
– the other. To accomplish this end, the amount of power allocated to each level of 
government and the reach of its authority presumably must be calibrated with some 
precision; an imbalance in either direction could lead to a risky accumulation of power at the 
national or subnational level – the very result that federalism is instituted to preclude. Thus, 
constitutional designers carry a heavy burden: they must carefully plot out and entrench, as 
the U.S. Supreme Court has said in a comparable context, a ‘finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered’ division of powerI that will permit national and subnational governments to fight 
each other to a permanent draw. 
What Madison did not and could not know, however, was that the dynamic, contestatory 
system he contemplated does not fully solve the problem of constitutional entrenchment 
due to the phenomenon of informal constitutional change. One of the most common drivers 
of informal constitutional change is alteration by government officials of the practices they 
employ in the discharge of their official duties. As Behnke and Benz (2009: 217) explain, 
‘[c]onstitutional evolution is often initiated by unilateral action [of government officials].’ In 
Denning’s (1997: 211) formulation, these kinds of actions may properly be understood as 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
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‘claims of power’ that constitute ‘“moves” made by the “legislative and executive branches 
. . . that serve as precedents for future actions.”’ II The establishment of precedents permitting 
government authority to be exercised in new ways in turn can alter the substance of the 
constitution’s grants of authority to the actors who establish these precedents. In other 
words, constitutional actors can alter their own power by changing how and when they 
exercise it, thus initiating change in the substance of the constitutional allocation of power 
(Gardner 2016: 353-364). 
If static methods of constitutional entrenchment are vulnerable to the problem of 
‘parchment barriers,’ this analysis suggests that dynamic systems of constitutional 
entrenchment may be vulnerable to what we might call the problem of ‘plastic barriers.’ That 
is, in a dynamic system, constitutional instructions may not be overtly repudiated or ignored, 
but may instead undergo alteration or evolution as holders of government power constantly 
probe for advantage in a permanent contest over public policy. 
The problem of plastic constitutional barriers is clearly presented in constitutional 
systems of federalism. Federalism is by nature a contestatory system in which it is anticipated 
that national and subnational governments will contend to secure influence and advantage 
(Bednar 2009: 63-85). As a result, the elements of informal constitutional change are 
necessarily present. First, the tools constitutional actors possess to deploy against other 
actors in contests over authority are by definition the tools of official practice. To the extent 
that the duties of officials at each level of government include monitoring and, when 
necessary, deploying power against the other level of government, the form that such 
resistance takes is inherently a mode of official practice. Second, a constitutional regime that 
furnishes government officials with incentives to struggle against one another provides them 
with incentives to prevail not merely by deploying the tools of incursion and self-defense 
that the constitution uncontroversially provides, but also to compete by changing the 
constitutional ground rules so as to develop and deploy more effective tools of contestation 
(Levinson 2011).  
The institutionalization of intergovernmental contestation thus has the potential to place 
great pressure on the stability of federal regimes. ‘The incentive to deviate from the division 
of authority,’ argues Jenna Bednar (2009: 63), ‘is inescapably built in to the federal structure.’ 
Because the system contemplates that national and subnational actors will compete against 
each other, ‘[t]he constitutional allocation of competences . . . is particularly prone to 
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entrepreneurial redefinition’ (Broschek 2011: 548). Constitutional actors, in other words, 
have an incentive to ‘try to shift the balance [of constitutional authority] incrementally in a 
direction favourable to them,’ thereby inducing a form of ‘authority migration’ (Benz and 
Colino 2011: 381). When government officials become adept players of this game, 
‘assignments of power and competences have to be continuously renegotiated’ (Benz 2008: 
1).  
In short, a constitutional regime that institutionalizes contestation among officials is a 
regime that invites unforeseeable alteration of the very aspects of the constitutional regime 
that contestation is meant to stabilize – the constitutional allocation of authority. Through 
the process of intergovernmental contestation, the location of the boundary between 
national and subnational authority may shift, initially as a matter of contingent fact, and 
eventually as a matter of constitutional reformation. Contestatory federalism, then, is a 
constitutional structure that seems to invite change, not only in the palette of tools and 
techniques that national and subnational governments deploy against one another, but also, 
over time, in the substantive allocation of authority among the two orders of government. 
If I am correct to this point, the relevant question of constitutional design in federal 
states is quite different from the one that occupied Madison. My claim is that the mechanism 
of intergovernmental contestation deployed by federalism to stabilize constitutional 
allocations of power is capable simultaneously of destabilizing those very allocations; 
federalism, in other words, is inherently a system with the capacity to destabilize itself. If so, 
then a different question arises: might some federal constitutional arrangements be more 
stable than others? Might they incur less risk of variation from the desired distribution of 
competencies, and thus endure longer? This is not an idle inquiry: by one count, 27 of the 
44 federations formed in the last two hundred years have failed either by breaking apart or 
by collapsing into a unitary state (Lemco 1991: 1). Especially in modern, ethnonational 
federations, maintenance of a particular allocation of authority between national and 
subnational governments is often a critical term of the basic constitutional bargain upon 
which the legitimacy of the state is founded. 
The balance of this paper explores these questions through a case study of the Canadian 
Constitution. It begins with an overview of the Canadian Constitution, focusing on the 
allocation of power between the national government and the provinces contemplated by 
the constitutional design. It then moves on to examine how federalism is actually practiced in 
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Canada, primarily by analyzing the tools and tactics deployed by Canadian provinces in 
moments of conflict with the central state. It also looks at the consequences of these tactics 
for the constitutional allocation of power. The paper concludes with some reflections on the 
relation between the Canadian Constitution’s federal design and the stability over time of the 
constitutional division of authority. 
 
2. A case study: Canadian federalism 
 
2.1. The structure of Canadian federalism 
In a celebrated double irony of unintended consequences, the Constitution of Canada 
was written for the express purpose of making the structure of Canadian government as 
different as possible from that of the United States. In this, the designers of the document 
succeeded, but not in a way they foresaw. Enacted at Canadian request by the British Imperial 
Parliament in 1867, the original Canadian Constitution was intended to create a highly 
centralized state with a powerful national government for the express purpose of avoiding 
what Canadians saw as the catastrophic failure of the decentralized U.S. Constitution, a 
failure that they observed at uncomfortably close range during the American Civil War. The 
resulting document – the British North America Act – did in fact create a powerful central 
government and weak provinces. Over time, however, the Canadian Constitution became 
something very different: a series of decisions by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
a British court that served as the highest judicial authority during the colonial period, reversed 
the polarity of the document to the point that Canada is today among the most decentralized 
of all federal states (Hogg 2007: '' 5.3(b), (c)). Simultaneously, the United States Constitution 
evolved from its original design as the charter of a decentralized state with a weak central 
government to something that is, for many purposes and in many circumstances, very close 
to its polar opposite. Neither set of drafters, then, obtained what they wanted, and one of 
the main differences between the two constitutional cultures today is that the fact of 
constitutional evolution is obvious to and often welcomed by Canadians, whereas it is 
sometimes denied, and often regretted, by Americans.III 
The structure of Canadian federalism is complex, and needs to be described in some 
detail. This section begins by describing the formal features established by the Canadian 
Constitution, and then moves on to describe the many informal institutions and practices 
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that overlie the constitutional structure and account for the characteristic institutions of 
Canadian federalism. 
 
2.1.1. The formal federal structure 
The current constitution of Canada was enacted in 1982 by the British Imperial 
Parliament at Canadian request, and effected the ‘patriation’ of the constitution, the most 
significant step in a long and gradual – but still incomplete – process of Canadian 
disengagement from the British Empire and corresponding assumption of self-sovereignty. 
Although the Constitution Act, 1982, made a very significant change from previous 
constitutional documents by adding for the first time a bill of rights – the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms – it left fundamentally intact the basic structure and institutions of 
government created under its 1867 predecessor. 
Under the Canadian Constitution, national legislative power is vested in Parliament, 
which consists of a House of Commons and a Senate. Members of Commons are popularly 
elected. Senators are formally appointed by the Governor General, an official appointed by 
the Queen, but by long practice the Governor General makes appointments only upon 
recommendation of the cabinet (Hogg 2007: ' 9.5(d)). Senators serve no terms, leaving only 
once they reach the constitutional retirement age of 75.  
The Senate was originally intended to serve as a forum for representation of provincial 
interests: the Constitution Act provides that Senators shall be appointed in equal numbers 
from Ontario, Quebec, the Atlantic Provinces, and the Western Provinces, the traditional 
four regions of Canada. However, the possibility that the Senate might serve as an effective 
forum for subnational power was thoroughly undermined by the constitutional method of 
appointment. Rather than vesting the appointment of Senators in the provinces or regions 
themselves, the constitution vests it for all practical purposes in the federal cabinet (Hogg 
2007: ' 9.5(d)), with the predictable result that the Senate is comprised of cohorts of hand-
picked allies of the governing party in Commons. In consequence, the Senate has historically 
served neither as a vehicle for the exertion of subnational influence on national power, nor 
even as an effective check on the national legislative power of the Commons. Indeed, when 
Canadians speak of Parliament they generally mean the House of Commons; like the British 
House of Lords on which it was modeled, the Senate is for most purposes an irrelevancy. 
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In Canada, then, national politics effectively does not take place in a bicameral legislature 
in which one house represents national and the other subnational interests; Canadian national 
politics take place in a unicameral parliamentary house in which national political parties are 
the primary organizing institutions (Smith 2010: 92-93). With the one exception of 
guaranteed provincial representation on the Supreme Court of Canada – three of the nine 
justices must be from Quebec – formal constitutional protections for subnational interests 
and autonomy are found primarily not in the blueprint of national institutions, but in the 
constitutional allocation of powers between the national and provincial governments.  
The Canadian Constitution divides the powers of government principally into those that 
are exercised exclusively by Parliament and those that are exercised exclusively by the 
provinces. Under these provisions, the federal government has exclusive power over matters 
such as trade and commerce, unemployment insurance, military affairs, navigation, banking, 
currency, and patents and copyrights. It also has power over marriage and divorce, as well as 
the substantive criminal law. Most importantly, the national government is granted the power 
‘to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada’ (the so-called POGG 
power), a provision originally intended to reserve residual power to the national level (Hogg 
2007: ' 17.1). Under the constitutional principle of paramountcy, validly enacted federal laws 
displace conflicting provincial laws. Exclusively provincial powers include provincial fiscal 
affairs, hospitals, intraprovincial public works, nonrenewable resources, education, the 
administration of justice, and, most notably, property and civil rights. 
Things have turned out to be more complicated. Most importantly, judicial decisions by 
the Privy Council interpreting the constitution eventually reversed the originally 
contemplated balance of power, in two principal ways. First, the provincial power over 
property and civil rights, probably originally intended to do little more than permit Quebec 
to retain its private civil law following confederation with English-speaking, common-law 
provinces, was expanded by decisions of the Privy Council to make it one of the most 
significant powers exercised at any level. Much of what is now widely regarded as public law 
– regulation of the environment, labor, health, social services – has been deemed to fall 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of provinces as the regulation of property (Hogg 2007: ' 
21.2). Second, the national POGG power, probably intended to be of very broad scope, was 
construed narrowly by the Privy Council. For example, the federal POGG power was held 
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inadequate to sustain federal regulation of economically significant industries of nationwide 
reach, relegating their regulation to the provinces, an extremely important power under 
contemporary economic conditions.IV 
Additional complications arise from the fact that many powers have turned out to be 
shared. In the area of immigration, for example, the federal government has power over the 
admission of immigrants, but the provinces exercise authority over settlement and 
integration of immigrants (Banting 2012: 262-263). In the realm of criminal law, although 
the federal government has authority to define crimes, provincial power over the 
administration of justice gives them substantial influence over the course of criminal justice. 
Control of trade and transportation are divided along a hazy line distinguishing 
interprovincial from intraprovincial activity (Hogg 2007: ch. 20). The federal government has 
authority to negotiate treaties, but cannot unilaterally implement them when they deal with 
matters falling within provincial jurisdiction (Bowman 2012). 
National and provincial power are further entangled under the Canadian Constitution by 
the constitutional commitment to ‘equalization,’ a system of intergovernmental income 
redistribution: 
 
‘Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization 
payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably 
comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation (Const. Act, 1982, ' 36(2)).’ 
 
The fiscal capacity of the provinces varies dramatically, and equalization payments by the 
federal government help smooth out inequalities in the ability of each province to provide 
its citizens with the kind of public services available elsewhere in the nation.V In the Canadian 
context, however, equalization addresses another kind of mismatch: the mismatch between 
power and resources. In many issue areas, principal authority is vested in the provinces, yet 
it is the federal government that has greater access to the fiscal resources necessary to 
accomplish programmatic objectives (Simeon 1972: 146-147). Consequently, in many cases 
if nationally significant goals are to be accomplished, subnational power must be yoked to 
national funding, a task requiring intergovernmental cooperation on a broad scale. 
One additional area deserves mention: the extraordinarily complex provisions for 
amending the constitution, a highly contentious issue in Canadian constitutional politics. 
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Under the Constitution Act, 1982, the general amending rule requires that any amendment 
proposed by Parliament be ratified by ‘at least two-thirds of the provinces that have, in the 
aggregate, . . . at least fifty per cent of the population of all the provinces.’ VI This is known 
colloquially as the ‘seven-fifty formula’ because it requires the approval of seven of the ten 
provinces having more than fifty percent of the population. Its significance, however, lies in 
the way it avoids giving any province a veto while at the same time ensuring that all 
amendments enjoy broad regional support. First, any group of seven provinces necessarily 
must include at least one of the four Western provinces and at least one of the four Atlantic 
provinces, all but eliminating the risk of outright regional exploitation. Second, the fifty-
percent population threshold requires either Ontario or Quebec to be among the ratifying 
provinces, guaranteeing support by at least one of the major centers of wealth and 
population. 
Complicating matters, however, is a provision that permits provinces to opt out of 
constitutional amendments enacted by this method: ‘An amendment . . . shall not have effect 
in a province the legislative assembly of which has expressed its dissent thereto by resolution 
supported by a majority its members. . . .’ VII The constitutional amending rules also provide 
that amendments relating to a small number of issues may be enacted only by unanimous 
approval of the provinces, and that an amendment applying to fewer than all provinces must 
be approved by the legislatures of those provinces to which it applies. These rules on their 
face establish the basis for an unusual constitutional regime of asymmetrical application. On 
the other hand, to the extent that non-uniform application of constitutional rules is seen by 
national majority coalitions as something to be avoided – generally the case outside of 
Quebec – the amendment rules create incentives to change the constitution by means other 
than formal amendment, a topic to which we shall return shortly. 
 
2.1.2. Canadian federalism in practice 
As Gerald Baier (2012: 79), among many others, has observed, ‘Canada’s federal system 
features a rather large gap between the jurisdictional map of the written constitution and the 
actual activities of its governments.’ It is therefore essential to describe some of the important 
informal institutions that have arisen on the constitutional landscape. I shall mention three: 
constitutional conventions, responsible government, and executive federalism.  
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Like the British constitution that served to a great extent as its model, the Canadian 
Constitution is found not only in written legal texts but also in conventions of official 
behavior that have, through long practice and the consolidation of widespread public support 
and expectation, come to be regarded as having constitutional status (Hogg 2007: ' 1.10). 
Although the lack of any textual warrant precludes their enforcement by judicial review, 
constitutional principles created by convention are nevertheless observed, often strictly, 
mainly through the force of convention. To give a prominent example, one very important 
constitutional convention institutionalizes the virtual elimination of formally granted British 
royal power. Section 55 of the Canadian Constitution plainly states: 
 
‘Where a Bill passed by the Houses of the Parliament is presented to the Governor General for the Queen’s 
Assent, he shall declare, according to his Discretion, . . . either that he assents thereto in the Queen’s Name, 
or that he withholds the Queen’s Assent, or that he reserves the Bill for the Signification of the Queen’s 
Pleasure.’ 
 
This provision, by its incontrovertible language, gives the Governor General a power to 
veto federal legislation, yet by longstanding convention that power is never exercised. The 
Governor General’s assent to federal legislation is still required for its validity, and such 
consent is routinely given, but it is given on the advice of the Prime Minister and cabinet 
(Hogg 2007: ' 9.5(d)); the giving of royal assent has thus been reduced by convention to a 
ministerial task of ritual signature. 
Other significant conventions apply to the operation of Canada’s constitutional 
federalism, and indeed have contributed significantly to the undermining of the original 
constitutional plan for a strongly centralized state. Among these is the disappearance of the 
federal power of ‘disallowance’ of provincial legislation. Under the Canadian Constitution, 
the Governor General appoints Lieutenant Governors for each province. Much as the 
Governor General is granted the power to veto federal legislation, so the Lieutenant 
Governors are constitutionally granted the authority to disallow provincial legislation. Two 
conventions have made these provisions virtually dead letters. First, the Governor General 
does not exercise actual discretion in the appointment of Lieutenant Governors; he or she 
makes these appointments on the advice of the Prime Minister and cabinet, thereby 
effectively transferring to the federal government the power to disallow provincial legislation 
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(Hogg 2007: '' 5.3(f), 9.3). Another convention, however, restrains the federal government 
from exercising this authority; it was last exercised in 1943, and any attempt to use it now 
would likely precipitate what would surely qualify as a constitutional crisis. The result, of 
course, has been to grant to the provinces a kind of genuine autonomy not contemplated by 
the original constitutional design. 
Yet another constitutional convention relating to the operation of federalism is the 
appointment by Prime Ministers of a cabinet that includes representatives of all the major 
Canadian regions – Ontario, Quebec, the West, and the Atlantic provinces. This convention 
was initiated by Canada’s leading founder and first Prime Minister, John Macdonald, as a way 
to ensure high-level federal attention to sectional interests when other institutions of the 
newly-created constitution seemed ill-suited to serve this function (Smith 2010: 43). 
By far the most important and wide-ranging constitutional convention, however, is the 
convention establishing ‘responsible government.’ Responsible government refers to the 
British or ‘Westminster’ system of parliamentary government, which Canadians have 
adopted. In that system, executive power is exercised not by its formal holder, the Queen, 
but by the Prime Minister, who is selected by the majority party or party coalition in 
Parliament, and his or her cabinet. The government is ‘responsible’ in the sense that the 
executive is answerable to, and must have the continuing support of, the Parliament. The 
system of responsible government was similarly adopted in each of the Canadian provinces, 
where the head of the dominant legislative party and first minister is known as the Premier. 
Finally, there is the practice of ‘executive federalism,’ a process of policy making in which 
major decisions about national policy are made not in the deliberations of a broadly 
representative national legislature – the paradigmatic method in modern democratic states – 
but through intergovernmental negotiations among the chief executives of the national and 
subnational governments.VIII Executive federalism is not so much a constitutional 
convention as an institutional consequence of an unusual set of interactions among Canadian 
constitutional structures, both formal and conventional. It is, in Ronald Watts’s (1989: 1) apt 
description, ‘a logical dynamic resulting from the marriage of federal and parliamentary 
institutions.’ 
Three principal conditions have underwritten the rise of executive federalism in Canada. 
First, Canada is not merely a federal state, but one in which the provinces exercise a very 
substantial degree of independent power, and the ability of the federal government to 
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accomplish its objectives thus often depends upon provincial cooperation. Moreover, the 
expansion of the scope of governmental intervention in daily life over the course of the 
twentieth century, in Canada as elsewhere in the West, has only increased the number of 
occasions on which programmatic cooperation at both levels of government is required to 
achieve widely desired public objectives (Simeon 1972: 3-4). 
Second, Canadian national and provincial governments all employ Westminster-style 
parliamentary institutions. The Westminster form of government by design greatly 
concentrates power in the hands of the prime minister and cabinet (Watts 1989: 1). It does 
so by effacing any separation of legislative and executive power and placing control over 
both branches in the hands of the same individual – the prime minister – who simultaneously 
heads the executive branch and the majority party in parliament. As a result, the Canadian 
Prime Minister and provincial Premiers can ‘deliver’ their governments in a way that U.S. 
presidents and governors cannot (Savoie 2009: 125);IX that is, they can with considerable 
confidence make representations and commitments to others about what their governments 
will do because they exercise a very strong degree of control over what their governments 
will do – as the Supreme Court of Canada has observed, ‘the reality of Canadian governance 
[is] that, except in certain rare cases, the executive frequently and de facto controls the 
legislature.’X American chief executives, in contrast, must contend with independent and 
sometimes cantankerous legislatures whose cooperation they have no power to direct. 
Finally, because the number of Canadian jurisdictions is small – one national government, 
ten provincial governments, and three territorial governments – the agreement of only 
fourteen individuals, a very manageable number, is required effectively to make virtually any 
kind of national policy. Taken together, these conditions have created a system in which ‘the 
big issues of public policy have been settled in an elaborate system of intergovernmental 
accommodations presided over by the first ministers’ (Carty and Wolinetz 2004: 66).  
 
2.2. Tools and methods of subnational influence 
Having reviewed the main structures and institutions of Canadian federalism, we are now 
in a position to examine the concrete methods by which subnational units in Canada 
influence national policy and get what they want from the national government. In brief, due 
to the institutionalization of executive federalism, by far the most common method to which 
Canadian provinces resort to get their way is negotiation. So dominant is negotiation as a 
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mode of intergovernmental relations that it establishes a baseline against which all other 
modes are conventionally perceived in most of Canada as derogations. I describe two of 
these below: unilateral action and the making of threats, including the threat of secession. 
The subsection concludes with a brief examination of modes of subnational influence that 
are used widely in other federal states, but play a much smaller role in Canada: exploitation 
of political party channels, mobilization of popular political opinion, and constitutional 
litigation. 
 
2.2.1. Negotiation and deal-making 
The emergence of executive federalism in Canada has produced a system in which major 
national policy decisions are made primarily through ‘a process of direct negotiation between 
the executives of different governments’ – what Richard Simeon (1972: 5) has aptly termed 
‘provincial diplomacy.’ In this system, characterized by ‘extensive consultation and 
negotiation on an issue-by-issue basis’ (Bakvis and Tanguay 2008: 130), Canadian provinces 
attempt to influence the actions of the national government through bargaining. 
Comprehensive multilateral negotiations. In its purest form, the intergovernmental bargaining 
associated with executive federalism occurs by way of collective negotiation among all 
fourteen heads of government. These types of proceedings may occur within the formal 
confines of the institutionalized and routinized First Ministers Conference (FMC); on a more 
ad hoc basis in the form of First Ministers Meetings called to deal with occasional crises; or, 
from time to time, in quiet, behind-the-scenes consultations out of the public eye (Papillon 
and Simeon 2004). Not all such negotiations involve the prime minister and premiers directly; 
many Canadian intergovernmental negotiations are handled by ministers or bureaucrats with 
specific portfolios acting as representatives of their governments.XI Such meetings at all levels 
have become so commonplace, and so much an accepted aspect of the permanent 
architecture of Canadian intergovernmental relations, that an elaborate administrative 
apparatus has evolved to support them, including the Canadian Intergovernmental 
Secretariat, the Intergovernmental Conference, and a wide variety of intergovernmental 
affairs agencies, especially at the provincial level (Pollard 1986). Together, these institutions 
are capable of supporting negotiations of great breadth and complexity on subjects of 
considerable political controversy, producing at their best ‘a broad multilateral agreement, 
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including common principles and goals and a broad funding structure’ (Simeon and Nugent 
2012: 65). 
One of the most successful comprehensive intergovernmental negotiations is the 
Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), a deal struck between the federal and provincial 
governments in 1994.XII AIT grew out of longstanding problems rooted in the awkward 
constitutional division between the federal and provincial governments of regulatory 
authority over trade and commerce. Under the Canadian Constitution, the federal 
government is granted exclusive authority over ‘The Regulation of Trade and Commerce,’ 
but decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada narrowed its scope 
considerably, simultaneously expanding the authority over trade of provinces under the 
heading of power to regulate property.XIII This division of authority then encouraged the 
provinces to adopt protectionist policies that limited the mobility of goods and labor, 
impairing national economic performance (MacDonald Commission 1985: Vol. 3, 101-135). 
As concerns grew that these barriers to free internal trade were harming not only Canada’s 
domestic prosperity but its ability to compete in an increasingly global economy, intense 
negotiations were initiated to bypass constitutional limitations and create by mutual 
agreement a system of unimpeded internal trade (Doern and MacDonald 1999). The final 
product, the AIT, prohibits the erection of internal trade barriers, guarantees non-
discrimination in economic opportunities on the basis of origin or residency, and commits 
all governments to the liberalization of trade. 
Another important example of multilateral negotiation is the Social Union Framework 
Agreement (SUFA). Reached in 1999, the SUFA agreement established a collaborative 
framework among the federal government and all of the provinces except Quebec – which 
did not in the end join the agreement – to develop and structure social programs on a basis 
of equality, respect for human rights, and geographical uniformity of access to social 
programs and services, and committed the governments to the elimination of barriers to 
mobility arising from residency requirements for social programs, and various other 
measures.XIV 
Bilateral negotiations. The opportunities for Canadian provinces to influence national policy 
by way of negotiation are not limited to comprehensive, nationwide initiatives. As Bakvis 
and Brown (2010: 485) observe, Canadian intergovernmental relations ‘are not so much a 
matrix as a series of dyadic relations: of the executives of the federal government and the 
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executives of the provinces and territories, together, one-by-one, or, occasionally, in regional 
groups.’ On account of this flexibility, provinces can, and frequently have, successfully 
influenced national policy in their favor through bilateral negotiations with the federal 
government.  
Sometimes bilateral negotiations can take place on a single issue of interest primarily to 
one or a few provinces. One well-known example is the negotiation between Ottawa and the 
provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia that led to what are known as 
the Atlantic Accords (Feehan 2009). Under the Canadian Constitution, provinces in general 
have exclusive authority over non-renewable natural resources located within their borders. 
Jurisdiction over offshore resources, however, had been less clear. When, in the 1970s, oil 
prices rose dramatically, settling ownership of oil deposits off the coasts of Newfoundland, 
Labrador, and Nova Scotia suddenly became a pressing issue. In 1984, the Supreme Court 
of Canada ruled that ownership of offshore oil reserves lay with the federal government. 
Rather than concluding the issue, however, the judicial ruling became the point of departure 
for lengthy intergovernmental negotiations in which the provinces took the position that the 
judicial ruling deprived them of something that was theirs, and for which they ought to be 
compensated (Feehan 2009: 176-177). 
This was enough to bring the federal government to the table, and under the eventual 
agreements, an Offshore Petroleum Board was established as a joint federal-provincial 
agency to manage development of the oil resources. Provincial taxation was permitted as 
though the resources were provincially owned, so that the provinces were able to raise 
revenue from both royalties and corporate taxation. At the same time, the federal 
equalization formula was adjusted in favor of the two provinces. Normally, the receipt by a 
province of unanticipated revenue would result in an offset, or ‘clawback,’ of equalization 
payments by the federal government. Newfoundland and Labrador, and later Nova Scotia, 
received reprieves from operation of the clawback principle for periods of twelve and ten 
years, respectively (Feehan 2009: 177-183). Subsequently, complaints by other provinces, 
loud politicking by Newfoundland and Labrador, and changes in federal administrations, led 
to repeated renegotiations of the deal in the ensuing years. 
Bilateral intergovernmental deal-making does not always occur in the context of issues 
of concern solely to specific provinces; it also can be embedded in more comprehensive 
negotiations among all the governments over programs intended to have nationwide reach. 
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In particular, in order to reach agreements of comprehensive scope, the federal government 
will sometimes cut side deals with individual provinces to secure their agreement to the 
broader programmatic framework. For example, in order to induce agreement to the AIT by 
British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec, and Newfoundland, the federal government agreed 
during negotiations to provisions creating narrow (and frankly protectionist) exclusions for 
British Columbia and Alberta’s export of logs, Quebec’s export approval measures relating 
to unprocessed fish, and Newfoundland’s requirement for in-province fish processing.XV 
Another circumstance in which bilateral deals are struck is the negotiation of provincial 
authority to opt out entirely from a deal reached between the federal government and the 
other provinces. For example, negotiations over the Canada Pension Plan in the 1960s 
resulted in the inclusion at the insistence of Quebec of a provision allowing provinces to opt 
out and then recover lost funding on their own through an abatement of the federal income 
tax in the province exercising the option. This arrangement – not the first of its kind – 
authorized Quebec to ‘take full responsibility for programs that in the rest of the country 
were managed jointly by the federal and provincial governments or even by Ottawa alone’ 
(McRoberts 1997: 41). While opt-out provisions often are available to any province, they are 
frequently included because only one or two provinces express an interest in them. 
Constitutional negotiations. The combination in Canada of executive federalism and a 
constitutional amending formula that does not require popular participation creates 
conditions in which Canadian intergovernmental negotiations can extend not merely to 
policy within the constitutional framework, but to the terms of the basic constitutional 
framework itself. During the mid-twentieth century, this process was both quiet and routine:  
 
‘Provincial consent was not obtained through high-profile conferences with all the players at the table and 
a wide range of constitutional issues on the block. On the contrary, the federal government sought each 
province’s consent in turn for each amendment, and, with few exceptions, this consent was quietly given 
by provincial executives agreeing in correspondence, not by the provincial legislatures (Russell 1992: 65).’ 
 
Even when agreement to formal constitutional amendments has been impossible to 
obtain, intergovernmental negotiation has nevertheless from time to time produced their 
functional equivalent: ‘[f]ederal-provincial relations are often attempts to get around 
constitutional strictures, and in doing so they may result in de facto constitutional change’ 
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(Simeon 1972: 41). An example is negotiated efforts to circumvent the constitutional 
allocation of powers through the practice of ‘inter-delegation.’ The Canadian Constitution, 
as indicated earlier, allocates power between the federal and provincial governments in ways 
that are sometimes seen at both levels of government as impediments to the enactment of 
desired programs. Initially, the various governments sometimes attempted to get around this 
problem by agreeing essentially to swap powers as needed through a process of direct mutual 
delegation. When this plan was judicially invalidated, a different arrangement was worked 
out whereby the federal government delegated federal programmatic authority to provincial 
administrative agencies (Hogg 2007: '' 14.3(a), (b)), effectuating de facto a negotiated 
alteration of the constitutional allocation of power. 
At the limit, provincial initiatives, especially at the insistence of Quebec, have precipitated 
rounds of metaconstitutional politics, in which the prime minister and premiers have agreed 
to rewrite the Canadian Constitution in comprehensive and far-reaching ways. In 1987, an 
agreement – the Meech Lake Accord – was concluded in principle. That agreement would, 
among other things, have recognized Quebec as a ‘distinct society,’ given it a greater and 
asymmetrical role in immigration, provided each province with the power to veto 
constitutional amendments, and placed limits on the federal spending power (Hogg 2007: ' 
4.1(c)). After an agreement had been reached but before it could be implemented, 
unexpected changes in political leadership in New Brunswick and Manitoba eliminated the 
unanimity necessary to formalize the agreed constitutional amendments (Russell 1992: 141-
142). A similar process of metaconstitutional negotiation was completed in 1992, this time 
with the sustained unanimous support of provincial leaders, resulting in the Charlottetown 
Accord. In an unusual move, however, the Accord provided for popular participation in the 
form of a national referendum, sending to a rare, narrow defeat the outcome of 
intergovernmental constitutional negotiations (Lusztig 1994). 
Having reviewed in some depth the baseline method by which Canadian subnational 
units influence national political affairs, I turn to some other tools that Canadian provinces 
sometimes deploy to achieve their objectives. 
 
2.2.2. Ignoring the federal government 
Notwithstanding the dominant norm of mutual consultation and negotiation, Canadian 
provinces sometimes get their way simply by ignoring the federal government altogether and 
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pursuing provincial goals directly, through the direct and unmediated exercise of provincial 
power. This is to some extent more possible in Canada than in other federal states on account 
of the large measure of power constitutionally allocated to the provinces. Quebec, for 
example, has an elaborate provincial program of ‘interculturalism’ relating to the settlement 
and integration into French culture of immigrants (Banting 2012). In other settings, the 
provinces have made direct use of their powers to counteract unilateral uses of federal power 
of which they disapprove. For instance, some time after extensive intergovernmental 
negotiations produced a nationwide health insurance program, the federal government for 
financial reasons decided that it could not afford to continue the program at its negotiated 
scope, and unilaterally cut its funding. At that point, the provinces stepped up and raised the 
revenue necessary to continue the program in its original form (Taylor 1989). 
Occasionally, however, provinces act unilaterally not to exercise power in areas of their 
acknowledged competence but as a kind of power entrepreneurialism meant to seize and 
expand their authority. A good example of this is the history of Quebec foreign policy 
adventurism. In 1965, Quebec claimed, on the basis of the Canadian Constitution’s 
requirement of provincial cooperation in treaty implementation, that provinces could have their 
own foreign policies, and it took the first step in this direction by signing an educational 
agreement with France. Federal officials first became alarmed when, in a 1967 visit to 
Montreal, French President Charles De Gaulle during a public appearance spontaneously – 
and to the horror of his advisors – exclaimed ‘Vive le Québec libre!’ Before Quebec could 
make any additional moves in response to De Gaulle’s prodding, federal officials quickly 
‘rejected Québec’s claims for diplomatic independence, on the grounds that national 
sovereignty is indivisible in international law’ (Clarkson 1989). Nevertheless, consistent with 
Canadian norms of consultation and negotiation, they simultaneously invited the provinces 
to take a more active role in formulating foreign policy in areas related to their constitutional 
authority. 
Quebec, however, pushed this principle further than Ottawa could tolerate. In 1968, 
Gabon invited Quebec’s minister of education to an international conference of 
francophone nations, without consulting or notifying Ottawa. Federal officials rebuked both 
Quebec and Gabon, but when the same behavior was repeated, Ottawa severed diplomatic 
relations with Gabon in retaliation (Mahler 1994). Quebec’s entrepreneurialism, however, 
eventually yielded a settlement it found acceptable: foreign policy in some areas was 
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thereafter conducted on a cooperative basis, and the federal government agreed to permit 
Quebec to become directly and officially involved on its own account in some international 
organizations. Given the ways in which the Canadian constitutional system is capable, in 
time, of transmuting practice to constitutionally entrenched convention, a degree of power 
entrepreneurism at the provincial level seems understandable. 
A final way in which provinces act by ignoring the federal government is to exclude it 
from interprovincial negotiations. In 2003, the premiers of the ten provinces and the 
territories formed the Council of the Federation (COF), an organization similar to the more 
established First Ministers Conference, but without the presence of the federal government 
(Simeon and Nugent 2012: 67) . Motivated in part by a growing feeling that recent federal 
administrations were not acting in a sufficiently consultative manner, the premiers organized 
themselves, in their own words, ‘because they believe it is important for provinces and 
territories to play a leadership role in revitalizing the Canadian federation and building a more 
constructive and cooperative federal system.’XVI Thus, the COF coordinates provincial policy 
on matters in which federal involvement is not needed, and attempts to develop consensus 
positions among the provinces to enable them to present a united front in collective 
negotiations with Ottawa. 
 
2.2.3. Threats 
The making of threats is the polar opposite of the Canadian default preference for 
intergovernmental consultation and negotiation, yet provinces have from time to time 
deployed this tool in efforts to get what they want. The most notable kind of threat is of 
course the threat of secession, a tactic deployed by Quebec periodically over the last thirty 
or so years. Although it has never been entirely clear how seriously Quebec’s threats to secede 
ought to be taken, the threat of secession has been sufficient on at least two occasions to 
bring the federal government – and with it, the other Canadian provinces – to the bargaining 
table for metaconstitutional negotiations addressed mainly to accommodating Quebec’s 
grievances in order to keep it within the dominion. After the failure of the Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown Accords, Quebec held an internal referendum on secession in 1995, which 
failed by a narrow margin (Hogg 2007: ' 4.1(c)).XVII Since then, Quebec governments have 
threatened not so much to secede as to hold another referendum on secession. This occurred 
most recently in the Fall of 2012, when the Parti Québécois took control of the Quebec 
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parliament on a platform that included a pledge to hold such a referendum, a threat it did 
not carry out. 
Unlike the United States, where subnational threats to engage in minor acts of defiance 
are often enough to get the attention of the national government, in Canada the availability 
of the secession threat seems to have helped create a context in which public threats of lesser 
disobedience are seen as insufficiently powerful to call attention to provincial grievances, 
especially given the ready availability of private, civil, and often meaningful bilateral 
negotiations with the federal government. As a result, other provinces have occasionally 
hinted at the possibility that they, too, might contemplate secession. Some Newfoundland 
premiers, for example, have found it expedient to invoke the threat of secession. In the 
1970s, Premier Frank Moores raised eyebrows elsewhere in Canada by occasionally using 
slogans such as ‘masters in our own house’ (evoking the Québécois nationalist slogan maîtres 
chez nous) and ‘Vive Terre Neuve Libre’ (Marland 2010: 161). More recently, Premier Danny 
Williams ordered Canadian flags removed from provincial buildings. Williams’s tactics did 
indeed produce results in the form of a renegotiation of the Atlantic Accords. Rhetoric in 
Alberta has also occasionally flirted with threats to secede. 
 
2.2.4. Other tools of subnational influence 
Several other informal tools of influence that often receive heavy usage by subnational 
units in other federal states are invoked either infrequently or not at all by Canadian 
provinces. One such tool that is strikingly unavailable to Canadian provinces is the ability to 
exercise influence at the national level through the medium of political parties.XVIII In many 
federations, subnational officials can call upon fellow partisans in the national legislature to 
press their interests. This is all but impossible in Canada due to the extreme decentralization 
and fluidity of Canadian political parties: although national and provincial parties were more 
integrated in the past, today ‘Canadian parties, and the party systems they constitute, are now 
largely disconnected’ (Carty and Wolinetz 2004: 302-303). As a result, Canadian parties do 
not offer paths of political influence that cross constitutional lines of authority; indeed, the 
centralization of power associated with the Westminster system intensifies the autonomy of 
national and regional or provincial parties because under that system, a minority party in a 
province has no standing to approach the central government, even if it is controlled by the 
same party (Simeon 1972: 31).XIX Some idea of the degree to which Canadian national and 
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provincial parties fail to align can be gleaned from the career of Jean Charest, who after 
service as a cabinet minister in the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney and a career 
as leader of the federal Progressive Conservative Party – the opposition party to Jean 
Chrétien’s federal Liberals during the 1990s – went on to become the leader of Quebec’s 
Liberal Party and Premier of the province. 
In addition, Canadian parties have long adhered to a tradition of forming minority 
governments rather than negotiating their way into majority coalitions (Bakvis and Tanguay 
2008: 130). As a result, a national party with a regional base in one or a few provinces typically 
cannot use the occasion of formation of a national government to extract concessions 
regarding subnational interests as a condition of joining a coalition government. 
Another extraconstitutional tactic of subnational influence that is used very infrequently 
by Canadian provinces is mobilization of popular opinion.XX Although it has been tried 
occasionally, most notably by Newfoundland Premier Danny Williams to generate pressure 
on Ottawa to renegotiate bilateral deals concerning revenue from natural resources, it does 
not seem an especially effective tactic. One reason may be a Canadian political culture that 
stresses respectful consultation over dramatic confrontation, but another may be simply that 
Canadian politics is not highly democratic in the sense of cultivating broad popular 
involvement – the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ (Bakvis and Skogstad 2002: 19). 
Finally, despite the availability of a widely respected constitutional court with a power of 
judicial review and a demonstrated willingness to elaborate the boundaries of constitutional 
powers, Canadian provinces over the last three decades have rarely resorted to litigation to 
get what they want from the federal government. At one time this was a relatively common 
tactic; as Russell (1992: 97) reports, between 1975 and 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada 
decided some eighty constitutional cases dealing with the allocation of power. Judicial rulings 
were subsequently shown, however, to be weak constraints on power because of the ability 
of federal and provincial officials to negotiate quasi-constitutional or even formal 
constitutional changes.XXI Furthermore, ‘[i]n Canada, . . . frequent recourse to the courts is 
sometimes seen as an indicator of breakdown of these more consensual, administrative 
mechanisms’ (Simeon 2000: 148). Consequently, intergovernmental agreements of the kind 
described earlier have largely eclipsed the courts as the institutional vehicle for assigning 
power (Baier 2012: 86-91). 
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3. Conclusions: The Impact of  Constitutional Design on Federal 
Stability 
 
Unlike subnational units in many federal states, Canadian provinces have ready access to 
extremely powerful tools to influence national policy and actions, including negotiated 
alteration of the federal constitution itself. As a result, they do not need to resort to 
improvised weaker tools, as is often the case elsewhere (Gardner 2005: 87-98; Gardner and 
Abad 2011). The availability of such tools makes Canadian provinces potentially extremely 
effective advocates of provincial interests in the arena of national policy making. 
Nevertheless, this provincial effectiveness may come at a price to the extent that it results 
from what might be called the ‘hyperplasticity’ of the Canadian Constitution’s allocations of 
federal and provincial power. 
By hyperplasticity in this context, I mean that the capacity of provinces to elevate policy 
disputes with Ottawa to the level of constitutional disputes – to convert negotiations over 
policy into negotiations over the constitutional allocation of national and provincial powers 
– seems to create an incentive structure in which governments have significant incentives to 
raise the stakes in every negotiation. In this environment, policy disagreements between the 
provincial and federal government carry inherently the potential to serve as an opening for 
constitutional dispute, and the constitution therefore need not be seen by the players as 
establishing a set of binding institutional structures and constraints within which other 
decisions are taken. Instead, governments engaged in conflict may be tempted to view the 
constitution as provisional and subject to renegotiation whenever it seems to offer them a 
losing position. If you are going to lose in a policy dispute conducted according to a particular 
set of rules, why accept the rules if they can be changed mid-negotiation? If the constitution 
allocates a power to the national level and the national government will not exercise that 
power in a way congenial to a province, why should a province hold out for its policy 
preference when it can instead press for a reallocation of the power in question to the 
provincial level? In these circumstances, the practice of intergovernmental relations has a 
distinct tendency to collapse into pure, unconstrained politics.XXII Constitutional flexibility, 
of course, has its benefits; the ability of Canadian governments to negotiate their way past 
constitutional obstacles has ‘on many occasions . . . allowed constitutional rigidities to be 
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circumvented’ (Bakvis and Skogstad 2002: 8). But it may be possible for this fluidity to go 
too far. As Marc-Antoine Adam has observed,  
 
‘what is striking with Canadian federalism is that we try to govern this country without the assistance of a 
legal framework, i.e., the Constitution. … That we should constantly be negotiating is perhaps normal; 
that there should be no permanent agreed-upon rules to govern our negotiations and what we negotiate is 
more troublesome. But this is what a constitution is meant to provide: a set of fundamental rules or a 
framework within which the day-to-day political process can take place. Lack of agreement on day-to-day 
political issues is normal and healthy. Lack of agreement on the fundamental rules is a different matter. In 
fact, one could say that in our federation, because of this lack of agreed-upon fundamental rules, the 
management of what should be day-to-day political issues has a tendency to mutate into quasi-
constitutional negotiations, with the ironical result that Canada, for wanting to avoid its constitution, finds 
itself locked in a state of permanent constitutional debate’ (Adam 2009: 297-298). 
 
Moreover, as Choudhry (2003: 78) notes, the fact that Canadian governments prefer to 
settle their disputes through judicially unenforceable intergovernmental agreements instead 
of through, say, the creation of mutually binding statutory law, suggests an underlying 
preference for remaining at all times completely free and unbound, just as states are in 
international diplomacy. 
* * * * * 
Federal constitutions do not attempt to preserve the state by suppressing conflict. Quite 
to the contrary, federal constitutions begin from the premise that intrasocietal conflict is 
inevitable and neither can nor should be suppressed. Instead, federal constitutions seek to 
preserve the stability of the state by creating a forum in which, if all goes well, conflict can 
emerge predictably and safely – the forum of intergovernmental contestation. In that, the 
Canadian Constitution has succeeded: conflict between the provinces and the central 
government is frequent and open, and the arena of intergovernmental contestation has 
become by far the most important and the most flexible forum within which policy conflicts 
among Canadians are resolved. 
Yet it is by no means clear that the forces aligned in opposition during intergovernmental 
conflict are balanced in a way that achieve a Madisonian equilibrium revolving reliably around 
a politically consensual center of constitutional gravity. The design of the Canadian 
Constitution has encouraged the emergence of negotiation as the dominant mechanism by 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
27 
which intergovernmental contestation is waged. Yet that same design has not been successful 
in containing the scope of such negotiations within the parameters fixed by the constitution. 
If the success of a federal state is measured by the robust endurance of a mutually agreeable 
division of authority among the orders of government, the Canadian Constitution may be 
guilty of purchasing short-term peace at the expense of long-term risk to constitutional 
stability. 
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I INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
II Denning here quotes John R. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, 
and Amending Issues, 1789-1995 (1996), at 92. 
III This distinction is perhaps most clearly manifest in the Supreme Court of Canada’s embrace of the ‘living 
tree’ doctrine of organic constitutional evolution compared to the U.S. Supreme Court’s adoption of originalism 
as the preferred mode of constitutional interpretation. 
IV A.G. Canada v. A.-G. Alta. (Insurance Reference), [1916] 1 A.C. 588; Hogg, 2007: ' 17.4(a). 
V Recently, only two provinces – Ontario and Alberta – have been net resource exporters. All the other 
provinces receive equalization payments from Ottawa. Hogg 2007,' 6.6.  
VI Constitution Act, 1982, ' 38(1)(b). 
VII Constitution Act, 1982, ' 38(3). 
VIII As one commentator has put it, ‘[i]n Canada, intergovernmental relations have become the substitute for 
engagement through Parliament’ (Smith 2010: 93). See also Russell (1992: 81): ‘By the mid 1960s meetings of 
federal and provincial ministers and their expert advisers on virtually all topics became so numerous that they 
were supplanting legislatures as the primary arena of Canadian policy making.’ 
IX Savoie (2009: 115-119) argues that the Canadian Prime Minister has an even stronger hand than most prime 
ministers in Westminster systems on account of a recent consolidation of executive power by the Harper 
Government in the hands of the prime minister at the expense of the cabinet. In his view, Canada’s national 
government is developing into a modern version of monarchical court government in which ‘[a]dvisors, much 
like courtiers of old, have influence, not power’ (130). 
X Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, & 54. 
XI Simeon’s (1972) analogy to international diplomacy has great traction here: just as in the international realm, 
Canadian intergovernmental relations may be carried on by heads of state, or by progressively lower-level 
officials, depending upon the degree of interest and involvement governments wish to convey, consistent with 
diplomatic conventions. 
XII Available at 
https://www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Consolidated-with-14th-Protocol-final-draft.pdf. 
XIII E.g., A.-G. Canada v. A.G. Alta. (Insurance Reference) [1916] 1 A.C. 588; The King v. Eastern Terminal 
Elevator Co. [1925] S.C.R. 434; A.-G. B.C. v. A.-G. Can. (Natural Products Marketing Reference) [1937] 2 
S.C.R. 151. 
XIV A Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadians, available at 
http://www.scics.gc.ca/english/conferences.asp?a’viewdocument&id’638. For contemporaneous analysis and 
critique, see, e.g., Lazar 2000 and Young 1999. 
XV AIT, supra note XII, Annex 1102.3. 
XVI Council of the Federation, http://www.councilofthefederation.ca/aboutcouncil/aboutcouncil.html. 
XVII The vote was 50.6% against separation and 49.4% in favor. 
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XVIII Compare the descriptions of party channels of influence in the United States and Spain in Gardner and 
Abad (2011: 508-509). 
XIX Chhibber and Kollman (2004) attribute this to the strong decentralization of power in the system, i.e., 
because the provinces have such significant responsibility, voters have incentives to vote their policy 
preferences at the provincial level; whereas in more centralized systems they have incentives to vote their 
national preferences in subnational elections. 
XX Such tactics are used effectively elsewhere – in Spain, for example. Gardner and Abad (2011: 509-510). Cf., 
however, Wright (2016: 29), claiming that ‘Public criticism of federal initiatives by the provinces is a staple of 
intergovernmental politics in Canada.’ Wright later goes on to cast doubt on the efficacy of this tactic as a 
means by which provinces might discipline the national government (36-44). 
XXI Swinton (1990: 10-20) describes the court’s decisions as only an early move in what is often a series of 
strategic actions by provincial governments. Ryder (2006: 353) similarly describes ‘a familiar pattern in Canadian 
federalism’ in which an initial victory in court by the central government is followed by the losing province 
being ‘accommodated politically through intergovernmental negotiations.’ Scholars, moreover, seem to agree 
that the Supreme Court has in recent years backed away from an aggressive form of judicial review of structural 
issues, preferring instead to let the political branches work out their disagreements through negotiations (Wright 
2010; Ryder 2006; Brouillet 2006). 
XXII Choudhry (2003: 82) argues that the ‘site for the evolution of the legal framework governing social policy 
has been in politics. The politics of social policy, in other words, has been an arena for constitutional politics.’ 
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Abstract 
 
Constitutional scholarship in Canada since Confederation has been characterized by two 
primary narratives. The dualist narrative, which characterized constitutional scholarship 
between the late-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, focussed on the parallel 
developments of provincial and federal constitutions. The monist narrative, which has 
become the dominant model of interpretation since the mid-twentieth century, focusses on 
the federal constitution as a singular foundation of constitutionalism in Canada. As a result 
of the shift from dualism to monism, provincial constitutions have become largely ignored 
in Canada and subsumed by the “mega-constitutional” politics of the federal constitution. 
This paper examines provincial constitutions to highlight the significant reorientation of 
constitutional scholarship in Canada over the past 150 years, which has become primarily 
focussed on post-Confederation constitutional history and written constitutionalism. 
 
Keywords 
 
Canadian constitution, subnational constitutionalism, narratives, constitutional history, 
federalism  
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The newspaper reports say that two thousand people crowded the bunting-wrapped 
streets of Niagara-on-the-Lake in July 1892 to mark the centennial of the reading of the 
proclamation that established the province of Upper Canada and its system of representative 
government, as outlined in the Constitutional Act of 1791. The Lieutenant Governor of 
Ontario read verbatim the proclamation issued a century earlier by his predecessor John 
Graves Simcoe that called for the election of a Legislative Assembly. The importance of the 
occasion, Ontario Premier Oliver Mowat told the crowd, was that it marked “the first step 
in the political history of the Province” (“Responsible Government” 1892).I It was clear to 
him and to those assembled that the anniversary marked an important milestone in Ontario’s 
constitutional evolution. A century later, however, the event’s bicentennial passed largely 
unnoticed. Instead, the national referendum on the Charlottetown Accord, which proposed 
wide-ranging reforms to the Canadian constitution, crowded newspaper headlines and 
dominated constitutional discussion. Compared to the clamorous noise of constitutional 
reform in those years, the establishment and development of constitutional government in 
Upper Canada and other British North American colonies were barely-heard whispers from 
a very different era.  
The contrast of anniversaries in 1892 and 1992 reveals a deeper change in 
constitutionalism in Canada, which since the mid-twentieth century has become almost 
exclusively focused on the Constitution Act, 1867 and 1982, and written constitutionalism 
more generally. This is nowhere more obvious than in the strange silence surrounding 
provincial constitutions in Canada, which form a great disappearing act in Canadian political 
history. Once regarded as foundational elements of Canadian constitutional law and politics, 
they have become largely ignored and subsumed by the “mega-constitutional” politics of the 
federal constitution (Russell 2004).  
The diminishment of provincial constitutions in Canada is less a reflection of their 
secondary significance than the changing narratives of the constitution in Canada, which 
over time have come to focus almost exclusively on the federal constitution as the singular 
legal architecture of the state in Canada. A number of political scientists who have reflected 
on the paucity of attention to provincial constitutions have concluded that it is largely the 
result of their basis in varied documents and unwritten principles (Cheffins and Tucker 1976; 
Rowe and Collins 2015). What is often missed, however, is that a reorientation in 
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constitutional and legal scholarship over the past one hundred and fifty years has produced 
a constitution that is largely unmoored from the pre-Confederation foundations of its 
development. This article broadly traces this change in key writings of prominent 
constitutional scholars – those who wrote systematically about the historical development 
and legal principles of the constitution in Canada – revealing how the developing historical 
narrative of constitutionalism in Canada, which came to focus almost exclusively on the post-
Confederation period, emphasized written constitutionalism and the federal constitution in 
particular. Provincial constitutional lineages, once central in Canadian constitutional 
scholarship, consequently became largely ignored and subsumed into a singular framework 
anchored in the Constitution Act, 1867. 
As pre-Confederation constitutional history faded from the focus of constitutional 
scholars, so too provincial constitutions. This was not a coincidence. The growing 
concentration on the British North America Act as “the” Canadian constitution placed it as 
the primary focus of constitutional concern. Anything that came before, notably the 
development of political autonomy and constitutional government in British North 
American colonies, largely faded from view. By essentially regarding distinct British North 
American colonies as provinces in waiting and Canada as a nation founded in 1867, they 
reframed the constitutional development of those political societies into intimations of 
Confederation. Provinces are thus less likely to be regarded as constitutional communities in 
their own right, but rather as subsidiary cohorts of the Canadian constitutional order. This is 
often understood through the lens of the “act or pact” debate on the meaning of 
Confederation, but more substantially it is a reflection of the parameters of history in 
understanding constitutional law (Cook 1969). The diminishing presence of provincial 
constitutions in the writings examined here is a symptom of the wider diminishing (and 
almost near disappearance) of the pre-Confederation period from Canadian constitutional 
analysis.II  
The first part of this article lays out the legal foundations of provincial constitutions in 
Canada and compares them to subnational constitutions in other federal jurisdictions. It 
highlights the peculiar position of Canada’s provincial constitutions in this wider framework, 
and questions why Canada’s federal constitutional architecture has developed in a relatively 
unique way. The following sections turn to examine the writing of constitutional history in 
Canada, and traces the place of provincial constitutions and pre-Confederation 
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constitutionalism in key legal works published in Canada. This shows that the narrative of 
constitutional history bears greatly on our understanding of federalism today, though often 
in implicit ways. Much has been written about the development of federalism in Canada, 
especially in the early years of judicial review and post-Charter of Rights reorientations 
(Cairns 1971). It is not the intention of this paper to reengage these debates, but rather to 
add to the discussion an often overlooked element. The development of constitutional 
narratives serves to shape the common sense of what the constitution is and is not, and to 
understand the relative absence of provincial constitutions therefore requires careful 
attention to the historical narration of the constitution in Canada.  
 
1. Subnational Constitutions in Federal States 
 
It is not common to hear about provincial constitutions in Canada today. In fact, 
provincial constitutions are so absent from political discourse and academic scholarship that 
they seem almost non-existent. As Wiseman (1996: 143) notes, “provincial constitutions 
barely dwell in the world of the subconscious. They are apparently too opaque, oblique, and 
inchoate to rouse much interest, let alone passion.” Despite the perennial constitutional 
battles between levels of government that have become a regular feature of Canadian political 
culture, it is rare to hear provincial politicians invoke their province’s constitution in political 
debate. Constitutions are one of the strongest symbols of legitimacy in politics, and yet for 
Canadian provinces, they are not part of the toolbox of political rhetoric. As Baier suggests 
(2012: 191), this may be in part because of the “national unity imperative” that has dominated 
Canadian politics from the mid-twentieth century. 
It is not the case that provinces do not have constitutions, but rather, that their 
constitutions are less readily identifiable than the federal constitution. Of course, as is the 
case in the British constitutional system inherited in Canada, many of the most important 
and practical aspects of the constitution are unwritten conventions. Unlike the Constitution 
Act, 1867 and 1982, which might be readily pointed to as Canada’s constitution (the renaming 
of the British North America Act to the Constitution Act in 1982 certainly removed room for 
ambiguity in this regard), most provinces do not have clear constitutional documents. British 
Columbia, which has had a Constitution Act since it entered Confederation in 1871, is the 
exception here, and as Campbell Sharman has argued, it “provides a good example of the 
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scope and importance of provincial constitutional documents quite independent of the BNA 
Act” (1983: 88). There have been more recent calls in Quebec to create a written provincial 
constitution, but most provinces have not expressed interest in enshrining formal written 
constitutional documents (McHugh 1999/2000; Turp 2013; Richez 2016). 
In this regard, Canada is rather unusual compared to other federal states around the 
world. Most other subnational jurisdictions have some form of a constitution that provides 
a clear legal and political apparatus (Tarr, Williams, and Marko 2004). American and German 
states and Swiss cantons, among the world’s oldest federal jurisdictions, have formal 
constitutions. Australian states, perhaps the most analogous jurisdictions to Canadian 
provinces, each have a written constitution, many of which have been subject to formal 
amendment. It is clearly established that Australian states entered the Commonwealth of 
Australia as distinct constitutional jurisdictions maintaining their separate constitutions and 
constitutional lineages. Section 106 of the Australian constitution recognizes “The 
Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth shall, subject to this Constitution, continue 
as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission of the State.” The 
explicit recognition of the continuation of state constitutions is vital to understanding 
Australian federalism, and constitutional scholars there have noted that “the colonies were 
deliberately called ‘States’ and not merely ‘provinces’ to indicate their status as constituent 
self-governing political communities” (Aroney, Gerangelos, Murray, and Stellios 2015: 608). 
While state constitutions have not been popularly ratified, they nevertheless form an 
important element of the constitutional architecture of modern Australia.III  
 
2. Pre-Confederation Constitutional Development in British North 
America 
 
Provincial constitutions in Canada are varied and are less visible in part because they are 
based on a history of gradual development, which is anchored in a period before the 
province’s entry into Confederation, with the exception of Alberta and Saskatchewan, which 
were jurisdictions created by the Canadian government after Confederation. It is critical to 
note that the constitutional narratives examined here are settler expressions of legal and 
political order, which rarely account for indigenous practices and norms of governance. The 
focus on settler constitutionalism is, as Borrows (2010) argues, only a partial understanding 
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of constitutionalism in Canada. The development of European constitutional cultures in 
British North America was divided among different colonies that, despite shifting 
boundaries, eventually became Canadian provinces. In each of these cases, a myriad of 
statutes, conventions, royal instructions, and orders in council may be cited as elements of 
provincial constitutions. Most important among these is the principle of responsible 
government, which remains the foundation of parliamentary democracy in Canadian 
provinces but which is not spelled out in any particular constitutional document. 
The disappearance of provincial constitutions is directly connected to the diminishing 
place of pre-Confederation history in modern legal scholarship, a process that began 
following the turn of the twentieth century. Baker (1985: 287) has illustrated how Upper 
Canadian legal culture quite literally dissipated in legal studies as a result of the disbursal of 
law libraries, creating a “discontinuity in the organic development of Canadian legal culture.” 
As many of the sources that formed the basis of a distinct local legal culture vanished, so too 
did the historical narrative on which it was largely based. Though later constitutional scholars 
would seek to uncover the roots of an autochthonous Canadian constitution – one that 
developed as a consequence of growing autonomy and expressions local political sovereignty 
– by focussing on the period after Confederation, they in fact helped to deracinate Canadian 
constitutionalism, pulling it away from the roots that had germinated from the eighteenth 
century.IV The practical consequence of this, as this essay examines, is that provincial 
constitutions are not typically part of considerations of Canadian constitutional law and 
history.  
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw the remarkable transnational 
spread of constitutions and constitutional innovation in the Americas and Europe, or what 
Linda Colley (2014: 263) has called a “contagion of constitutions.” Societies in British North 
America were certainly not impervious to this.V It was during this pivotal period that the 
foundations of modern Canadian constitutionalism developed, with the shaping of local 
constitutions occupying considerable space in political debate and public sphere deliberation 
(McNairn 2000). This pattern was echoed in pre-Confederation colonies that adapted 
cardinal elements of the “British constitution” – notably representative institutions and 
responsible government – to their North American societies (Buckner 1985). Throughout 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, commentators pointed to pre-
Confederation constitutions as the local foundations of self-government and political 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
38 
autonomy (Ajzenstat 1990). For example, on the centenary of the Constitution Act, 1791, 
Toronto politician Oliver Aiken Howland (1891) described it as the watershed in the 
development of self-government in Canada.  
Understanding provincial constitutions therefore requires understanding the deeper 
historical lineages from which they developed.VI In the case of Nova Scotia, the 1749 
Instructions to Edward Cornwallis, the colony’s first British governor, established a 
legislative and judicial framework that are considered foundations of the province’s 
constitution (Beck 1957: 143). By contrast, the Constitutional Act, 1791, may be considered 
a statutory foundation of Ontario’s constitution. For provinces that joined after the initial 
union of 1867, specific statutes may form part of the province’s constitution. The Manitoba 
Act, 1870 or the Alberta and Saskatchewan Acts of 1905 are examples where a statute may 
be recognized as the constitutional foundation of the province. Beyond these individual 
constitutional developments, the Constitution Act, 1867 recognizes “provincial 
constitutions” in Part V, which outlines the provinces’ legislative, judicial, and vice-regal 
composition. The varying and uncodified nature of these constitutions means that, as 
Wiseman (1996: 156-159) discovered, even provinces themselves seem to struggle with 
defining precise parameters of their constitution. 
The largely uncodified nature of provincial constitutions has meant that they are almost 
perceived not to exist. Yet, with the exception of changes to the office of the Lieutenant 
Governor, provinces have wide control over their constitutions. As a result, changes to 
provincial constitutions are relatively uncomplicated, and tend to elicit less sustained notice 
as a result. Most notably, the lack of entrenched constitutions has allowed several provinces 
to abolish their second legislative chambers with relative ease, especially compared to the 
recurrent frustrations of Senate reform at the federal level.VII There has been little effort in 
Canada’s provinces to entrench statutory provisions as a way of formalizing the constitution, 
or implementing clearer regulations for amending provincial constitutions. This could mean, 
for example, requiring a “super majority” of legislators or a public referendum to approve 
changes to fundamental aspects of the constitution, such as the formation of the legislature 
or the electoral system. The absence of such an entrenchment, Tarr (2012: 190) argues, “may 
suggest that provincial constitutions are viewed as different in dignity from the federal 
constitution. They are more akin to ordinary statutes than to fundamental law.” The laws 
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and conventions that form provincial constitutions are therefore less likely to be described 
as such, though this has not always been the case. 
 
3. Constitutional Dualism in Early Post-Confederation Scholarship 
 
From the initial legislative debates on the subject of Confederation, there were concerns 
that a new written federal constitution would overshadow provincial constitutions. 
Christopher Dunkin commented on the “absence of a feature from the scheme – the non-
provision of anything like provincial constitutions,” adding that as a result “there may be no 
two of our six or more local constitutions framed on the same model” (Canada 1865: 501). 
Antoine-Aimé Dorion shared Dunkin’s concern about the vagueness of local constitutions, 
noting that they were essential aspects of the federation plan, and should be “laid at the same 
time before the House” (Canada 1865: 267). Others like Dorion who opposed the federation 
scheme believed that the ambiguity of local constitutions would exacerbate the dominance 
and status of the federal powers. Leonidas Burwell, for example, argued that provinces 
should have separate written constitutions that could be regulated by judicial review (Canada 
1865: 446). Similarly, in Nova Scotia, opponents of Confederation like Thomas Coffin 
worried that the plan was “one calculated to sweep away our constitution” (Nova Scotia 
1865: 292). In deliberating on the plans for a federal union, the desire to maintain and even 
formalize local constitutions was thus an important element, especially for those who worried 
about the centralizing effects of Confederation.  
When the British North America Act came into effect in 1867, its historical development 
and future prospects quickly became popular topics for legal scholars and public writers alike, 
generating sustained public interest in a way that would not be seen again until the major 
constitutional reforms of the late twentieth century. Even if its contents were rhetorically 
dull and uninspiring, the British North America Act provided a document that could be 
pointed to as the basis of Canada’s constitution. Though some were initially reluctant to 
recognize a “written” constitution for a British society that typically venerated the mythos of 
an “unwritten” constitution, it was impossible to escape the fact that within a few short years 
of its enactment, the British North America Act was a central feature of constitutional 
politics and adjudication. 
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Compared to the new federal constitution, provincial constitutions seemed much more 
ambiguous. The concern that Christopher Dunkin expressed about the vagueness of local 
constitutions and their inherent dissimilarities led to attempts to clarify provincial 
constitutions so that they could be examined and understood alongside the federal 
constitution. Shortly after Confederation, Liberal Opposition Leader Alexander Mackenzie 
rose in the House of Commons in Ottawa to ask that some order be given to the muddled 
morass of provincial constitutions in Canada. His motion asked for all documents pertaining 
to the pre-Confederation British North American colonies, including imperial despatches, 
Orders in Council, royal instructions, statutes, and charters, be organized together in a readily 
accessible volume. Some of these documents, he argued “conferred certain political rights, 
which will not be found in the particular charter respecting that Province” (Canada 1882: 
167). Prime Minister John A. Macdonald, who was certainly no proponent of provincial 
rights, expressed surprise that such a compendium did not already exist, and agreed that 
various aspects of provincial constitutions should be gathered up and catalogued together. 
The House decided to have the Library Committee look into the “important” matter and 
assemble a more definitive volume of provincial constitutions in Canada. 
The motion would not make much of a difference, as it turned out. Six years later, 
constitutional scholar John George Bourinot (Canada 1888: 232) complained to the same 
parliamentary committee that “all the organic laws and documents establishing changes in 
the constitutions of those countries are only found scattered in a large number of volumes 
to be consulted at much inconvenience by the parliamentarian, publicist and historical 
student.”VIII The particular difficulty here was that the federal and provincial constitutions 
seemed to follow two different timelines, with the provinces that pre-existed the federal 
Canadian state claiming a much longer lineage of constitutional history than the new federal 
state. As a result, a quandary of post-Confederation constitutional scholarship was the 
question of what happened to the constitutions of the separate British colonies that joined 
Confederation. Did they continue to form independent constitutions of these provinces, or 
were they superseded by the Canadian constitution? The practical effect of this question was 
largely inconsequential; the legislative institutions of these provinces continued to exist after 
Confederation unaffected by the British North America Act, which in any case guaranteed 
provinces the ability to amend their local legislative institutions. Nevertheless, the issue of 
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provincial constitutions had important symbolic value for constitutional writers who sought 
to trace unique constitutional lineages of provinces beyond the British North America Act.  
Two important features distinguished the first generation of post-Confederation 
constitutional scholarship. First, most of the authors who popularized constitutional 
scholarship were born and raised in the colonies that formed British North America before 
Confederation, and they wrote at a time when the meaning of Canada as a nationality and as 
a constitutionally distinct entity was uncertain and thought to be in a continuing state of 
transition. The constitutional nationalism that would come to define scholarship in the later 
twentieth century was largely absent in this period.IX Second, the prevailing legal logic of the 
time informed constitutional scholarship, especially the emphasis on legal liberalism and the 
focus on separate and autonomous jurisdictions.X Federalism thus formed a central place in 
late-nineteenth century constitutional scholarship, especially the unfolding understanding of 
autonomous federalism, based on the separate and independent spheres of provincial and 
federal levels of government. What tends to be lost to the more pronounced political 
controversies about the nature of federalism in those years is attention to the distinct 
transformation of constitutional narratives. Based on the compact theory of Confederation, 
the “provincial rights” movement, as Vipond (1991: 10) points out, germinated chiefly from 
a concern “to show how a federal constitution could be fit squarely and comfortably into a 
larger, pre-existing, and deeply rooted cultural system” and to ensure that the federal 
constitution “reconciled with the constitutive symbols that anchored their self-identity.”XI 
The provincial rights movement was, from this perspective, less about “decentralizing” the 
federal constitution than it was about maintaining commitments to the existing constitutional 
architecture that defined the evolution of political life in the province.  
The most prominent works of constitutional scholarship published in Canada in the 
decades following Confederation unambiguously argued that pre-Confederation 
constitutions continued to operate in Canada as the bases of provincial constitutions. 
Bourinot was the most widely recognized authority on constitutional law and history in late-
nineteenth century Canada (Banks 2001). In addition to his work as a parliamentary clerk, he 
published dozens of books, pamphlets, and articles on Canadian constitutionalism and 
political history. In his Federal Government in Canada, based on a series of public lectures he 
delivered in Toronto, he traced the independent constitutional lineages of the provinces most 
vividly. Examining the constitutional acts of the province of Canada and the collected 
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statutes and documents pertaining to the other pre-Confederation provinces, he rejected the 
idea that the provinces were created anew at Confederation. He wrote (1889: 124-126), “the 
provinces never intended to renounce their distinct and separate existences as provinces, 
when they became part of the confederation… The constitutions of the four provinces, 
which composed the dominion in 1867, are the same in principle and details.” He added that 
this extended to provinces that subsequently joined Confederation, so that “local or 
provincial constitutions are now practically on an equality, so far as the executive, legislative 
and all essential powers of self-government are concerned.”XII As much as Bourinot sought 
to illustrate the development of a new Canadian constitution in much of his writings, he 
stressed that it should not be seen to signify the extinction of provincial constitutions. 
Importantly, he regarded the federal and provincial constitutions as “equal,” and his narrative 
of constitutionalism in Canada reflected the duality of constitutions at the federal and 
provincial levels. It was clear to him that understanding the constitution in Canada required 
examination of provincial constitutions.  
Bourinot’s framing of provincial constitutions related directly to his emphasis on the pre-
Confederation constitutional history of Canada. In his widely circulated book How Canada is 
Governed, which was aimed at a general readership and went through twelve editions, Bourinot 
emphasized pre-Confederation constitutional development as the foundation for 
understanding contemporary constitutionalism. The fundamental political freedoms and 
constitutional government enjoyed in modern Canada, he wrote, could only be discovered 
“as we look back of the century that has passed between the Treaty of Paris, which ceded 
Canada to England in 1763, and the Quebec convention of 1864” (1895: 33). Similarly, a 
chapter on provincial constitutions in his Manual of the Constitutional History of Canada (1888: 
90-102) traced the development of legislative institutions in separate colonies in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These were not matters of purely historical interest, but 
were central to understanding contemporary constitutionalism in Canada, especially the civil 
rights that were central elements of provincial jurisdiction. 
Bourinot was not alone in emphasizing the pre-Confederation development of provincial 
constitutions. The nature of provinces’ constitutions was also a central concern for William 
Henry Pope Clement, who published his influential Law of the Canadian Constitution in 1892. 
Clement was a Toronto lawyer who later became a judge in the Yukon and on the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia. The first chapter of the book traced the history of pre-
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Confederation constitutions, dating back to the creation of the Nova Scotia Assembly in 
1758, because, he explained, “the slate was not cleaned” by Confederation (25). He expanded 
this point further in the following chapter, titled “What Became of Pre-Confederation 
Constitutions?” Its purpose, he averred, was “to ascertain whether, under the B.N.A. Act, 
the provincial constitutions continue; for if so, then the same connection between the 
legislature and the executive, which existed before confederation, must still continue with 
respect to subjects of provincial cognizance” (46). It was clear to him that provincial 
constitutions that antedated the British North America Act were not “wiped out” by that 
Act and continued to operate in Canada. A strong defender of classical federalism, Clement 
emphasized the importance of recognizing the separate constitutional lineages and 
frameworks of provincial and federal governments in Canada.  
Other constitutional authorities shared a similar emphasis on constitutional duality in 
Canada by stressing the separate historical development of provincial constitutions. This is 
especially evident in the writing of Toronto lawyer Dennis Ambrose O’Sullivan, whose 
emphasis on the separate and distinct nature of provincial constitutions became more 
pronounced over time. His popular Manual of Government was published in 1879 with the 
instructive subtitle The Principles and Institutions of Our Federal and Provincial Constitutions. In the 
revised and expanded reissue of the book in 1887 under the main title Government in Canada, 
O’Sullivan extended his chapter on provincial constitutions and stressed the continuity of 
the pre-Confederation constitutions of former colonies. The constitutions and Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick, which were both based originally on royal instructions, were 
“unaffected by the [British North America] Act and continued as they were before 1867” 
(128). Ultimately, he claimed, constitutional jurisprudence had given credence to the 
provincial perspective that they had not voided their own constitutions by joining 
Confederation and that “the old Constitutional Acts were not repealed” (136). His emphasis 
was clear in the updated preface, in which he voiced his concerns that the federation was 
becoming “something different from what the framers of it intended.” The federal 
government’s veto power was an “accident of the Canadian federation,” according to 
O’Sullivan (1887 vi), stressing the absolute sovereignty of provinces within their legislative 
jurisdictions.  
The importance of provincial constitutions was perhaps most evident in Quebec, where 
the development of a constitutional culture that ensured religious, linguistic, and legal 
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protections had long been germinating. Not surprisingly then, one of the most explicit calls 
for the recognition of pre-Confederation provincial constitutions in the late nineteenth 
century came from Thomas-Jean-Jacques Loranger, a Quebec judge who wrote extensively 
on legal matters. His Letters Upon the Federal Constitution Known as the British North America Act, 
1867 was published in English in 1884 after being originally published in French. 
Throughout the pamphlet, Loranger avoided referring to the British North America Act as 
the constitution, instead using the term “Federal Union Act.” The provinces, he argued, 
continued to be governed by their pre-Confederation constitutions, particularly the 
endowment of parliamentary authority on provincial legislatures.  
For Loranger, therefore, the Constitutional Act of 1791 marked the beginning of 
provincial constitutional existence in Quebec and Ontario because it provided them with 
parliamentary institutions. This, he added emphatically, was not repealed by the 1867 Act 
(1884: 14). Pointing to recent court appeals, he concluded that the “principle, that the 
provinces retained their old powers when they entered confederation and have continued to 
be governed by their former constitutions, was judicially consecrated” (41). The importance 
of this matter was clear in his pamphlet, as he feared that the attempt to deny the enduring 
existence of provincial constitutions threatened the “French race” in Quebec. Inhabitants of 
the provinces, he wrote, “have a common interest in opposing the excessive centralization 
of federal power, the lowering of their legislatures, and the gradual disappearance of their 
constitutions” (vi). For Loranger, the need to stress the fact that provinces maintained unique 
“constitutions” was an essential element of his forceful defence of provincial rights. 
 
4. Monist Counter-Narratives 
 
The sense of a creeping centralization of constitutionalism that prompted Loranger’s 
pamphlet was not without foundation. A number of writers in the decades following 
Confederation put forward an argument that the British North America Act marked a 
complete break from the past. Loranger’s worry about the “lowering” of provincial 
legislatures, for example, was illustrated in a book written by Fennings Taylor (1879), the 
Deputy Clerk of the Senate, which argued that provincial “legislatures” were subordinate 
bodies to the Parliament of Canada, which as a “parliament,” had inherent rights and 
privileges not accorded to ordinary legislatures.XIII This was obvious, Taylor believed, 
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because the British North America Act expressly described a federal parliament, whereas the 
term was never used to distinguish provincial assemblies. This semantic dispute highlighted 
a growing tendency following Confederation to regard the British North America Act as a 
moment of constitutional rupture, especially for many defenders of the federal government’s 
position in unfolding constitutional adjudication.  
From this perspective, there was only one level of constitutionalism in Canada after 1867, 
which effectively extinguished prior constitutional development. Edward Douglas Armour, 
who served as editor of the Canadian Law Times between 1881 and 1900, frequently used his 
editorial prerogative to reinforce his preference for highly centralized federalism. In an 
otherwise positive review of Clement’s Law of the Canadian Constitution, for example, he took 
exception with the book’s focus on provincial constitutions, insisting instead that “the British 
North America Act is a new departure from an old system of government” (1892: 301). This 
meant, as he stated elsewhere (1884: 631), that “the pre-confederate Provinces as political 
societies, are extinct, and their territories constitute the several provincial sub-divisions of 
the Dominion.” Though this position was at clear odds with prevailing constitutional 
scholarship, it was a powerful way for opponents of the provincial rights movement to 
narrate an alternate understanding of the “new” Canadian constitution. As James Cockburn 
(1882: 430), a strong centralist member of Macdonald’s caucus, stated bluntly, at 
Confederation “we surrendered our Provincial systems and existences. We had nothing left; 
nothing in reserve. All the old chartered constitutions were repealed and swept away as if 
they had never been.” According to his argument, the British North America Act was not 
merely a federal constitution, but a revolutionary constitutional order that rendered void all 
aspects of pre-Confederation constitutions. His insistence here that those constitutions were 
erased “as if they had never been” is a particularly striking admission, and reflects the 
minimization of pre-Confederation history in the narratives that would come to characterize 
later constitutional scholarship in Canada. 
While provincial constitutions figured centrally in earlier constitutional treatises, the term 
virtually disappeared in later works. The authors, part of a generation that Paul Romney 
considers errant centralists (1999: 161-180), contributed to a narrative of constitutional 
development that repositioned provinces as subconstitutional units. They tended to follow 
the nationalist teleology of Canadian history that was perhaps most vividly captured in 
historian Arthur Lower’s popular Colony to Nation (1964: 332), first published in 1946, in 
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which he made it clear that Confederation had “wiped out [the] old provinces of Canada, 
New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia and created in their place four new provinces, Ontario, 
Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia.” As a result of this perspective of history, 
provincial constitutions, insofar as they were mentioned, were largely limited to the legislative 
configuration outlined in the British North America Act. In distinct contrast to earlier 
constitutional scholarship, these writers did not devote much space to pre-Confederation 
history. The implication was that Confederation marked not only the genesis of a new 
political jurisdiction, but also of an entirely new and different constitutional order. The 
constitutional narrative that emerged in the mid-twentieth century was one that placed strong 
emphasis on the British North America Act as a constitutional watershed and largely 
displaced pre-Confederation constitutionalism from the picture. Scholars consciously moved 
away from the focus on British legal contexts that had become popular at the outset of the 
century.XIV It is hardly coincidental then that many of the constitutional centralists of the 
twentieth century – proponents of what Adams (2006) calls the “newer constitutional law” 
– were also strong Canadian nationalists who were especially preoccupied with the growth 
of Canadian political autonomy. 
The increasing professionalization of the social sciences at the turn of the twentieth 
century meant that legal and historical studies tended to be more rigidly divided, with pre-
Confederation constitutional matters, especially the development of responsible 
government, becoming a common focus of historians in the early part of the century.XV For 
example, Chester Martin’s popular Empire & Commonwealth, published in 1929, focussed 
extensively on history before 1867; Confederation does not appear until the book’s last 
chapter. As an historian, Martin evidently worried about the development of contemporary 
legal constitutional scholarship, and particularly the “tendency to regard the British North 
America Act of 1867 as the ‘constitution of Canada’” (327). He emphasized instead that the 
development of constitutional self-government in Canada “is to be sought not in the written 
statute but in those unwritten ‘conventions’ which came to govern the relations between 
Crown, councils, and Assemblies in the old ‘royal’ provinces. In that sense the most 
fundamental part of our constitution – both provincial and federal – is not, and never has 
been, ‘written’” (328). 
For legal scholars, however, the focus on written constitutionalism became the central 
focus, especially as it related to judicial review. The growing preoccupation with written 
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constitutionalism is perhaps clearest in the writings of William Paul McClure Kennedy, one 
of the most influential constitutional scholars of the twentieth century. His most famous 
work, The Constitution of Canada, was first published in 1922 and has been reissued as recently 
as 2014. Impressive in size and scope, it would be the last major work on Canadian 
constitutional law to dedicate extensive space to pre-Confederation constitutional 
development.XVI The bulk of the book examines constitutional development in British North 
America before Confederation, and again, it is only in the final chapters that Confederation 
is considered in detail. Despite the fact that it remains Kennedy’s most well-known work, it 
was after its initial publication that he started to voice a more robust sense of centralized 
constitutionalism. In particular, he pointedly criticized the Privy Council’s regard for the 
British North America Act as an ordinary British statute rather than fundamental 
constitutional law. Writing in the Canadian Bar Review (1937: 400), Kennedy claimed that “In 
the far-off days of 1864-67, the men who made the Dominion of Canada had express vision 
that its peoples would forget that they were Lower Canadians, Upper Canadians, New 
Brunswickers or Nova Scotians and would become Canadians in a new nation.” The failure 
of that vision in the intervening years of constitutional jurisprudence meant that the British 
North America Act needed to be repealed and reconstructed. It was an astonishing admission 
from Canada’s leading constitutional scholar, but marked a wider change in constitutional 
thought that increasingly displaced the constitution in Canada from its historical 
development. Small wonder then that Kennedy (1931: 554) complained about the “dull” 
nature of older constitutional writing, saturated deep with historical detail, which seemed to 
him to be impervious to “actual modern issues.” 
The source of Kennedy’s barely-concealed anger was the belief that the Privy Council 
deviated Canadian constitutionalism from the centralized course intended by its framers, a 
sense that would define much of the constitutional scholarship of the mid-twentieth century. 
The pertinent point here is less about the conflicting views of federalism that this divide 
reflected than the fact that the focus on the Privy Council became so pervasive that it 
effectively erased provincial constitutions from constitutional discussion. Defining the scope 
of provincial constitutions and detailing their development before Confederation would 
seem at odds with the mission of recasting Canadian federalism as a strongly centralized 
system. In his numerous articles on the perceived errors of the Privy Council, for example, 
Dalhousie Dean of Law Vincent MacDonald (1948: 23) argued that, contrary to the court’s 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
48 
interpretation, the Canadian constitution embodied a “special kind of centralized or quasi-
federalism.”  
The decline in consideration of provincial constitutions is particularly overt in Robert 
Dawson’s 1933 collection titled Constitutional Issues in Canada, 1900-1931. The first excerpt 
included is Charles Stuart’s 1925 speech to the Saskatchewan Bar Association (Dawson 1933: 
6), in which he commented on the relative lack of mention of provincial constitutions, 
especially when compared to state constitutions in the United States. The reason for this, he 
averred, was that while states had written constitutions, Canadian provincial constitutions 
were of the “utmost variety in their origin.” His fundamental point, however, was that 
provincial constitutions “are entirely outside the British North America Act” (7) found 
instead in the separate and largely unwritten development of political institutions of separate 
colonies. Interestingly, however, the next document in Dawson’s collection was a 1925 
speech by federal Minister of Justice Ernest Lapointe (1933: 15), who claimed that provinces 
“have no Constitution other than the British North America Act; all their powers they derive 
from that Act.” The apparent contradiction in these two sources from the same year is a 
telling reflection of the changing attitude toward the relationship between provincial 
constitutions and the federal constitution.  
It was an assumption that became pervasive in constitutional scholarship in the mid-
twentieth century. Adams (2006: 438) notes that “the scholars of the newer constitutional 
law fundamentally altered the landscape of Canadian constitutional thought by abandoning 
the formalist traditions of early twentieth-century scholarship.” This alteration is perhaps 
most pronounced in the ideas of Frank R. Scott, whose many writings on the constitution 
were unambiguous in their effort to bolster a strongly centralized federal structure. In his 
various essays on the Canadian constitution, Scott rarely mentioned provincial constitutions 
and devoted little space to pre-Confederation history. He wrote bluntly (1950: 203) that “the 
phrase ‘Constitution of Canada’ includes the provincial constitutions.” It is very clear that 
for Scott, the British North America Act was a radical point of departure from the past and 
effected a total reconstitution of political order in British North America. He stated, for 
example (1977a: 252), that the purpose of Confederation was “to take away from local 
governments many of their existing powers,” meaning that “the post-Confederation 
provinces therefore started with their previous autonomy much reduced.” Not only did Scott 
exclude provincial constitutions from his writing, but he also claimed (1977b: 246) that all 
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laws and political rights exercised by provinces were derived from the British North America 
Act, and not pre-Confederation constitutions.  
A dedication to written constitutionalism emerges in many twentieth century sources. 
Most works on Canadian constitutional law and politics from the mid-century onward 
featured a chronology of constitutional development that began in 1867 and were largely 
understood according to the written provisions of the British North America Act. The 
narrative laid out in Peter Russell’s Constitutional Odyssey, one of the most important works on 
constitutional history written since the mid-twentieth century, starts with the deliberations 
on the British North America Act. Most constitutional scholars in the second half of the 
century echoed Quebec lawyer Paul Gérin-Lajoie’s definition (1950: 4) of capital-C 
“constitution” as “the document or set of documents containing the ‘fundamental law.’” 
From this definition, he could conclude that “the provinces of Canada have no rigid 
constitution” (41). The implication was that the political structures of provinces were to be 
understood through the written words of the Canadian constitution. “The starting point for 
the study of provincial constitutions is the British North America Act,” Cheffins and Tucker 
claimed (1976: 257). As the written constitution of 1867 became the primary focal point for 
describing constitutionalism in Canada, much of the history that preceded Confederation 
vanished from sight. 
 
5. Implications of  Monist Narratives 
 
The term provincial constitution may seem rather peculiar today because of its general 
diminishment in constitutional scholarship over the twentieth century. It is not that the 
protection and assertion of provincial rights declined over the twentieth century (indeed, it 
can be said that it amplified during that time), but that claims of provincial rights became 
restricted almost entirely to debate over the federal constitution. This was certainly cemented 
by the mega-constitutional controversies and political clashes, as well as the preponderant 
attention to rights adjudication following the “Charter revolution” in the 1980s. The 
consequence of this shift has in large part been that pre-Confederation constitutional history 
has been either largely ignored or problematically recast as the anticipatory antecedents of 
the modern federal constitution. The problem of the Confederation chasm, which rather 
arbitrarily divides much in Canada’s history, is thus particularly acute in constitutional studies. 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
50 
Beyond the implications for constitutional history, however, a few further points highlight 
how the diminishment of provincial constitutions and the longer narrative of constitutional 
development in which they are anchored has influenced public policy and constitutionalism 
today. 
A key risk in not acknowledging or understanding provincial constitutions is that gradual 
changes to them may go unnoticed or under-examined. Over the past few decades, a number 
of provinces have codified greater centralization of executive authority, though such changes 
are rarely deemed to be “constitutional” in nature.XVII This was a problem that began to 
develop soon after Confederation.XVIII In the late nineteenth century, Ontario legislator 
William Macdougall (1875: 20), concerned by what he considered the virtually unrestrained 
power of the provincial government to amend its constitution, suggested that the province’s 
constitution be subject to formal ratification to be altered or amended. Ironically, his 
criticism was aimed at Oliver Mowat – a primary actor in the early constitutional battles over 
the British North America Act – for what he considered to be his disrespect of the province’s 
constitution.  
Canadian provinces have exercised their ability to amend their (unwritten) constitutions 
– obvious most recently in a number of attempts to reform the electoral system in British 
Columbia, Prince Edward Island, and Ontario. In all three cases, the proposed changes were 
seldom qualified as constitutional reform, and given the grumbling that the very idea of 
constitutional change tends to elicit in Canada, that may have been advantageous to 
provincial politicians. Even though the proposed reforms would have been constitutional 
changes, they were not recognized as such. Proposals to introduce electoral reform at the 
federal level, on the other hand, have prompted some legal observers to point out that it is a 
constitutional issue, perhaps even requiring formal constitutional amendment (Macfarlane 
2016). 
Despite the long history of unwritten constitutional principles in Canadian provinces, 
some have argued for the formalization or entrenchment of provincial constitutions, 
particularly in Alberta and Quebec.XIX The matter of enshrining the provincial constitution 
has been most prevalent in Quebec, owing to the unique constitutional politics of the 
province. The vital importance of language and culture in Quebec has been reflected in 
concerns for their constitutional protection. Quebec’s language law, for example, as a 
provincial statute does not have formal recognition or protection as a “fundamental law,” 
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which is a key reason that advocates argue for an enshrined provincial constitution. It is 
particularly interesting to note that most references to a new Quebec constitution tend to be 
characterized by the assumption that Quebec does not currently have a constitution; there 
are few references, for example, to the nineteenth century development of responsible 
government or the expansion of representative institutions. Thomas-Jean-Jacques 
Loranger’s nineteenth-century plea to guard against the “gradual disappearance” of separate 
provincial constitutions seems entirely unrequited in this modern constitutional debate. 
Instead, discussions of developing a provincial constitution tend to proceed from the 
premise that a constitution must be written in order to exist, and that the “unwritten” 
historical development of political rights have little bearing on modern constitutionalism. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
For the first generations of post-Confederation constitutional scholars, the subject of the 
constitution in Canada typically included consideration of two levels of constitutions – 
provincial and federal. This was based on a narrative of constitutionalism that located 
constitutional origins of different provinces in their pre-Confederation development. 
Alongside this narrative, however, gradually emerged a tendency to understand the British 
North America Act as a radical departure in Canadian constitutional history. The narrative 
that followed from this perspective was one that favoured a more centralized federal 
government and traced a timeline of development that usually began in 1867. As a result, the 
separate constitutions of provinces tended to be subsumed into the larger story of Canada’s 
federal constitution. 
The shift in constitutional narrative mirrored the more recognized constitutional debate 
about the nature of federalism in Canada and its interpretation (or transformation, as the 
argument may be) by the Privy Council. The irony here is that the preoccupation of the 
provincial rights advocates on the adjudication of the British North America Act contributed 
to a constitutional culture focussed almost exclusively on that legislation. By focussing on 
the meetings of British law lords in central London, the defence of provincial rights became 
refracted almost exclusively though the adjudication of the act – of “the constitution” – and 
less through the claims to inherited constitutional identities. The later push back against the 
provincial rights advocates only further bolstered the monist narrative of the constitution in 
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Canada. The practical consequence of the tendency to minimize pre-Confederation Canadian 
history is that it homogenizes distinct constitutional origins and cultures as aspects of 
Canadian constitutional history rather than the contours of discrete constitutional 
communities.  
The study of provincial constitutions in Canada has thus become a study of the effects 
of historical narrative in constitutional scholarship. The relative absence of provincial 
constitutions in Canada is the product of a largely deracinated constitutional history that 
tends to position the establishment of a new constitutional order in 1867 as a de novo 
foundation. It is also a significant reflection of the growth of the culture of written 
constitutionalism in Canada. Aside from the “unwritten” conventions that continue to 
govern parliamentary affairs and the crises that they have engendered, there is little attention 
given to the development of constitutional institutions in Canada and its provinces.XX In the 
post-Charter era of Canadian constitutionalism, political rights and individual freedoms are 
predominantly understood as protections guaranteed by written law.  
The sesquicentennial of Confederation in 2017 is often described as the anniversary of 
the Canadian constitution. That anniversary, however, is only one milestone in a much longer 
and varied narrative of constitutional development in Canada’s past, which continues to bear 
resonance today. Pre-Confederation constitutional history did not cease to be relevant in 
1867, though its imprint on Canadian constitutionalism today may be hard to see, as both 
public and scholarly attention focusses on more recent constitutional developments. Amidst 
the attention to the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Confederation, then, it is worth 
looking again at the Upper Canada centennial celebrations in Niagara-on-the-Lake in 1892 
to see what all the fuss was about. 
 Peter Price is a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Postdoctoral Fellow in the 
Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge. This essay extends on his 
presentation at the Symposium on the Constitution of Canada held at Scuola Sant’Anna in Pisa, Italy. 
I Despite the headline of the article, the anniversary marked the establishment of representative government. 
The proceedings of the centennial event were published in 1893 as The Centennial of the Province of Upper Canada, 
1792-1892.  
II An important exception is the tracing of the constitutional history of Quebec since the sixteenth century in 
Jacques-Yvan Morin and José Woehrling 1994. For a recent anthology of constitutional history before 1867 in 
Quebec and Ontario, see Laforest, Brouillet, Gagnon, and Tanguay 2015. 
III Though as Nicholas Aroney (2012: 222) argues, popular ratification of state constitutions could bring about 
dramatic changes in Australian constitutional practice and the “logic upon which the constitution operates.”  
IV Russell (2004: 125) notably considers the quest for constitutional autochthony in Canada as the objective of 
developing and ratifying a written constitution in Canada. 
V Enlightenment ideals of liberty and constitutional government circulated widely in early Canadian politics, as 
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Ducharme (2010) persuasively illustrates. 
VI For a brief overview of the pre-Confederation development of provincial constitutions, see Read (1948). 
VII Upper legislative chambers were abolished in Manitoba in 1876, New Brunswick in 1891, Prince Edward 
Island in 1893, Nova Scotia in 1928, and Quebec in 1968. As with the absence of written constitutions, 
Canadian provinces are relatively unique among subnational jurisdictions in having unicameral legislatures.  
VIII Bourinot (1888) published his petition, along with a list of relevant constitutional documents, as a pamphlet 
for wider public circulation, notably titled Federal and Provincial Constitutions. 
IX On the rise of constitutional nationalism, which was closely tied to constitutional centrism, see Adams (2015). 
X See Risk (2006). As Vipond (1991) has indicated, legal liberalism was a central tenant in the provincial rights 
movement in Ontario.  
XI For a similar argument, see Hodgins (1972: 56). 
XII This point is also raised in Bourinot’s famous Parliamentary Procedure and Practice (1884: 64-72). 
XIII For a critical rejoinder to Taylor, see Watson (1880). 
XIV Baker (1985: 278) calls this the development of “legal neo-colonialism.” The writings of A.H.F. Lefroy and 
Alpheus Todd, both committed to the imperial unity, are primary examples of this tendency. 
XV On the professionalization of history in Canada, see Wright (2009). 
XVI An exception here is Lederman (1981), who emphasizes the pre-Confederation development of responsible 
government in his collection of essays.  
XVII See for example O’Flaherty (2008). 
XVIII See for example Banks (1986).  
XIX For a brief commentary on the idea of a written constitution for Alberta, see Morton (2004). 
XX Most notable in recent times was the 2008 prorogation controversy; see Russell and Sossin (2009). 
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Abstract 
 
The paper focuses on Canadian Provinces’ role in migrant selection. After an 
asymmetric approach, that benefited only Quebec, the federal government granted 
devolutionary powers in migrant selection to the other Provinces as well, moving towards 
de facto asymmetry. This process has proved to be successful over the years, but recently the 
federal government has reacted, recentralizing some aspects of immigration policy. This 
does not apply to Quebec.  
This policy change may suggest that, although immigration federalism may be 
grounded on reasons other than the need to accommodate linguistic or ethnic claims, it 
remains the case that the former are “weaker” than the latter, and are more subject to 
pressure from the central government.  
This is also confirmed by looking at the mechanisms through which intergovernmental 
agreements have been translated into law. Unlike the Quebec case, immigration’s 
devolution in relation to the other Provinces has occurred through administrative 
delegation of powers from the federal government. This permits the federal government to 
exercise some form of political pressure in order to realign the Provinces’ discretionary 
choices. 
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immigration, federalism sub-state nationalism, intergovernmental agreements, Canada 
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1. Federalism, asymmetry and immigration: some introductory remarks 
 
Certain scholars have cautioned against the idea of a general theory of federalism and 
the risk of conceiving particular historical experiences, notably the US case, as a 
paradigmatic example of a federal state (Gamper 2005: 1297).  
This methodological warning is important when it comes to evaluating issues of 
symmetry and asymmetry in compound territorial states. Since classical federal states have 
come into existence through a compact of previously independent and thus formally equal 
states, the assumption is that all of the components of a federation should be treated 
equally and be entrusted with the same powers.  
However, asymmetry in compound territorial states is increasingly frequent, especially 
due to the fact that federalizing processes are nowadays related to devolutionary processes 
of previously centralized states. Often, these processes take place precisely in order to grant 
special treatment to specific territorial components. 
When studying asymmetry in compound territorial systems, it is common to distinguish 
between de facto asymmetry and de jure asymmetry (Burgess 2006: 209-225; Tarlton 1965: 
861).  
De facto asymmetry refers to social elements such as population, territory, economy, and 
language, which make each territorial component different from the other units within the 
federation. It also includes the case of a different regulatory outcomes as a consequence of 
the exercise of the same power. De facto asymmetry does not represent a problem with 
regard to the equal treatment of the constituent units and it may be said that it is a natural 
output of any federation. 
 On the contrary, de jure asymmetry implies a differentiation that is grounded in law. 
Here the social, economic, geographical, and cultural differences of a relevant constituent 
unit are taken into consideration by the legal order in order to provide a differential legal 
treatment in comparison with the other subnational units.  
De jure asymmetrical federalism can take many forms. It can be entrenched in 
Constitution; it can be established by statute law or even by intergovernmental agreements. 
Moreover, asymmetry can relate to the division of powers, the distribution of finances 
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between the federation and sub-national entities, or the institutional representation of the 
federal units in federal bodies (Palermo 2009: 12). 
Because de jure asymmetry represents a breach of the principle of equal treatment 
between federal components, it must be justified in political and/or in legal terms, 
particularly when it is not originally entrenched in the Constitution. Amongst the grounds 
usually advanced for justifying asymmetry, the need to accommodate ethno-cultural or 
linguistic differences that are present in a given sub-national unit is the most common. 
Where a component of the federation presents some cultural elements that differ from the 
other federal units, namely language, religion or a different legal tradition, this component 
may be entitled to a different treatment and/or special powers that are functional to 
maintaining its distinctiveness in relation to the rest of the federation (Agranoff 1999: 21).  
Other grounds for granting special powers or for providing differential treatment may 
be related to the geographic position of the sub-national unit (insularity for instance) or to 
structural problems that prevent this component from growing economically to the same 
degree as the rest of the federation. Some scholars argue that asymmetry should be 
dependent on the institutional capacity of the relevant unit to exercise its self-government 
powers efficiently. The more a given subnational unit provides the population with 
efficient services, the more the federation should grant either more powers or additional 
fiscal transfers (Antonini 2000).  
At first, asymmetry in immigration policy is difficult to conceive. Immigration, and 
even more so, the selection of immigrants, are regarded as a national responsibility and as a 
consequence, uniformity is the rule. There are several explanations for this: immigration 
encroaches upon the foreign affairs of the state, it concerns the control of national borders, 
and finally it impinges upon the personal component of the state, which the national level 
has an interest in shaping. 
However, there may be reasons that justify a certain degree of devolution in the 
selection procedure and thus de facto asymmetry.I For instance, sub-national units may be 
considered best placed to evaluate their labour force needs. There are also grounds for 
justifying de jure asymmetry. In a multinational state, a subnational unit in which a 
national/language minority is principally settled – thus constituting a majority with respect 
to the regional territory – may feel the need to preserve its cultural homogeneity with 
respect to immigrants. This occurs especially when immigrants find it more useful or more 
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attractive to learn the language of the national majority than to learn the local language 
(Kymlicka 2001, Zapata-Barrero 2009). Due to such a situation, subnational units may be 
granted special powers enabling them to select immigrants on the basis of their capacity to 
integrate successfully in the cultural/linguistic environment of the relevant unit.  
The case of Canada is particularly interesting for examining the issue of ‘immigration 
federalism’,II and within it, the different dynamics of de facto and de jure asymmetry. 
Unlike many other constitutions, the Canadian Constitution Act 1867 conceives 
immigration as a concurrent jurisdiction, although the supremacy of federal law is expressly 
foreseen. The first section of this paper will explore the reasons that led the Canadian 
constituent assembly to introduce this provision and the early practice and case law that, 
since the beginning of the 20th century, have oriented the system towards centralization.  
The second section will explore subsequent practice in immigration federalism, where, 
through intergovernmental agreements, the federal government progressively granted 
Quebec special powers in the selection of immigrants. This asymmetric de jure approach 
towards devolution in immigration has been followed by a progressive devolution of 
immigrant selection powers to the other Provinces as well, shifting from de jure to a certain 
degree of de facto asymmetry. This process has proved to be successful over the years, but 
recently the federal government has reacted, and recentralized some aspects of immigration 
policy, notably immigrant settlement services. This does not apply to Quebec, which is the 
only Province to have exclusive responsibility in this area.  
I argue that this policy change may suggest that, although immigration federalism in the 
selection of immigrants may be grounded on reasons other than the need to accommodate 
linguistic or ethnic claims, it remains the case that the former are “weaker” than the latter 
and are more subject to pressure from central government. This is also confirmed by 
looking at the mechanisms through which intergovernmental agreements have been 
translated into law, an issue explored in the third section of this paper. Unlike the Quebec 
case, immigration’s devolution in relation to the other Provinces has occurred through 
administrative delegation of powers from the federal government. This permits the federal 
government to exercise some form of political pressure in order to realign the Provinces’ 
discretionary choices in the selection of immigrants, in light of federal objectives.  
Finally, in the concluding remarks, the paper will consider to what extent the Canadian 
case may be useful to assess in the light of some EU Member States’ experiences of 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
61 
immigration federalism, traditionally more concerned with migrant integration rather than 
selection. 
 
2. The origins of  immigration federalism in the Constitution Act, 1867 
and early practice 
 
The power to admit or deny aliens entry to the national territory (jus excludendi alios) is 
traditionally considered as a prerogative of sovereignty (Plender 1998: 6). As a 
consequence, even in compound territorial states, it is vested in the national tier of 
government.  
However, from an historical perspective, although the power of the king to deny entry 
or to expel aliens has been admitted since the dawn of the modern age, the lack of a central 
well-articulated bureaucratic apparatus made this power quite ineffective. The 
monopolization of the legitimate means of movement by states, and thus the effective 
control of their national territory and population, has been a very lengthy process that has 
its roots in the French Revolution when, for the first time, a system of border controls and 
identification of aliens was implemented (Torpey 2000).  
Before this, jus excludendi alios was a power exercised by local authorities, related to 
welfare access. Lacking a national system of social assistance, each local authority was 
responsible for providing the poor with some minimal relief. In order to avoid rendering 
local authorities responsible for the poor of other territorial communities, they were 
entitled to remove anyone “likely to be chargeable to the parish” to their place of legal 
settlement. This applied irrespective of the national origin of the person. This system was 
in place in England since the adoption of the Elizabethan poor law,III but similar 
arrangements were known in France and Prussia as well (Brubaker 1992).  
These brief historical references can help us to better contextualize the jus excludendi 
alios power in the context of the federal experience in North America. 
The US Constitution does not explicitly provide the federation with powers related to 
immigration. During the 18th and 19th centuries many states, especially on the Atlantic 
coast, enacted statutes with the aim of deterring the entry of paupers, idiots, lunatics and 
aliens, usually by imposing levies on shipmasters (Neumann 1993: 1833; Motomura 2014, 
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65). The constitutional authority to enact such statutes was based on the police powers of 
the states and on English poor law tradition (Trattner 1989; Van der Mai 2002: 806).IV 
In one case, the US Supreme Court upheld these measures;V in another, it did not, 
considering them in breach of the commerce clause reserved to the federal union.VI Only in 
1875 did Congress pass a federal statute dealing with immigrants’ entry. As a consequence, 
state legislations limiting the entry of aliens were deemed to be preempted by federal 
statute. Lacking an express constitutional clause conferring the power to the Congress, the 
Supreme Court stated that the regulation of the entry and the stay of aliens in the national 
territory was “an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the US”.VII 
However, the scope of federal action in immigration jurisdiction and the possible conflicts 
with state measures are still questionable issues, as the recent Arizona vs. US case 
revealed.VIII 
The reference to the US experience is important in order to historically contextualize 
those provisions of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1867 that expressly concern the 
division of powers in the area of immigration. On the one hand, the influence that the US 
federalism experience and the US Civil War played on the choices of the Canadian 
founding fathers is well known, pushing them towards a strengthening of the 
Confederation’s powers (Smith 1993: 67; D’Ignazio 2002: 9). On the other hand, like many 
American states, Canadian Provinces, relying on their inherent police powers, had already 
passed statutes regulating immigration, usually forbidding entry to those people that could 
become a burden upon local welfare, or that had previously been convicted of serious 
crimes in their countries of origin. 
The result of these partially contradictory rationales is sec. 95 of the Constitution Act, 
1867, which conceives of immigration as a concurrent jurisdiction. This is an exception 
within the Canadian watertight model of division of powers, and it means that both federal 
and provincial legislators are empowered to act in the immigration field. However, in order 
to safeguard federal interests, the clause explicitly provides that the law of a Province «shall 
have effect in and for the province as long and as far only as it is not repugnant to any act 
of the Parliament of Canada». 
Thus, the clause gives the federal Parliament wide discretion in defining the role of the 
Provinces in immigration, admitting at least three options. Indeed, sec. 95 makes it clear 
that the federal legislator can opt at any moment for uniformity and centralization, since it 
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asserts the paramountcy of federal law in the field. However, sec. 95 also seems to admit 
decentralization in immigration and thus de facto asymmetry. There is also a third option. 
Sec. 95 states that federal Parliament may «pass law into all or any of the provinces». This 
means that the territorial scope of a federal statute in immigration may be formally limited 
to a part only of the national territory. Thus, de jure asymmetry, at least with regard to the 
territorial scope of the federal statute in immigration, would be compatible with the 
clause.IX  
Sec. 95 is not the only provision of the Constitution Act, 1867 dealing with 
immigration, since sec. 91.25 grants the federal Parliament exclusive jurisdiction in relation 
to naturalization and aliens. 
As admitted by the Canadian Supreme Court in 2001, the possible tension between the 
two provisions is an issue that has been neglected both in case law and in the literature.X  
It may be said that the Courts have considered as falling under sec. 91.25 the various 
rights, privileges and disabilities attached to the status of alien. This should include 
admission and expulsion, as typically they are privileges or disabilities attached to the alien’s 
status. As a possible way to reconcile the two provisions, I argue that while the procedure 
for the alien’s admission – (i.e. the evaluation with respect to public order, public security, 
and health requirements) – falls under sec. 91, the selection procedure falls under the 
concurrent jurisdiction of sec. 95. This would reflect current federal legislation, which 
provides for devolution in the selection of migrants, while reserving the admission 
procedure to the federal government. 
Soon after the entry into force of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Provinces agreed that 
the federal parliament would comprehensively deal with immigration. The Immigration Act 
1869 – the first federal statute on immigration - was heavily influenced by previous 
provincial statutes, and was aimed at deterring the entry of specific classes of immigrants 
deemed dangerous for public order or likely to become a burden on public welfare. 
The division of powers in immigration became an issue of contention when, at the 
beginning of the new century, British Columbia passed laws aimed at forbidding the 
admission of Chinese immigrants. The federal government usually disallowed these 
statutes, but two cases were brought before the courts. In Narain Singh,XI and Nakane and 
Okazake,XII the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered the British Columbia statute 
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to be in breach of sec. 95 and declared it preempted by the 1869 federal statute (Hucker: 
1975, 649ss.).  
Although the classification of immigration as a concurrent jurisdiction could suggest 
that the conflict between a federal and a provincial statute on immigration should be 
evaluated in concrete terms, favouring the best interpretation for the safeguarding of both 
statutes, the court’s reasoning in the two cases seemed to suggest a different conclusion. It 
applied a “covering of the field” test: once the federal legislator had acted in an 
immigration matter, the provincial legislator was prevented from taking action in the field, 
except in cases where the provincial statute was in furtherance of the federal statute. 
The outbreak of World War I coincided with the adoption of restrictive measures on 
immigration, increasingly seen as an issue related to national security and foreign affairs, 
both falling within federal jurisdiction. As a result, immigration federalism in Canada 
vanished.  
Immigration federalism regained political salience with claims for the recognition of 
Quebec as a distinct society that led to the conclusion of executive agreements granting the 
Province meaningful power in selecting economic migrants. Since the second half of the 
1990s, this devolutionary trend has been extended to the other Provinces as well. This 
practice was considered by both territorial levels of governments as a way of implementing 
the original understanding of sec. 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867.  
However, this approach to devolution in immigration was, and still is, subject to the 
political will of the federal level. Parliament was free, as it still is, to simply ignore these 
agreements and the Provinces lacked remedies against such a decision. Because of the weak 
position that the Canadian constitution granted to the devolutionary framework in 
immigration, at the time of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords Quebec and the 
other Provinces pushed the federal government to accept some amendments to sec. 95. By 
and large, these amendments were aimed at constitutionalizing the practice of the 
intergovernmental agreements and considering them as a mechanism for determining the 
exact division of powers in immigration (Garcea: 1993; Schwartz: 1987, 132-133).  
Had the Meech Lake Accord been approved, intergovernmental immigration 
agreements, once authorized by both federal and provincial legislatives, would have had 
force of law and been placed beyond the reach of unilateral change by the federal 
Parliament. They would have had priority not only over existing federal powers on 
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immigration (sec. 95) but also on naturalization and aliens (sec. 91.25). However, the 
federal government would have kept control of «national standards and objectives relating 
to immigration or aliens».  
The Charlottetown accord confirmed the previous requests advanced in Meech Lake 
and added an obligation for the government to conclude an agreement when so requested 
by a Province and inserted an equality treatment clause. This would have guaranteed all 
Provinces equality of treatment in relation to any other Province that had already 
concluded an agreement, «taking into account different needs and circumstances».  
The failure of the two accords renders the legal nature of the immigration agreements 
uncertain, as we shall see in the following paragraphs. 
 
3. Immigration federalism in action. The practice of  intergovernmental 
agreements: between de jure and de facto asymmetry 
 
3.1. From federal uniformity to de jure asymmetry: the Quebec case 
With Quebec’s quiet revolution, the francophone Province became aware of the 
importance of immigration for maintaining and developing the distinctiveness of Quebec 
as a nation (Houle F. 2014, 118-118; Piché 2003, Kymlicka 2001).  
Given the concurrent jurisdiction with regard to immigration, Quebec could opt to act 
in the field unilaterally, subject to the confines of federal legislation. However, this option 
was not viable. The previous federal practice of considering immigration as a field of de 
facto exclusive federal jurisdiction, coupled with the restrictive attitude shown by the 
judiciary towards the provincial powers in immigration, persuaded Quebec’s leaders that 
they needed to conclude an agreement with the federal government before acting in the 
immigration field.  
The results of this strategy were quite modest at the beginning. The first agreement 
concluded in 1971 – the Lang-Cloutier agreement – merely authorized Quebec’s officers to 
be present in some federal consulates and to provide information to immigrants wishing to 
settle in Quebec. In 1975, a new agreement was signed, setting out the principle that 
Quebec’s officers would be formally consulted before selecting immigrants wishing to 
settle in Quebec (on these evolutions, see Kostov 2008: 91; Vineberg 1987: 305). 
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Only in 1978, following the signature of the Cullen-Couture agreement, was Quebec 
granted substantial powers in the selection procedure. The Canadian immigration selection 
system was based, as it still is today, on a points system. The applicant had to totalize a 
given score by meeting several criteria that evaluated a candidate’s capacity to adapt to the 
Canadian labour market.  
Under the Coullen-Couture agreement, the selection of permanent economic migrants 
applying from abroad was the result of a joint decision-making process (see for a detailed 
account Garcea 1993: 111-129). Applicants had to be assessed under both federal and 
Quebec standards. However, applicants that met Quebec’s standards would be admitted, 
even if they did not qualify under the federal government’s selection criteria. At the same 
time, applicants who met the federal government’s standard but failed to qualify under 
Quebec’s standards would be denied entry into Quebec. In this case, applicants could be 
selected by the federal administration and once they had entered into Canada, could 
nevertheless settle in Quebec.XIII The federal administration retained the power to deny 
entry to migrants selected by Quebec on the grounds of security, public order, or public 
health (see Garcea 1993).  
Quebec was also granted the power to select asylum seekers who applied from abroad. 
The federal tier of government retained the exclusive power to determine whether the 
applicant qualified as a refugee or as a person in similar circumstances in need of Canada’s 
protection. However, once identified by the federation, the applicant had to meet Quebec’s 
criteria in order to be admitted to Canada (Garcea 1993: 111-129).  
In relation to other categories of immigrants, namely temporary workers, students, and 
persons seeking medical attention, Quebec was granted a negative veto. This meant that 
federal government retained the right to reject the applications of such candidates, even if 
they received approval from Quebec (Garcea 1993: 111-129).  
The Cullen-Couture agreement gave Quebec the power to establish its own grid for 
selecting immigrants. There were two core criteria that permitted an immigrant to acquire 
the selection certificate: knowledge of French and adaptability. This second criterion gave 
wide discretion to Quebec’s officers in assessing whether the applicant had the ability to 
rapidly integrate into Quebecker society. In practice, these criteria were applied so as to 
favour candidates coming from francophone countries, despite otherwise weak 
applications (Houle: 2014, 216). Over the years, the need to attract educated, skilled and 
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experienced immigrants to the Province led Quebec’s authorities to admit applicants with 
insufficient knowledge of either French or English. In 2011, as a reaction, the Quebec 
government introduced an amendment to the skilled worker category with the aim of 
requiring candidates to provide documentation attesting their knowledge of French (Houle: 
2014, 220). 
The Cullen-Couture agreement did not grant Quebec any power in the selection of first 
family class members, and of refugees applying for visas within Canada, or any power in 
immigrant’s settlement services. This was a crucial issue for Quebec, with such a right only 
being granted in the subsequent 1991 agreement. As a matter of fact, the capacity of 
Quebec to integrate immigrants in the French cultural milieu was based on several 
strategies. The first was to give priority to French speaking ability as a criterion for 
selecting immigrants. The second was the requirement that immigrants’ children should be 
compulsorily enrolled in French speaking schools, not allowing them to opt for English 
schools, which were reserved for the Quebecker anglophone minority.XIV The possibility of 
providing French training services to newcomers was seen as a further necessary step in 
ensuring full integration into Quebecker culture. 
The Cullen-Couture agreement had a statutory basis, namely sec. 109 of the 
Immigration Act 1976, according to which the federal minister, with the approval of the 
Governor in Council, may enter into agreement with any Province or group of Provinces 
for the purposes of facilitating the formulation, coordination and implementation of 
immigration policies and programs. 
Sec. 109 of the Immigration Act 1976 was not per se an expression of de jure asymmetry 
since the signing of an agreement with the federal counterpart was an option formally open 
to all the Provinces, not only to Quebec. However, given that the federal government was 
under no obligation to conclude such an agreement, even if requested to do so by a 
relevant Province, in practice immigration devolution was left to a discretionary decision of 
the federal government that favored de jure asymmetry rather than de facto asymmetry, and 
thus equal treatment in relation to the other Provinces. This reticence of the federal 
government to enter into agreements with Provinces other than Quebec explains why, on 
the occasion of the Charlottetown Accord, the Provinces attempted to introduce a new 
constitutional immigration provision compelling the federal government to conclude an 
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inter-governmental agreement when requested so by a Province, and to guarantee equal 
treatment. 
The terms of the Cullen-Couture agreement were considered by many scholars to go 
beyond what the Constitution Act, 1867 allowed (on the different views see Garcea 1992: 
274; for more favorable views, in line with Quebec’s position, see Brossard and de 
Montigny 1985: 305; Brun and Brouillet 2002: 55). Some argued that allowing Quebec to 
veto admission into the Province of immigrants who met federal requirements, but not 
Quebec’s requirements, was contrary to the paramountcy clause of sec. 95 (see Kostov 
2008: 91-103). It was also noted that the federal government had, in practice, delegated to 
Quebec the selection of immigrants, despite the fact that under sec. 91.25 of the 
Constitution Act 1867, this power should fall under exclusive federal jurisdiction. In such a 
case, inter-delegation of legislative power would not be admissible according to Supreme 
Court case-law.XV Finally, even the wording of sec. 109 of the Immigration Act 1976 
suggested that the intergovernmental agreement should have the aim of facilitating the 
federal administration in immigration, rather than replacing it.  
Quebec was very much aware of these legal weaknesses. This explains why, on the 
occasions of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords, it considered the insertion of a 
new immigration clause to be so important. If approved, the clause would have 
constitutionalized the practice of intergovernmental agreements and would have clearly 
prescribed its legal ability to derogate from the paramountcy provisions of both sec. 95 and 
sec. 91 of the Constitutional Act 1867. 
The failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords had two consequences. 
From a legal perspective, the nature of the intergovernmental agreement agreed with 
Quebec and its conformity with the Constitution Act, 1867 remained unclear. It was 
evident, nevertheless, that the federal Parliament was by no means bound by it. It could act 
unilaterally and thus preempt Quebecker legislation, with no need to respect any of the 
procedural safeguards foreseen in the agreement. However, in political terms, due to the 
failure to find a constitutional accommodation with Quebec, after the repatriation, and due 
to the resurgence of popular support for the separatist movement, not only was a revision 
of the Coullen-Couture agreement impracticable, but Quebec’s claims for strengthening its 
powers in the immigration field were even tougher than before.  
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This led to the conclusion of a new agreement between Quebec and the Federal 
government, signed in 1991 and still in force (see Young 1992, Garcea 1993).  
The agreement recognised Quebec’s right to receive the same percentage of the total 
number of immigrants admitted to Canada as is its percentage of the Canadian population, 
with the right to exceed it by 5% for demographic reasons. Quebec is solely responsible for 
the selection of permanent and temporary economic migrants, who must be assessed under 
Quebec’s points system alone. However, the federal administration retains some 
competency in the admission procedure: immigrants selected by Quebec may be refused 
entry by federal administrators only on the grounds of national security, public order, and 
public health. The federal government is also responsible for determining which individuals 
qualify as a refugee and, once this evaluation is completed, Quebec can select those 
refugees it feels best suit Quebec’s interests. Finally, the federal administration withdrew 
from the delivery of services for the reception and linguistic integration of permanent 
residents, instead granting Quebec a federal monetary transfer in order to provide the 
services. In practical terms, this was the main achievement of the 1991 agreement.  
The 1991 agreement’s preamble explicitly states that «the integration of immigrants to 
that Province in a manner that respects the distinct identity of distinct society of Quebec» 
is one of the aims pursued by the agreement.  
This further devolution of powers in immigration is then explicitly related to the need 
to promote and defend the cultural and linguistic background of Quebec. At the same 
time, however, the agreement also makes a reference to immigration as a shared 
jurisdiction under sec. 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867. This suggests that devolution to 
Quebec of immigration powers is to be considered consistent with an original 
understanding of Canadian federalism with regard to immigration, implying that it may be 
applicable to the other subnational units as well. 
Thus, the 1991 agreement contains two rationales: on the one hand, it is coherent with 
a de jure asymmetry perspective and consistent with the need to accommodate Quebec’s 
claim to a distinct society; on the other hand, it may merely be seen as an instrument 
through which the Federal government effectively implements sec. 95 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 and the idea expressed therein of immigration as a concurrent jurisdiction. 
However, this second rationale would have implied that the Federal government 
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guaranteed devolution in immigration to the other Provinces as well, moving from de jure 
asymmetry to de facto asymmetry. 
 
3.2. Moving towards de facto asymmetry 
As a matter of fact, since the signing of the 1978 Cullen-Couture agreement, the federal 
government pushed the other Provinces to take advantage of possible decentralization in 
the field of immigration. After a century of federal uniformity, however, Provinces lacked 
the awareness of the political relevance of immigration for their social and economic 
development, as well as the proper administrative skills. Even modest attempts by the 
federal government to involve the Provinces in consultation prior to the programming of 
immigrants’ entry numbers were unsuccessful (Vineberg: 1987, 305).  
However, over the years, some Provinces began to consider immigration as increasingly 
crucial for their interests. As noted in many official reports, the great majority of 
newcomers in Canada settled in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec, and lived in major 
cities such as Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
2009). Thus, the immigration influx did not prove to be of any help to those Provinces 
facing serious problems of economic growth and of uneven distribution of population in 
their territory (Baglay and Nakache 2014: 92; Seidle 2013: 7). 
Moreover, federal policy with regard to the selection of economic migrants 
progressively favored highly skilled applicants. This transpired to be a problem for those 
Provinces that had a need for low skilled jobs.  
In the 1980s, some Provinces, such as Manitoba and Alberta, realised the importance 
of immigration for their regional economies. However, the federal government was quite 
reluctant to provide wide decentralization in the selection procedure, using Quebec as an 
example (Garcea: 1993).  
The signing of the 1991 agreement with Quebec marked a turning point in this regard. 
Given the sensitivity of the other Provinces towards symmetry in federalism, the Federal 
government was pressured to promote generalized decentralization in immigration matters. 
Although negotiations with the government proved difficult, by 2009 all Provinces and one 
territory entered into agreements with the federal government (see Paquet: 2014, 519-548).  
The main achievement of these intergovernmental agreements has been the possibility 
for the Provinces to establish their own provincial immigration selection programs (so 
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called Provincial Nominee Programs - PNP). Each Province has the power to select a 
given number of newcomers, previously agreed with the federal government, through 
criteria suitable for the relevant Province (see Baglay and Nakache 2014: 95-96).  
As we shall see in the following section, from a legal point of view, the provincial 
administration acts under a delegation of power from the federal government. Indeed, the 
federal administration retains not only the power to deny admission to Canada because of 
national security, public order and public health, as in the Quebec case, but also a certain 
discretion in evaluating the selection procedure enforced by the provincial administration, 
to the extent of assessing the individual’s effective ability to become economically 
established in Canada and to reside in the Province in question. 
The PNP have proved successful. The number of people admitted through these 
programs has progressively increased,XVI almost reaching the number of people selected 
through the federal programs. In relation to some Provinces, the immigrant population 
admitted though PNP is by far the greatest channel of immigration in the Provinces in 
question.XVII 
The selection of immigrants has not been the only area in immigration subject to 
devolution. With the 1991 intergovernmental agreement, Quebec obtained from the federal 
government the power to deal with settlement services for immigrants coupled with a 
federal money transfer. In the 1990s, the federal government offered this opportunity to 
the other Provinces as well. Due to the federal government’s resistance to granting the 
same amount of money offered to Quebec, only Manitoba and British Columbia accepted 
full responsibility for settlement services (Banting 2012: 90-91). 
These two policy areas – selection of migrants and settlement services – are strictly 
related, as the case of Manitoba reveals. Once an immigrant has been selected as a 
permanent immigrant, either under a federal program or under a PNP program, he can 
move freely within Canada. Thus, there are no guarantees that he will stay in the selecting 
Province. Because of this, the PNP programs favoured the selection, as permanent 
migrants, of persons already having family ties in the Province or that had previously 
worked there as temporary workers. For the Province, the power to provide settlement 
services to newcomers became an important way to increase retention of immigrant 
populations in the Provinces, especially in the less inhabited areas of provincial territories 
(Carter et al. 2008: 161-183).  
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3.3. The current recentralization and the resurgence of de jure asymmetry 
Over the years, the federal government has become increasingly worried about the 
provincial nominee programs, as increasing PNP admission numbers were leading to a 
drop in the number of immigrants selected under federal administered programs. 
Investigations conducted by the federal ministry revealed that in some cases, the PNP 
pursued objectives that were not in line with the federal programs (CIC 2011). For 
instance, Manitoba and other Provinces used the PNP as a way to counteract their low 
levels of population, favoring the selection of those immigrants that already had relatives 
settled in the Province. PNP was thus transformed into an alternative to family 
reunification, which is a matter reserved to the federal level. Other forms of misalignment 
were observed in relation to the selection of the labour force. While federal programs 
progressively focused on highly skilled immigrants, many PNP have been selecting low-
skilled immigrants with negligible proficiency in English (Baglay and Nakache 2014: 101-
102; Seidle 2013: 8-10).  
These shortcomings, coupled with the will of the federal government to focus its 
priority action more on key economic issues, led the federal administration to implement 
stricter control of provincial measures in immigration. PNP programs were maintained, but 
the federal government pressured the Provinces to realign their PNP to national purposes 
(Paquet 2014: 540; Banting 2012: 90-91). The number of immigrants admitted through the 
PNP were capped at the levels of the previous years. As a consequence, some Provinces, 
which in the past had agreed for low numbers of immigrants through PNP, were prevented 
from admitting more (Paquet 2014: 540).  
The recentralization process has been most evident in relation to integration services 
for migrants. As noted, only Quebec, Manitoba and British Columbia had agreed with the 
federal government to accept full responsibility for providing integration services in return 
for a federal money transfer. In the other Provinces, integration services have been 
federally administered or have followed a mixed approach.  
When, in 2010, Ontario asked the federal government to renew its immigration 
agreement and to have full responsibility for settlement services, the federal government 
refused and decided, unilaterally, to take back from Manitoba and British Columbia full 
responsibility for the provision of settlement services. The decision, taken by the Harper 
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conservative government, has been maintained by the current liberal Trudeau government. 
Thus, currently only Quebec has the power to provide settlement services for immigrants.  
Immigration has thus undergone a change in terms of policy. The decision to 
recentralize settlement services, as well as pressures for the alignment of PNPs to the 
national purposes in the field of immigration, seem to put the previous move from de jure 
asymmetry to de facto asymmetry under strain (Paquet 2014; Reeve 2014). This also 
confirms the weak legal nature of intergovernmental agreements and their main relevance 
as a matter of political, rather than legal, commitment, an issue we will now explore. 
 
4. Immigration federalism, asymmetry and the legal framework 
 
The unilateral withdrawal of the federal government from the agreements concluded 
with British Colombia and Manitoba with regard to the provision of settlement services in 
immigration indicates a need to focus our analysis on the legal nature of these agreements.  
As noted above, sec. 109 of the Immigration Act 1976 enabled the federal minister to 
conclude agreements with provincial executives «for the purposes of facilitating the 
formulation, coordination and implementation of immigration policies and programs». The 
current sec. 8.1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002 (IRPA), which 
repealed the Immigration Act 1976, confirms this power and extends the scope of the 
intergovernmental agreements, stating they may be concluded for the general purposes of 
the act.  
The IRPA foresees two distinct hypotheses. The first, defined in sec. 8.2, occurs when, 
under the agreement, the Province has not acquired sole responsibility for selection, but 
only a shared responsibility with the federal government. In this case, which currently 
corresponds to the intergovernmental agreements concluded by the Federation with all 
Provinces other than Quebec, sec. 8.2 states that the statutory provisions of the IRPA and 
the regulation provisions governing the selection, sponsorship and the acquisition of status 
must be consistent with the federal-provincial agreements.  
The second hypothesis applies where, under a federal-provincial agreement, a Province 
has acquired sole responsibility for the selection of a foreign national who intends to reside 
in that Province as a permanent resident. In such a case, which currently applies vis-à-vis 
Quebec, sec. 9 (1) explicitly states that the individual is granted permanent status if he 
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meets provincial selection criteria. Sec. 9 (1) lett. d) also states that the conditions imposed 
by the law of the Province will have the same force and effect as if they were made under 
the IRPA. This applies unless the agreement provides otherwise. Thus, in case of non-
consistency with the IRPA provisions, the agreement is supposed to be directly applicable. 
Are these provisions a sufficient basis for granting force of law to the 
intergovernmental agreements? Are these references enough to incorporate the 
intergovernmental agreements into the legal order, make them opposable to third parties 
and Parliament and confer on them a derogatory capacity of the federal statute? 
Despite their relevance to Canadian constitutionalism, there is little literature 
concerning the legal nature of intergovernmental agreements. They are considered, 
especially by political scientists, as soft law instruments (Simeon and Robinson 2004: 101) 
and/or as binding only on the executives, but they are not considered opposable to the 
legislatures and third parties. According to some analysis based upon Canadian Supreme 
Court case-law, because an intergovernmental agreement is recognized as having the force 
of law, a specific parliamentary act that incorporates the agreement is necessary, as occurs 
with international agreements (Poirier 2009: 78-111).  
Thus, in light of this framework, the IRPA provisions do not seem to represent a 
sound basis on which to give force of law to the intergovernmental agreements in 
immigration.  
However, this is not enough to conclude that they have no legal effect, since the 
normative substance of these agreements may be reflected by official sources of law and 
thereby become binding and opposable to third parties. 
Indeed, in order to grant intergovernmental agreements and cooperative federalism a 
legal value, the Canadian legislative bodies have made use of several techniques, such as 
administrative inter-delegation, referential legislation or conditional legislation. At the heart 
of the system is Canada’s retention of the British system of responsible government, which, 
according to Peter Hogg, renders any separation of the executive and legislative functions 
utterly inconsistent. Because of this, there are no limits, or at least there are no clear 
constitutional limits, to the capacity of Parliament to delegate its legislative powers to the 
executive branch of government.XVIII  
However, in the early 1950s the Supreme Court was unwilling to accept that federal 
and provincial legislatures could circumvent the division of powers prescribed by the 
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Constitution by means of legislative inter-delegation (La Forest 1975: 131). In a case 
decided by the Supreme Court, the federation and the Provinces decided on a statutory 
scheme for old age pensions. Since the federal level had no constitutional power to impose 
a contributory pension scheme on the Provinces, while the Provinces had no power to levy 
taxes for financing such a scheme, each parliamentary assembly lent the other, by means of 
delegation, the necessary powers. In Attorney General of Nova Scotia,XIX the Supreme Court 
struck down the initiative, holding that one legislative body cannot enlarge the power of 
another by authorizing it to enact laws where the matter falls outside of its jurisdiction.  
The Nova Scotia decision has also had some echoes in the debate concerning the 
devolution of immigration to Quebec. Some scholars, opposing the constitutionality of the 
Cullen-Couture agreement, suggested that the federal government had delegated the 
responsibility in the selection of immigrants to Quebec, despite the fact that, under sec. 
91.25 (but not under sec. 95), selection of immigrants falls under the exclusive federal 
jurisdiction on naturalization and aliens. 
Although the Nova Scotia decision is still a binding and quoted precedent, over the years 
the Supreme Court has validated other techniques that have permitted the development of 
cooperative federalism, and has allowed for the departure from the Nova Scotia rationale 
based on dual federalism. Inter-administrative delegation of powers and referential 
incorporation are among them.  
Inter-administrative delegation of powers occurs when, in an area of exclusive federal 
responsibility, the federal Parliament delegates the power to the federal executive to 
regulate the matter. The federal executive is, in turn, enabled to delegate this power to the 
provincial executive branch.XX  
Referential incorporation occurs when a federal statute incorporates, by reference, rules 
that exist in another jurisdiction, included the provincial one. The Supreme Court has even 
admitted anticipatory incorporation by reference that occurs when the referred rule is not 
already in force, but it when it might come into existence in the future.XXI As Peter Hogg 
notes, a combination of administrative inter-delegation and referential legislation have thus 
helped to evade the Nova Scotia inter-delegation case-law (Hogg 2003: 350).XXII 
Moving back to immigration, we may note that both techniques are used in order to 
effectively implement the intergovernmental agreements.  
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As far as the PNP programs are concerned, their legal basis rests on the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Regulation (IRPR). Section 12 of the IRPA confers on the federal 
government the power to set the criteria for the selection of immigrants and to establish 
classes of admissible immigrants. As an exercise of this delegation of powers from the 
Parliament to the federal government, sec. 87 of the IRPR provides for the institution of 
the provincial nominee class, which is the only legal provision dealing with the PNP.XXIII 
According to sec. 87 of the IRPR, a foreign national is a member of the provincial class if 
he is named in a nomination certificate issued by the government of a Province under a 
provincial nominee agreement concluded between that Province and the federal minister. 
Thus, the signing of the agreement is the condition that allows the Federal government to 
delegate its administrative powers of selecting economic migrants to provincial 
administrators.  
The fact that the provincial administration acts under a delegation of administrative 
powers implies some limitations to provincial discretion. For instance, sec. 87.3 of the 
IRPR sets out the rule that the federal administration may, after consultation with the 
provincial administration, review the provincial evaluation on the grounds of the likely 
ability of the foreign national to become economically established in Canada. Moreover, 
under sec. 10.2.1 of the IRPA, the federal minister retains the power to give instructions 
and thus to realign PNP to federal objectives.XXIV As noted above, this power has been 
substantially exercised after the federal administration’s review revealed some 
misalignments of PNP with the federal objectives. 
The mechanism to give force of law to the Canada-Quebec agreement follows a 
different scheme. According to sec. 9 of the IRPA, the signing of the intergovernmental 
agreement, under which a Province is granted sole responsibility for the selection of 
foreign nationals, has the primary function of triggering the application of sec. 9.1 
paragraphs a), b), c), d), provided that the agreement does not state otherwise. This safety 
clause is undeniably difficult to assess, as it seems to confer on the intergovernmental 
agreement a higher position than federal law, and suggests that the agreement, as such, 
would be opposable to Parliament’s discretion.  
However, setting aside this reservation, sec. 9 in practice replicates the content of the 
1991 agreement in so far as it grants Quebec a negative and a positive veto with regard to 
the selection of immigrants, and it incorporates, by reference, the law of the Province, 
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granting it the same force and effect as the IRPA provisions. It is not, then, the 
intergovernmental agreement as such that is incorporated by reference, but a statutory act of 
the Province.. It follows, then, that unlike the other Provinces, where the power to select 
immigrants stems from a delegation of administrative powers, Quebec exercises its own 
legislative functions with regard to immigration. The discretion of the Quebec 
administration is not subject to any limitations by the federal administration. This cannot 
substitute the Quebec administrative evaluation, as it may occur under the PNP programs, 
and the federal Minister is not allowed to give instructions, However, it is important to 
stress that the evaluation with respect to public order, public security, and health 
requirements in order to admit an alien remains a federal responsibility. 
I argue that this scheme, based on incorporation by reference to the Quebecker 
legislative act, is in line with sec. 95 of the Constitution Act 1867, which allows the federal 
parliament to pass an act in the field of immigration having territorial effect only in some 
Provinces. Sec. 9 of the IRPA may be read as having the effect of excluding from the 
territorial scope of the IRPA those Provinces (currently only Quebec) that, under the 
agreement, have taken full responsibility for the immigrants’ selection process. The 
applicable law in this case will be the provincial statute that is referred by the IRPA. 
The different techniques used for incorporating intergovernmental agreements have 
consequences for the individual seeking a judicial remedy against provincial immigration 
decisions. Given that the powers of the Provinces to act under the PNP stem exclusively 
from federal legislation, and that the PNP do not currently have a statutory basis, there is 
no clear legal framework to review a negative decision of a Province concerning an 
application made under a PNP. Conversely, the process of obtaining a Quebecker 
certificate of selection is regulated by statutory and secondary legislation, offering more 
precise safeguards to individuals (Nakache and Blanchard 2014: 527). 
 
5. Concluding remarks: a lesson to learn – Immigration executive 
federalism? 
 
The analysis conducted thus far has demonstrated the different approaches adopted by 
the Canadian system towards federalism and immigration. Although sec. 95 of the 
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Constitution Act, 1867 conceives immigration as a shared power, since the beginning of 
the 20th century the rule has been federal uniformity.  
With Quebec’s quiet revolution, the federation progressively granted special powers to 
Quebec in the immigration field, according to a framework of de jure asymmetry. Since the 
1990s, however, soon after the signing of the 1991 Canada and Quebec agreement, the 
federation has promoted a general decentralization in the selection process of immigrants 
that also benefited the other Provinces. By 2005, all Provinces and one territory had signed 
intergovernmental agreements with regard to immigration and, thanks to the PNP 
programs, were granted substantial powers in the selection of migrants.  
Although significant differences exist between Quebec and the other Provinces, the 
shift from de jure to de facto asymmetry has been evident. However, the two devolutionary 
processes have been based, also in legal terms, on different grounds. As a matter of fact, 
the PNP programs are based on an inter-administrative delegation of powers, which grants 
the federal government a certain power to redress the provincial administrative discretion. 
This became apparent when in 2012 the federal Government required the Provinces to 
bring their PNPs into line with federal objectives, and withdrew unilaterally from 
agreements with Manitoba and British Columbia concerning immigrant settlement services. 
Thus, although Provinces other than Quebec still maintain relevant powers in the selection 
procedure, the result of these policy changes has denoted a resurgence of de jure asymmetry. 
Quebec is the only Province that maintains the full control of migrants’ integration 
process. Unlike the other Provinces, Quebec acts autonomously in the field of selection of 
immigrants, and not under a delegation of administrative powers. This also implies that 
while in relation to PNP programs a unilateral decision of the federal government is 
enough to end them, in the Quebec case an act of Parliament is needed. 
Thus, the Canadian case tells us that devolution in selection procedures, and in 
integration of migrants, may be an answer not only to subnational-units’ national claims, 
but also to the economic and/or demographic needs of territorial units. However, the two 
grounds may not equally counterbalance the national interest in a uniform policy in 
migrants’ selection and integration. The federal measures adopted in 2012 seem to confirm 
that immigration federalism is more likely to develop, or, at least, to have a broader scope, 
in compound territorial states characterized by ethnic and linguistic cleavages, where it is 
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used as an instrument to bring together the different original nations.XXV Because of this, 
immigration federalism is also inherently asymmetric. 
A second element to highlight is the role played by sec. 95 of the Constitution Act, 
1867 in shaping the current Canadian immigration federalism scene. I argued that sect. 95 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 may be interpreted according to three different options: 
centralization, de facto asymmetry and de jure asymmetry. As a matter of fact, the Canadian 
system has over time developed each of these different possibilities. Because of this, it may 
be assumed that sect. 95 has not been crucial for a correct understanding of the division of 
powers in immigration, whose effective boundaries have been defined by inter-
administrative agreements rather than by the Constitution. However, such a conclusion 
would be unwarranted: the very existence of the immigration clause has allowed for the 
consideration of the devolution in immigration, as developed in the inter-administrative 
agreements, to be legitimate and consistent with the original understanding of the 
constitutional division of powers rather than beyond the letter of the Constitution. 
The failure of the Meech Lake and the Charlottetown Accords has certainly been a 
missed opportunity, not only to constitutionalize the practice of the intergovernmental 
agreements and state clearly their ability to derogate the federal primacy under both sec. 95 
and 91.25 of the Constitution Act, 1867, but also to guarantee to the representatives of 
both federal and provincial legislatures the possibility of exercising democratic control over 
the process of conclusion, modification or redrawing of the intergovernmental agreements. 
However, the fact that at both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords’ 
conclusions the insertion of a new immigration clause was not a highly debated issue, 
might confirm that the Canadian system as a whole has accepted that devolution in 
immigration is indeed an acknowledged feature of the federal-provincial relations. After all, 
even the recent recentralization trend has had as a consequence a better realignment of 
PNP programs with federal objectives, rather than the ending of the PNP’s existence. 
A further point worth highlighting is the legal technique which make the immigration 
intergovernmental agreements legally binding. As noted in relation to PNPs, this occurs 
through a delegation of administrative powers. The use of the delegation of powers and of 
other incorporating techniques is common not only in immigration but also in other 
material areas and has allowed the Canadian federal system to evolve from dual to 
cooperative federalism. These developments have been possible thanks to the cabinet 
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system of Canadian government: the functional relation between the Executive and the 
legislature allows Parliament to delegate normative powers to the Executive with no clear 
constitutional constraint.  
Thus, although this institutional feature of the Canadian system needs to be kept in 
mind, the Canadian case suggests nonetheless that an effective decentralization process in 
migrants’ selection may occur by means of a devolution of administrative functions.  
This feature may be important in order to consider the feasibility of the application into 
Europe of the Canadian case of federalism in immigrants’ selection. In many European 
states, immigration is a legislative power reserved by the Constitution to the national 
jurisdiction, even in compound territorial states. This is the case, for instance, of both Italy 
(see art. 117, 1 lett. a) and b) of the Italian Constitution) and Spain (see art. 149, 1 n. 2 of 
the Spanish Constitution). However, art. 118 of the Italian Constitution, which deals with 
the division of administrative functions in conformity with the subsidiarity principle, calls 
for the national level to agree with Regions’ measures for coordinating their actions in the 
field of immigration (Bonetti 2002, 1149). In Spain, at the occasion of the amending 
process of their Estatuto de Autonomia in the second half of the 2000s, Catalonia and 
Andalusia introduced provisions aimed at having administrative powers in the selection of 
immigrants, to be exercised in collaboration with the national authorities. They drew this 
power from the competences they already had in relation to the organization of active 
labour market policies (Donaire Villa and Moya Malapeira 2012: 521-559).  
Certainly, there are social and cultural features that make the Canadian case different 
from the European states’ experiences of immigration federalism. For instance, while in 
Canada, economic immigration is by far the main channel of access to the country, this is 
not the case in many European countries, where family reunification and humanitarian 
immigration are the most important migration channels. Both cases are areas where EU 
directives and international law apply, leaving no or scarce room for autonomous regional 
policies. 
Nonetheless, the idea remains that having a territorial decentralisation in economic 
migrant’s selection based on a devolution of administrative functions would be legally 
possible, as seen in relation to Italy and Spain, and it would offer an opportunity for 
subnational units to better match their territorial needs with migrants’ profiles, at the same 
time granting the national level a coordinating role. 
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 Researcher in Comparative Constitutional Law, Trento University, Sociology and Social Sciences 
Department. 
I Scholars have usually highlighted the role of subnational units in integration of migrants (see for a recent 
comparative overview Joppke and Seidle 2012), according to the distinction between “policies of 
immigration” – to be reserved to the National level – and “policies for immigrants” – to be reserved to the 
sub-national level -, formulated by Hammar 1990. However, there are also books taking a broader perspective 
and analysing the increasing role of subnational units in the selection procedures. See for a comparative 
overview, Baglay and Nakache 2014. 
II ‘Immigration federalism’ is the expression used in American legal scholarship to describe the role of 
subnational units in the enforcement of immigration rules (see Huntington 2008). Some scholars express 
criticisms, deeming that immigration enforcement by state authorities would increase the risk of racial 
discrimination (see Wishney 2001; Olivas 2007), others express more positive views (see Schuk 2007). 
III The poor law principles were reaffirmed by Charles II with the Act for the Better Reliefe of the Poore of this 
Kingdom, in 1662. 
IV It is important to note that in many cases these statutes were aimed to deter the poor irrespective to their 
national identity. They also applied to American citizens coming from other states of the federation. See 
Neumann G.L. 1993. 
V City of New York vs. Miln, 36 (11 Pet) (1837) 
VI See The Passenger cases, 48 US (7 How) 283, 512-513, 12 L.Ed, 702 (1849). 
VII Chae Chan Ping vs. US 130 US 581, 604 (1889) 
VIII Arizona vs. US, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
IX Arguably, this could also mean that the federal statute might provide different treatment that would apply 
only in some of the Provinces. This would not be a specificity of immigration, however, but rather is a 
general tenet of Canadian federalism. In fact, Peter Hogg (2003: 439) suggests that «while uniform laws are 
usual, federal law occasionally impose different rules on different part of the country. There is no 
constitutional requirement of uniformity». 
X Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, (2001) SCC 67. 
XI Narain Singh, (1908), 13 B.C.R. 477 (B.C.C.A.). 
XII (1909), 13 B.C.R. 370 (B.C.C.A.) 
XIII This was a consequence of sec. 6.2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that grants to 
permanent migrants the same mobility rights that are granted to Canadian citizens. This principle was already 
enforced by the judiciary before the entry into force of the Charter.  
XIV This is set out in the Charter of the French language. On this, see Richez 2014.  
XV On this point, see later in the text. 
XVI According to Seidle 2013: 5, in 1999 only 477 people were admitted though the PNP programs. By 2004 
they were 6,248 admissions. Following the election of the Harper Conservative government in 2006, there 
was a general move away from limit and in 2012, 40,899 people (17,200 principal applicants and 23,699 
spouses and dependants) were admitted. However, in 2012 the same Harper government progressively 
become concerned with PNP programs and introduced limits as describes later in the text. 
XVII According to the CIC 2011 evaluation, in Manitoba the percentage of migrants admitted through PNP 
during the 2005-2009 period was 91,1% (which corresponded to 13,089 people), while the percentage of 
migrants admitted through federal programs was 8.5% (1,223). In Ontario, the situation was reversed, with a 
percentage of migrants selected by the federal programs which amounted to 94.2% (98,733) and only 1.2% 
selected by the PNP (1,247). See, p. 39. 
XVIII See Hogg P. 2003, 350-351. 
XIX Attorney General of Nova Scotia v. Attorney General of Canada, 1951 SCR 31. 
XX See P.E.I. Potato Marketing Board v. Willis, (1952) 2 S.C.R., 392 
XXI See Coughlin v. Ontario Highway Transport (1968) S.C.R. 569, 584. 
XXII For a recent application, Pelland v. Attorney General of Quebec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 
XXIII This reading is confirmed in by case-law. See Kaberwal v. Saskatchewan (Ministry of Economy), 2013 SKQB 
244, 424 Sask R 144: “The Saskatchewan Immigration nominee program is not established pursuant to 
specific legislative authority. It derives its authority pursuant to “management direction from the broader 
umbrella legislative mandate of the ministry. In this respect, the processes, forms guidelines, criteria, 
requirements, evaluation and decision making were all created and are governed by broad based ministerial 
policy. As succinctly put by the ministry, the program has no statutory basis and the officials who administer 
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it do not exercise statutory authority of any kind”. 
XXIV Sec. 10.2.1 applies only to those Provinces that concluded an agreement under sec. 8 of IRPA, not under 
sec. 9. This means that currently only Quebec is not subject to this federal power. 
XXV As Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 29 point out: «Given that admissions, reception and citizenship 
policies have significant downstream impacts on the demographic, linguistic, and cultural make-up of the 
multinational state, it is unsurprising that sub-state units assert an interest not just in implementing but also in 
deciding on immigration policy with the goal of mediating the impact of immigration and integration on their 
own national identity and society». On the relation between sub-state nationalism and immigration, see also 
Medda-Windisher and Popelier 2014. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper starts with a general contextualisation of how Canadian constitutional law 
acquired an important role in global constitutional conversations in recent decades. It then 
considers, in particular, the well-known Canadian Living tree doctrine as a model of evolutionary 
constitutional interpretation, and argues that it is a relevant case study for our purposes since 
it is able to precisely link the ‘history, evolution, influence and reform’ of constitutional law 
in a comprehensive doctrine. The doctrine's comparative influence will be analysed in 
particular: the Living tree is especially relevant, since its comparative influence is traceable 
both in the work of courts that are historical participants in transnational judicial conversations, 
and courts that are new players in the game. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The symposium, and this special issue, are appropriately devoted to the history and 
evolution of Canadian constitutional law, and aim at exploring its comparative influence as 
a complementary dimension. These sought to examine the ‘history, evolution, influence and 
reform’ of the Canadian constitutional experience. I am sympathetic with this organic 
approach: after all, in an age of the renaissance of comparative constitutional law (Hirschl 
2014), one could even argue that the comparative influence of a national constitutional law 
is actually part of its history and evolution, and can even have consequences at the internal 
level. 
In this light, my reflections will start from a general contextualisation on how Canadian 
constitutional law acquired, over recent decades, an important role in global constitutional 
conversations. I will then consider in particular the well-known Canadian Living tree doctrine 
as a model of evolutionary constitutional interpretation (Waluchow 2007), and will argue that 
it is a relevant case study for our purposes since it is able to precisely link the ‘history, 
evolution, influence and reform’ of constitutional law in a comprehensive doctrine. I will 
then look in particular at the comparative influence of such a doctrine, especially relevant, I 
argue, since such an influence is traceable both in the work of courts that are historical 
participants of transnational judicial conversations (Slaughter 1994; McCrudden 2000) and courts 
that are new players in the game. 
 
2. Contextualisation 
 
Canadian constitutional law is widely discussed today: the organization of our symposium 
is an example of how Canadian constitutional law is studied and discussed beyond national 
boundaries. But a proper contextualization of our discussion is not simply that of an abstract 
comparative analysis. There is something more: in the current age of the global evolution of 
constitutionalism (Law and Versteeg 2011), when the migration of constitutional forms and 
ideas is at a historical peak (Choudhry 2006), Canada has become more and more a source 
of inspiration and a model in comparative terms.  
This is true in general sense for Canadian constitutional sources. 
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In this respect, anecdotally but quite significantly, we are reminded of a recent famous 
interview with Justice Ruth Baden Ginsburg on the Egyptian television ‘Al-Hayat’ on January 
30th 2012.I In the middle of constitutional turmoil in Egypt, Justice Ginsburg delivered some 
basic suggestions on how to draft a new constitutional text, and on where to look for 
inspiration for such an endeavour. In this sense, she stated quite openly that she could not 
‘speak about what the Egyptian experience should be’, since her experience was that of a 
judge ‘operating under a rather old constitution [and] would not look to the US constitution 
[for] drafting a constitution in the year 2012’. Importantly, she referred in this respect to the 
examples of more recent and supposedly progressive constitutional documents, mentioning 
the examples of the South African constitution of 1996, of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982. This attracted 
several criticisms by US scholars, since it was considered as an exercise of rebuttal of ‘the 
U.S. Constitution’s relevance today’ (Volokh 2012), made by an authoritative interpreter of 
it: and in a certain sense, it is precisely an example of how, today, the comparative influence 
of a national constitutional law is actually part of its history and evolution, also discussed at 
the internal level. 
But the anecdote is an example of something that has been studied by scholars in a more 
comprehensive way; recent and very popular quantitative studies were devoted precisely to 
the effort of proving the ‘declining influence of the United States constitution’ (Law and 
Versteeg 2012). For the sake of our reflections, it is not relevant to discuss whether they 
succeeded or not: what is actually relevant, I think, is that in these articles the authors 
highlighted the influence, as comparative models, of other competitive ‘transnational 
constitutional paradigms’, and explicitly designated Canada as the first new ‘constitutional 
superpower’ (Law and Versteeg 2012: 809 et seq.). In this sense, again, the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, which was adopted in conjunction with the patriation of the 
Canadian Constitution in 1982, has been described as the leading influence on the drafting 
of the South African Bill of Rights, the Israeli Basic Laws, the New Zealand Bill of Rights, 
and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, amongst others (Law and Versteeg 2012: 810; Choudhry 
1999: 820-821). All in all, new codifications of human rights in the global arena proved to 
become more and more similar to the Canadian examples of the 1960 Bill of Rights 
(technically a statute, but constitutional in character) and of the 1982 Charter, and less and 
less modelled after the US classic paradigm (Law and Versteeg 2012: 810-811). 
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But, again, this is only part of the story. What I described could be labelled as a sort of 
‘material’ influence of Canadian constitutionalism: it experienced a relatively recent 
codification, and this new material structure became influential for other subsequent 
codifications, and more than other older material. Indeed, the transplant of old paradigms 
forged by natural evolution in a liberal context, such as for instance the American presidential 
system, proved very dysfunctional in several settings (e.g. South America, Asia: see Sartori 
2004: chapt. 5). 
There is also another, less obvious, dimension of influence of Canadian constitutionalism 
that could be termed ‘doctrinal’. 
Let us consider again the words of famous scholars and Supreme Court judges. 
Aharon Barak, the famous former president of the Israeli Supreme Court, wrote in 2002 
a celebrated Foreword to the Harvard Law Review, titled ‘A Judge on Judging: the Role of a 
Supreme Court in a Democracy’ (Barak 2002). The reflections of the Author were, in that 
context, once again phrased in terms of the migration and influence of constitutional ideas. 
But here, the renowned scholar and judge did not focus in general on the structural forms 
of national constitutional texts to be replicated/transplanted elsewhere. In the Foreword, the 
focus was explicitly on judicial interpretative activity: Barak somehow replicated the critical 
remarks discussed above, on declining and rising comparative constitutional influences, but 
he did so by specifically discussing the importance of judicial interpretation provided by 
national apical courts, and its relevance in transnational judicial conversations. He was so explicit 
in this respect that he distinguished the two levels of discussion, and acknowledged that ‘we 
foreign jurists all look to developments in the United States as a source of inspiration’, but 
‘out of deep appreciation for the impressive accomplishments of United States constitutional 
law and of its Supreme Court in particular’ in historical terms, critical remarks could be based 
on the fact that ‘the American Supreme Court (…) is losing the central role it once had 
among courts in modern democracies’ (Barak 2002: 27). In this context, the Canadian 
Supreme Court was praised by Barak in several senses: as ‘a source of inspiration for many 
countries around the world’; for ‘its frequent and fruitful use of comparative law’‘ (Barak 
2002: 114); and as the first cited example of a court from one on the ‘enlightened democratic 
legal systems’ which extricate themselves from the heavy hands of intentionalism and 
originalism in interpreting the constitution and adopt a ‘purposive interpretation of the 
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constitution’ (Barak 2002: 72-73). In this context, the words of several judges of the Canadian 
Supreme Court were cited in extenso (Barak 2002: 39, 42, 44, 51, 68, 114). 
In the same vein, Anne Marie Slaughter, one of the first and more renowned scholars to 
describe and discuss transjudicial communications through which judges are ‘building a global 
community of law’, singled out the South African Constitutional Court and the ‘Canadian 
Constitutional Court’ (sic) as ‘disproportionately influential’ and ‘highly influential, 
apparently more so than the U.S. Supreme Court and other older and more established 
constitutional courts’ (Slaughter 2004: 74). Other scholars working on transnational judicial 
dialogue identified, accordingly, the Canadian Supreme Court as ‘one of the most influential 
domestic courts worldwide on human rights issues’ (Waters 2005: 558). Newspapers 
commentators spread this debate among a non-specialist public noting again that ‘many legal 
scholars singled out the Canadian Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa as increasingly influential’ (Liptak 2008). 
So in a certain sense one could take for granted the comparative relevance not only of 
Canadian constitutionalism in general, but also of the Canadian Supreme Court as its 
authoritative interpreter in particular. As said, its influence is recognized and traced by 
scholars and even in non-specialist publications. And here as well, quantitative studies 
confirm such an impression, and show that at least in certain relevant jurisdictions Canadian 
decisions are cited abundantly. For instance, in a study of 2007, Allan, Huscroft and Lynch 
demonstrated that in another common law jurisdiction, New Zealand, judges cite Canadian 
precedents far more often than those of any other nation from 1990 to 2006 (the United 
States comes next but with just over half as many citations ) (Allan, Huscroft, Lynch 2007). 
A recent study by Navot shows that in the case of the Israeli Supreme Court an average of 
more than one fourth of the constitutional cases decided between 1994 and 2010 included 
foreign citations, and 64% of all foreign law citations in constitutional cases (both 
institutional and human rights related) were from American cases, 13% from Canadian, 9% 
from English and 5% from German cases (Navot 2013: 141 et seq.). 
Such a success of the Canadian Supreme Court in comparative influence comes for many 
interrelated reasons. 
It is of course a by-product of the success in structural influence of Canadian 
constitutional sources. As many foreign legal texts are modeled on Canadian ones, it is 
natural for their interpreters to look at what the authoritative interpreter of the original model 
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has done in the past. This is true in particular for the aforementioned case of Israel: as well 
known, the local Basic Laws on human rights enacted in 1992 are drafted according to the 
Canadian example, and contain similar notwithstanding clauses, so that the Israeli Supreme 
Court in adjudicating on those has made reference to the Canadian Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence on the same matter.II 
The success of the Canadian Supreme Court comes also from the specific nature of an 
apical court of a common law jurisdiction in which a prototypical bill of rights was enacted. 
This proved decisive, for instance, in the aforementioned case of New Zealand, which is a 
perfectly comparable environment: the same study of 2007 by Allan, Huscroft and Lynch 
traces back the influence of Canada since its ‘judges are, by most accounts, the most judicially 
activist in the common law world – the most willing to second-guess the decisions of the 
elected legislatures’ (Allan, Huscroft, Lynch 2007: 5). 
Moreover, Canada is a young state with a stratified tradition of sources and, given the 
presence of Quebec, includes a mixed private legal system (Walton 1899: 282; Palmer 2007): 
in this respect, a former Canadian Supreme Court Justice, Gérard V. La Forest, for example, 
wrote that Canadians use foreign legal materials because they are naturally and ‘genuinely 
interested in the comparative approach, in learning how other traditions have dealt with the 
problems with which we are wrestling’, in a sort of exercise of inherent legal cosmopolitanism 
that is also a valuable source of both ‘effectiveness and sophistication’ (La Forest 1994: 217-
218). 
In fact, in this vein, it is well known that the Canadian Supreme Court championed the 
use of comparative law and international law in performing its interpretative tasks. Important 
studies noted that this was the case in the extensive use of comparative law in constitutional 
or human rights cases (La Forest 1994; Lefler 2001), but also in statutory interpretation 
(Neudorf 2017), and in the blossoming use of international law in defining the guarantees 
found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Warner La Forest 2004; Arbour, 
Lafontaine 2007; Oliphant 2014). Much could be said on this: but suffice is to say that the 
Canadian Supreme Court is clearly a well-recognised participant in transnational judicial 
conversations as both a borrower and a recipient of comparative influence. 
After all, since transnational judicial conversations comprise not only formal citations among 
judicial bodies, but also cross-fertilization in general (Teitel 2004), it must be noted that a 
remarkably large number of Supreme Court members also engaged in personal terms in such 
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an endeavour. Important works published – during their mandate – by Justices Claire 
L’Heureux-Dube (L’Heureux-Dube 1998), Gérard V. La Forest (La Forest 1994), Michel 
Bastarache (Bastarache 1998), Beverley McLachlin (McLachlin 1998), among the others, 
expressly preached the comparative role of the Canadian Court and its openness towards the 
global legal arena. 
 
3. The Living Tree doctrine as a distinctive model of  evolutionary 
interpretation 
 
So, we have a background of general openness of Canadian constitutionalism - in 
material/structural terms - and the Canadian Supreme Court in particular - in doctrinal terms 
- towards global legal conversation. Several interrelated dynamics concurred in shaping such 
an influential position. 
Here, I would like to focus my attention on one of the specific judicial doctrines which 
proved successful in determining the influence of the Canadian Supreme Court and of its 
much discussed interpretative work in the comparative ‘market of ideas’ (Goldman 1999). 
Funnily enough, I am talking of a very famous interpretative doctrine that was not forged, 
originally, by the Supreme Court and in relation to current Canadian constitutional sources. 
The Living Tree doctrine was first conceived of in a 1929 decision, Edwards vs Canada otherwise 
known as the ‘Persons Case’,III issued by the Canada’s highest court at the time, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in Britain. After analyzing the Constitution’s use of 
the term ‘persons’, which had always referred to men, the JCPC decided that both men and 
women were now ‘persons’, and therefore could be equally called to sit in the Canadian 
senate. According to the historically celebrated words of Justice Sankey, while constitutional 
stability and integrity are of crucial importance, the Constitution ‘also planted in Canada a 
living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits’. Women may not have 
been able to vote or hold office in 1867, but times had changed and so had to change 
constitutional interpretation: the decision led women to gain a measure of equality to men in 
the political arena.  
Such a Living Tree doctrine has since been endorsed multiple times by the Supreme Court 
of Canada when analyzing constitutional rights;IV it has become the Court's preferred method 
of constitutional interpretation when dealing with division of powers provisions.V Moreover, 
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it was associated not only with a progressive but also a purposive/teleological construction 
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms provisions (Tremblay 1995; Karazivan 2017: 631). 
The Supreme Court adopted the doctrine, and therefore a method of constitutional 
interpretation that openly aims at allowing the Canada’s constitution to change and evolve 
over time (‘ a living tree capable of growth and expansion (...)’), while still acknowledging its 
original intentions (‘(…) within its natural limits’) (Hogg 2007: 36.8(a)). In doing so the 
doctrine shapes a balance between two seemingly contradictory, but ultimately 
complementary, goals: predictability and flexibility. It was already clear in the words of Justice 
Sankey in Edwards: to be effective, the constitution must consist of a set of predictable rules, 
in order to let citizens know how their activities are treated, and the federal government and 
the provinces can be overseen in a consistent matter. Still, on the other hand, the necessity 
of a flexible interpretation is acknowledged (and it was acknowledged already in 1929!), to 
accommodate the realities and the challenges of changing modern life. The Supreme Court 
explicitly stated that this is, ultimately, to preserve the vitality of the constitution: unless 
interpreted in this way, it would be frozen in time and become more obsolete than useful 
(Hogg 2007: 36.8(a)).VI 
The approach consists of identifying the purposes or goals of the constitutional 
provisions in order to provide them with meaning: by constructing them according to those 
purposes or goals. Such a technique of interpretation is also adopted when there is no clear 
guidance as to the nature or the meaning of the protected interest at stake (Tremblay 1995: 
473), which is in any case researched by the Supreme Court, not necessarily in an historical 
light, but also in a ‘contemporaneous’ one (Tremblay 2006: 86; Karazivan 2017: 631). 
To give some well-known examples, such an approach led the Court in 2004 to include 
same-sex marriage in the capacity to enter into marriage provided by Section 91(26) of the 
Constitution Act 1867, even though such a provision probably did not include it in terms on 
unspecified intentions at the time in which it was enacted, since it deemed impossible to 
infer, in looking at the constitutional goals implied, ‘natural limits’ to the definition of 
marriage.VII Seemingly, it led the Court in 2005 to include maternity leave in the competence 
transferred to the federal parliament in 1940 on ‘unemployment insurance’, even though 
such a provision probably did not include it in terms on unspecified intentions at the time in 
which it was enacted. In looking at the constitutional goals implied, the Court highlighted 
that Parliament considered unemployment to be an historical urgent national problem, 
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and ‘over the years, numerous amendments were made to the original Act, generally to 
expand qualifying conditions, increase benefits and eliminate inequities’, and therefore, given 
the social transformation occurred, this has to include maternity leave nowadays.VIII Again, 
such an approach led the Court in 2007, when dealing with the historical division-of-powers 
provisions of Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act 1867 vis-à-vis the competence to 
rule on licensing scheme governing the promotion of modern insurance products, to state 
that the meaning those provisions had in 1867 does not reflect judicial practice. Here, ‘the 
interpretation of these powers and of how they interrelate must evolve and must be tailored 
to the changing political and cultural realities of Canadian society’ (and, in looking at the 
constitutional goals implied, the promotion of authorized insurance ‘is not part of the core 
of banking because it is not essential to the function of banking’).IX 
It must also be noted that, here again, the Living tree as an interpretative doctrine was 
formally endorsed not only by the Supreme Court, but also by its Justices in a personal 
academic capacity (L’Heureux-Dube 1998; Binnie 2004), and by major Canadian scholars 
(Hogg 2007: 15; Tremblay 2006; Cyr 2014); it became an orthodoxy.X 
For our purposes, in any case, it is important to evaluate the Living tree doctrine in a 
comparative perspective. And in this sense, I argue, the doctrine has something specific and 
distinctive that fed its success in a comparative perspective, as a model of constitutional 
interpretation with an important comparative influence. 
As has been already said (Jackson 2006), the Living tree doctrine could be considered as just 
one of the many metaphors used in different legal settings to describe the classic claim that, 
in a judicial pragmatic perspective, a constitution has a dynamic meaning, or that it has the 
properties of animate being or other object capable of change.XI The idea, as well-known, is 
associated with views that contemporaneous society should be taken into account when 
interpreting key constitutional phrases. 
In this respect, the best known example of a similar metaphor can be found in the United 
States, where doctrines of constitutional interpretation have been intensely discussed for 
decades and decades. Interestingly, the American idea of a ‘Living constitution’ also derives 
from the 1920’s, probably from the title of a 1927 book by Professor Howard Lee McBain 
(McBain 1927). Efforts at developing such a concept have been credited to both judicial and 
political figures such as Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Louis D. Brandeis, and Woodrow 
Wilson. The latter famously argued, in his 1908 book Constitutional Government in the United 
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States, that ‘living political constitutions must be Darwinian in structure and in practice’ 
(Wilson 1908). Such a trend gained more and more success also a tool of constitutional 
interpretation (Kammen 1987: 325), starting from the assumption that the old American 
constitution was deliberately written to be broad and flexible to accommodate social or 
technological change over time. A famous historical explicit application of such a framework 
is evident, for instance, in the Supreme Court's reference to ‘evolving standards of decency’ 
under the Eighth Amendment; in 1958 in the famous case Trop v. DullesXII the Court stated 
that ‘[T]he words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not 
static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society’. As also well-known, such an interpretative 
framework is opposed to other conservative ones, again phrased in metaphorical terms, such 
as the various forms of originalist interpretations, which aim to stick to the original meaning 
of the constitutional text or to the historical intent of the legislator (Strauss 2010). 
Similar approaches can be seen in continental Europe as well. For instance, scholars look 
at the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany as examples of eclecticism, 
in which judges ‘employ a set of arguments and analytical techniques that go beyond the text 
and typically involve resort to prior decisions (even in systems not formally built on judicial 
precedent), as well as constitutional purpose, and, on occasion, the likely consequences of 
alternative interpretations or the experience of other democracies’. They also recognize in 
any case that the principal approach adopted by the Federal Constitutional Court is a ‘value-
oriented’ one, ‘involving an “objective ordering of values”’ and often beginning ‘with a 
statement of the fundamental constitutional principle at stake’, so that such a principled 
interpretation cannot but depart from the plain text, and thus make the constitution a living 
instrument (Jackson 2006: 929). Such an approach is even more explicitly theorized in Italian 
constitutional law and adjudication, where a similar interpretation is adopted; both scholars 
and the Constitutional Court talk of Article 2 of the Italian Constitution as a ‘page left open’ 
by the Framers in the specification of constitutional basic principles and values, to be filled 
by interpretative means in a broad and flexible way to accommodate social and technological 
change over time (Mortati 1969: 949 et seq.; Barbera 1975: 50-53).XIII 
Again, similarly, even is settings where a sort of moderate originalist model of 
interpretation is in vogue, such as Australia (Goldsworthy 2000), famous doctrinal calls for 
interpreting the constitution as a ‘living force’ have been issued (Kirby 2000), again framed 
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in the same metaphorical terms and therefore using ‘life’ as an idea to express a capacity for 
dynamic change through interpretation. 
In terms of metaphors, it is relevant to notice in comparative perspective that the 
opposite idea of a ‘petrification’ of the constitution, and of its text and meaning, was used in 
different contexts to oppose such an idea of interpretative dynamic change.XIV This is 
relevant because the Canadian Supreme Court itself, in cases like Reference Re SameSex Marriage 
in which the Living tree doctrine was adopted and updated, explicitly confronted and refused 
the idea of a static nature of constitutional concepts: Chief Justice McLachlin introduced a 
very similar metaphor to that of ‘petrification’, stating that the ‘(T)he “frozen concepts” 
reasoning runs contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of Canadian 
constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution is a living tree which, by way of 
progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life’. 
I stress the point, since I argue that therein lies the distinctiveness of the Living tree doctrine, 
precisely as refined and updated by the Supreme Court of Canada throughout the decades: 
in constructing predictability and flexibility as complementary dimensions, in requiring 
adherence to the roots, while paying attention to nurturing the fruits of constitutional 
interpretation at the same time. 
Metaphors are widely employed in law since they are, after all, necessary: they reveal what 
technical language might not convey (Ricœur 1975). Still, because of their ultimately 
undetermined nature, they can nonetheless obscure as much as they illuminate (Jackson 
2006: 926). 
Nonetheless, I agree with the idea that the Living tree doctrine is distinct from ‘the less 
tethered ‘living constitution’’ metaphor, or the others we briefly described: it captures not 
only the idea of progressive interpretation, but the multi-dimensional idea of a 
purposive/teleological interpretation ‘constrained by the past, but not entirely’, in which 
both ‘the idea of constraint, the role of text and original understanding in the roots of the 
constitutional tree and the role of precedent and new developments in its growth’ are crucial, 
in which ‘the multiple modalities - text, original intentions, structure and purpose, precedent 
and doctrine, values and ethos, prudential or consequentialist concerns - of contemporary 
constitutional interpretation’ are distinctively embraced (Jackson 2006: 926).  
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
97 
And in this sense, I argue that such a precise and distinctive nature of the Living tree 
doctrine as a model of constitutional interpretation proved crucial for its comparative 
influence and thus also for the comparative influence of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
To support my argument, I will look at a sample of relevant cases from different 
jurisdictions.  
 
4. The Living Tree doctrine as a distinctive model of  evolutionary 
constitutional interpretation 
 
We will look at three cases from different jurisdictions where comparative arguments 
based on reliance of the Canadian Supreme Court's precedents were put forward. 
I argue that they are relevant for several reasons. It is noteworthy that, in their 
chronological order, they show a progressive comparative influence of the Canadian 
Supreme Court's model of constitutional interpretation: it was firstly cited by well-known 
participants of transnational judicial conversations such as the South African Constitutional Court 
and the Israeli Supreme Court, but ultimately it also influenced a rather traditional judicial 
body such as the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional. Moreover, I argue that in the cases 
selected the reliance on the model is not random, and is not interchangeable with the reliance 
on other ‘metaphorical’ but less specific models of interpretation: quite the opposite, it was 
carefully chosen because it was important to express that precise idea of both constraint and 
dynamic development, with ‘the role of text and original understanding in the roots of the 
constitutional tree and the role of precedent and new developments in its growth’. 
The first case comes from South Africa: it is the well-known Makwanyane case.XV It was 
one of the first cases decided by the local Constitutional Court once established by the 
Interim constitution of 1993 and after beginning its first session in 1995. In its landmark 
decision, the Court investigated the constitutionality of a provision of the 1977 Criminal 
Procedure Act on capital punishment in relation to section 8 (equality before the law), 9 
(right to life), 10 (protection of human dignity), and 11 (unlawfulness of cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment and punishment) of the new Interim constitution of 1993. The Court 
went through a critical assessment of various countries' constitutional jurisprudence on death 
penalty, discarded the usefulness of American and Indian precedents in this respect, and 
turned its attention mainly to Canadian case law. The Canadian Supreme Court faced, from 
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1991 to 2001, an important set of cases on the question of whether it would violate the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms to permit the extradition of a person to the United States 
to face a possible death sentence. In Kindler v. Canada,XVI the Supreme Court of Canada 
rejected a claim that section 7 of the Charter (prohibiting deprivations of liberty inconsistent 
with fundamental principles of justice) prohibited the extradition of the defendant, who had 
already been sentenced to death, to the United States; three of the seven judges nonetheless 
dissented with strong arguments, based upon ‘the historical reluctance displayed by jurors 
over the centuries to impose the death penalty, the provisions of s. 12 of the Charter and the 
decisions of this Court pertaining to that section. It is also built on the pronouncements of 
the Canadian Court which emphasised the fundamental importance of human dignity, and 
on international statements and commitments made by Canada stressing the importance of 
the dignity of the individual and urging the abolition of the death penalty’, and therefore on 
arguments based precisely on that blend of tradition and development which is typical of 
Canadian constitutional interpretation. Those dissenting arguments proved successful 
internally, since Kindler v. Canada was basically overturned in 2001 with United States v 
Burns,XVII and again with diachronic arguments: the Court explained its change of position 
in light of intervening developments, including international initiatives, change in other state 
practices, and accelerating concern in Canada over wrongful convictions in Canada and the 
United States. Although ‘the basic tenets of [Canada's] legal system.., have not changed since 
1991 when Kindler and Reference re Ng Extradition were decided (...) their application in 
particular cases (the ‘balancing process’) must take note of factual developments in Canada 
and in relevant foreign jurisdictions (...) [The] balance which tilted in favour of extradition 
without assurances in Kindler and Ng now tilts against the constitutionality of such an 
outcome’. But in particular, those dissenting arguments were relevant for the South African 
Court’s decision in Makwanyane, which relied on the Canadian Supreme Court’s idea that ‘a 
right or freedom guaranteed’ is ‘to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a 
guarantee’ and ‘in other words, in the light of the interests it was meant to protect’, ‘and the 
purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and 
larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or 
freedom, to the historical origins of the concept enshrined, and where applicable, to the 
meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated’, 
to state that ‘(T)he death penalty not only deprives the prisoner of all vestiges of human 
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dignity, it is the ultimate desecration of the individual as a human being. It is the annihilation 
of the very essence of human dignity’. 
The second relevant comparative case comes from Israel. I already hinted at how the 
Canadian example is ‘materially’/’structurally’ relevant for Israeli constitutional law and 
adjudication, since the drafting style of the local Basic Laws on human rights of 1992 is 
modelled after the Canadian charter of rights. I also touched on how Canadian precedents 
have been quantitatively important in shaping the Israeli jurisprudence. 
But there is also a qualitative doctrinal relevance of the Canadian model to be 
appreciated. This comes from the times in which the ‘constitutional revolution’ founded on 
the Israeli Basic Laws on human rights of 1992 had not yet been sanctioned by the Israeli 
Supreme Court,XVIII and the Court was shaping its own judicial-made bill of rights through 
mere interpretative activity (Barak-Erez 1995). In a famous case on free speech, Station Film 
Co. Ltd. v. The Film Review Board,XIX the problem of censorship on pornography was discussed. 
The classic question at stake was whether freedom of expression should be extended to 
pornography, and under what limits: should a work's artistic value be examined as a whole 
when the pornographic parts are seen as part of the entire work? The case heavily relied on 
a Canadian precedent, R v. Butler, and decisively: ‘a work's artistic value is evaluated on the 
basis of the work as a whole. Thus, the artistic value of individual sections per se is not 
examined. This approach is also accepted in Canada. In Butler, Justice Sopinka wrote: ‘The 
“internal necessities” test, or what has been referred to as the “artistic defence”, has been 
interpreted to assess whether the exploitation of sex has a justifiable role in advancing the 
plot or the theme, and in considering the work as a whole, does not merely represent “dirt 
for dirt's sake” but has a legitimate role when measured by the internal necessities of the 
work itself’. Thus, the Israeli Court relied here on a case in which the Canadian Supreme 
Court was evaluating the constitutionality of provisions of the Criminal Code dealing with 
obscenity, and specifically the phrase ‘undue exploitation’, by acknowledging that the 
concept meant different things at different times, appealing far more to conceptions of 
morality than to law, and is therefore inherently subjective. The Canadian Court implicitly 
argued that Parliament intended for the term to reflect evolving standards, since the term 
‘undue’ invariably requires a fact specific inquiry that, like the term ‘reasonable’, cannot be 
divorced from modern standards and conceptions. In the face of an ambiguous meaning, 
the Court rightly adopted the less intrusive option: this was based on the argument according 
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to which the overriding objective of the Charter (s. 163) was not moral disapprobation but 
the avoidance of harm to society, and therefore the constitutional interpretation was based 
on a specific quest for the constitutional goal or purpose to be compared with the legislative 
decision of the Parliament: a move that the Israeli Supreme Court effectively replicated in 
Station Film Co. Ltd. v. The Film Review Board, arguing that the respondent's order to delete the 
pornographic parts of the film was invalid, except for the portions which the petitioner had 
agreed to delete.  
The third relevant comparative case comes from Spain. It is a very well-known one, and, 
here as well, the Tribunal constitucional had to deal with the classic problem of a possible change 
in meaning of a legislative provision. The Spanish Court in the famous case n. 198/2012 of 
November 28th 2012 upheld Law n. 13/2005 which guarantees same-sex marriage in Spain. 
The Tribunal explicitly referred to the model of the Living tree doctrine of the Canadian 
Supreme Court, and, as said, this alone is relevant, as the tradition of quoting foreign law in 
Spanish constitutional adjudication was scarce, and on the decline (after a first period of 
ample use in the 1980's: Santana Herrera 2010). It made explicit reference to both the Edwards 
and the Reference re Same Sex Marriage cases. But what is more relevant is that the reliance of 
the Tribunal on the cited Living tree doctrine was not generic, as one of the many metaphors 
one can use to suggest a dynamic constitutional interpretation; quite the opposite, it was 
carefully planned. The Tribunal emphasized the need to guarantee full equality in marriage 
regardless of sexual orientation because of the constitutional protection of dignity and 
personality, and openly declared its adoption of a non-originalist interpretation of the 
constitutional text, which was to be interpreted as an evolving document in the perspective 
of its historical origins and within the limits of those, and therefore precisely as intended by 
the Supreme Court of Canada. The Tribunal looked, in fact, precisely at the historical purpose 
served in 1978 by Article 32, paragraph 1 in establishing legal equality between men and 
women, and recognized that the institution of marriage have developed in a different and 
more liberal framework precisely because of the natural evolution of that historical purpose. The 
Court explored the evolution of the social concept of marriage, its detachment from the right 
to create a family, and the parallel legislative acknowledgement of same-sex marriage in the 
vast majority of European legal orders: it stated that all required a changed interpretation of 
the Spanish Constitution, which should not be considered ‘frozen’ in time.XX As the 
concurrent opinion of Justice Aragón Reyes made clear, the decision was based on the 
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argument that, given the evolution of the historical purpose of equality, the principle of 
heterosexuality was no longer an essential element of the guarantee of marriage based on the 
current social conscience and legal culture of Spain. The Tribunal established the need for a 
new, evolutive interpretation of the Spanish Constitution, to make of it an ‘árbol vivo’ and 
not ‘letra muerta’, as an exercise of continuous legitimation. The adherence to the Canadian 
model was therefore explicit, both in principle and in the jargon employed. 
 
5. Some tentative conclusions 
 
What I have tried to demonstrate in the paper is, in short, the multi-faceted influence of 
Canadian constitutionalism, for reasons ranging from the general to the particular. 
It is widely discussed and influential in comparative terms in a sort of material/structural 
sense: it has experienced a relatively recent exercise of codification, a fruitful one, and this 
was then adopted elsewhere as a model, and much discussed by scholars, even attracting 
controversy. 
The Supreme Court of Canada is, then, the paradigmatic example of a modern judicial 
institution open to the influences of global constitutionalism, and much present in today's 
transnational judicial conversations. It makes frequent use of comparative and international law; 
it is much cited in foreign jurisdictions; its members do not shy away from theorising such 
an endeavour. 
But there is something more: a specific comparative influence of the Living Tree doctrine, 
as a distinctive model of constitutional interpretation which is assonant, but not identical, to 
other progressive/purposive forms of interpretation. This is becoming more and more 
relevant in the comparative ‘market of ideas’: it was adopted as an inspiration firstly by other 
classic transnational judicial conversations' participants, but it is today also used, with theoretical 
attention and precision, in the activity of a jurisdiction of a consolidated democracy like the 
Spanish Tribunal constitucional. The distinctive nature of the Living Tree doctrine in comparison 
with other models of constitutional interpretation is the basis of its comparative influence. 
 Postdoctoral researcher at Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna. Leonardo.Pierdominici@eui.eu. 
Thanks are due to Giuseppe Martinico, Giacomo Delledonne and the anonymous reviewers for their precious 
comments on an early draft. Errors are mine. 
I The interview is available at the website https://www.memri.org/tv/us-supreme-court-justice-ruth-bader-
ginsburg-egyptians-look-constitutions-south-africa-or-canada. 
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II See as a prototypical example the case HCJ 4676/94 Meatreal Ltd v. Knesset [1996] IsrSC. 50(5) 15. [30]. 
III Edwards v Canada (Attorney General) [1930] AC 124 at 124, 1929 UKPC 86. 
IV See for instance the cases Mounted Police Ass'n Ont. v. AG of Canada, 2015, SCC 1, (2015) 1 S.C.R. 3; 
Figueroa v. AG for Canada, 2003 SCC 37 (2003) 1 S.C.R. 912; H.M. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. (1985) 1 S.C.R. 
295. 
V See among the others Reference re Same-sex marriage, 2004 SCC 79 (2004) 3 S.C.R. 698, in particular at 
paragraphs 22-30. 
VI See for a judicial assertion on this Reference re Same-sex marriage, 2004 SCC 79 (2004) 3 S.C.R. 698 
VII Reference re Same-sex marriage, 2004 SCC 79 (2004) 3 S.C.R. 698. 
VIII Reference re Employement Insurance Act, 2005 SCC 56, (2005) 2 S.C.R. 669. 
IX Canadian W. Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 (2007) 2 S.C.R. 3. 
X Even though sometimes put into question: see Karazivan 2017. 
XI See on the use of metaphors in the legal realms the special issue of the journal Pólemos - Journal of Law, 
Literature and Culture VI 2012. 
XII Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
XIII See in this respect Corte costituzionale sentenze n. 11/1956 and 98/1979. 
XIV Of course the reference is to Versteinerungstheorie in Austrian constitutional doctrine: see on this Douin 
1977 at 49-52, Gamper 2005 at 15-16, Taylor 2006 at 98-103, Grimm 2011 at 24 in particular.  
XV S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 391; [1996] 2 
CHRLD 164; 1995 (2) SACR 1 (6 June 1995). 
XVI Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779. 
XVII United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7. 
XVIII With the foundational and well-known case CA 6821/93, 1908/94, 3363/94 United Hamizrahi Bank v. 
Migdal Cooperative Village [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221. 
XIX HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Ltd v. Film and Plays Review Board [1997] IsrSC 50(5) 661. 
XX Par. 9: ‘Para avanzar en el razonamiento es preciso dar un paso más en la interpretación del precepto. Se 
hace necesario partir de un presupuesto inicial, basado en la idea, expuesta como hemos visto por el Abogado 
del Estado en sus alegaciones, de que la Constitución es un ‘árbol vivo’, —en expresión de la sentencia Privy 
Council, Edwards c. Attorney General for Canada de 1930 retomada por la Corte Suprema de Canadá en la 
sentencia de 9 de diciembre de 2004 sobre el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo— que, a través de 
una interpretación evolutiva, se acomoda a las realidades de la vida moderna como medio para asegurar su 
propia relevancia y legitimidad, y no sólo porque se trate de un texto cuyos grandes principios son de aplicación 
a supuestos que sus redactores no imaginaron, sino también porque los poderes públicos, y particularmente el 
legislador, van actualizando esos principios paulatinamente y porque el Tribunal Constitucional, cuando 
controla el ajuste constitucional de esas actualizaciones, dota a las normas de un contenido que permita leer el 
texto constitucional a la luz de los problemas contemporáneos, y de las exigencias de la sociedad actual a que 
debe dar respuesta la norma fundamental del ordenamiento jurídico a riesgo, en caso contrario, de convertirse 
en letra muerta. Esa lectura evolutiva de la Constitución, que se proyecta en especial a la categoría de la garantía 
institucional, nos lleva a desarrollar la noción de cultura jurídica, que hace pensar en el Derecho como un 
fenómeno social vinculado a la realidad en que se desarrolla y que ya ha sido evocada en nuestra jurisprudencia 
previa (SSTC 17/1985, de 9 de febrero, FJ 4; 89/1993, de 12 de marzo, FJ 3; 341/1993, de 18 de noviembre, 
FJ 3; 29/1995, de 6 de febrero, FJ 3; y 298/2000, de 11 de diciembre, FJ 11) . Pues bien, la cultura jurídica no 
se construye sólo desde la interpretación literal, sistemática u originalista de los textos jurídicos, sino que 
también contribuyen a su configuración la observación de la realidad social jurídicamente relevante, sin que 
esto signifique otorgar fuerza normativa directa a lo fáctico, las opiniones de la doctrina jurídica y de los órganos 
consultivos previstos en el propio ordenamiento, el Derecho comparado que se da en un entorno socio-cultural 
próximo y, en materia de la construcción de la cultura jurídica de los derechos, la actividad internacional de los 
Estados manifestada en los tratados internacionales, en la jurisprudencia de los órganos internacionales que los 
interpretan, y en las opiniones y dictámenes elaboradas por los órganos competentes del sistema de Naciones 
Unidas, así como por otros organismos internacionales de reconocida posición.’ 
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Abstract 
 
In constitutional theory, the referendum is an instrument that allows for the expression of 
the popular will in government decisions and through which people are asked to vote directly 
on an issue or policy. Over the last decades, the referendum has been the instrument used 
by minority groups to claim their independence supported by popular will. This paper 
examines trends in constitutional jurisprudence on the issue of independence referendums. 
The birth of this constitutional trend can be found in the 1998 decision by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Reference Re Secession of Quebec. The principles developed therein have 
been further explored in two recent cases, issued by the Italian Constitutional), and by the 
Spanish Constitutional Tribunal in the latest decision of the Catalonia saga (Judgment no. 
114/2017). 
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1. Introduction 
 
In constitutional theory, the referendum (from the Latin expression ad referendum, meaning 
“convocation to referee”) is an instrument of direct democracy that allows the expression of 
the popular will in government decisions and through which people are asked to vote directly 
on an issue or policy (Morel 2012: 502). Thanks to the influence exercised by Rousseau’s 
ideas, and mainly the idea that the only valid form of legislation was popular legislation, it is 
possible to find the first constitutional traces of the referendum in the 1793 French 
Constitution (which remained inactive) and in the Swiss constitutional order (federal and 
cantonal) in which, since 1848, the referendum found extensive and well-structured 
prediction (Salerno 1988: 202). While no explicit reference to referendums or popular 
consultation was provided in the 1787 US Constitution, referendums started to be used by 
American states from the end of XVIII century, thanks to the influence exercised by the 
Progressive Movement and by the idea of the need to extend the use of the popular will (Salerno 
1988: 203).  
Although the referendum has been a subject of interest in legal science since its first 
conceptualisation, this interest has increased in the XX century, following the greater use of 
referendum, both internationallyI and constitutionally (as evidenced in the composition of 
many European Constitutions, such as the 1919 Weimer Constitution; Salerno 1988: 204). 
Referendums can take an extensive variety of forms: we can distinguish between 
mandatory or compulsory referendums and optional or facultative, depending if the request of the 
referendum is a compulsory part, or not, of a regulated process as, for example, a legislative 
process; we can distinguish by the actors who propose it, between referendums initiated by 
institutional actors such as the executive, the legislative branch, or a parliamentary minority, 
and popular initiatives. With regard to the formal objective, it is possible to differentiate 
between abrogative, suspensive or deliberative referendums when the vote is on existing legislation, 
and prepositive referendums if it refers to new legislation. We can classify referendums by the 
reference to the legal consequences of the vote, distinguishing between consultative or advisory 
referendums or binding ones. The referendum can deal with a wide category of legislative acts 
(ordinary legislation, constitutional reforms or international treaties), and it can concern a 
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range of subjects: institutional, international, territorial, moral, economic etc. (Morel 2012: 
508). 
The recent comparative experience, of the last 30 years, shows us an increasing trend in 
using the referendum as a tool to support minority groups’ demands for independence. Apart 
from those cases in which the independence request came from oppressed people as the 
expression of their right to self-determination, there has been an increasing use of the 
referendum by minority groups living in consolidated democratic states. Usually they are 
groups with a specific historical and cultural heritage, distinct from the majority, which 
already enjoy regional and/or federal political autonomy status: their demand is directed to 
obtaining the sovereignty that they consider belongs to them, through secession from the 
State they are part of.  
For Qvortrup (2014: 1-4), since the Second World War there have been slightly more 
than fifty referendums on independence. The conditions under which these took place were 
very different: for example, the referendum in French Guinea that was held in 1958 was part 
of the decolonisation process that took place in the second half of the XX century. It was 
held as part of a wider referendum across the French Union to adopt the new French 
Constitution. As the consequence of rejecting the adoption of the French Constitution, 
Guinea gained independence. Referendums held in 1991 in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania to 
gain independence were part of the restructuring of Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. The constitutional referendum held in Iceland in 1944 asked voters whether the 
Union with Denmark should be abolished and a new constitution approved. But the list is 
longer.  
Very few referendums had been held in each decade before 1990, while in the last 30 
years there has been an explosion of plebiscites (Qvortrup 2014: 1-4). Referendums held 
before 1990 are strongly linked to an international consolidation of the right to self-
determination of peoples, and the decolonisation process, while referendums held since the 
end of the Eighties finds their explication, from a geo-political point of view, in the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union that redesigned the features of 
Europe.  
However, referendums held since the middle of the Nineties have had different 
characteristics: they have been held in democratic countries, and they have all resulted in the 
rejection of the proposed change, as shown by referendums in Quebec in 1980 and 1995, in 
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St. Kitts and Nevis in 1998II and in Scotland in 2014. The only case in which a referendum 
on independence in a democratic country was successful is Montenegro in 2006. 
From a political point of view, the outcome of a referendum on independence is related 
to multiple elements. However, to be constitutionally legitimate, secession requires that 
certain essential elements be respected. Since most contemporary constitutions are silent on 
this point, with very few exceptions,III constitutional judges have been responsible for 
determining which elements should be respected to allow a constitutional secession. More 
specifically, this article will deal with two main aspects: the constitutional nature of a 
referendum on independence or secession, and its possible legal effects. 
In this regard, in the following pages we will first see the theoretical configuration of 
secession, and the transition from a de facto institution to a subjective legal situation which, in 
some cases, clearly provides for its qualification as a right (paragraph II). The analysis of the 
reference of the Supreme Court of Canada on the intent of the secession of Quebec will 
follow (III): even if the decision issued by the Supreme Court of Canada dates back to 1998, 
the constitutional argumentation developed therein still represents an important and topical 
lesson for more recent cases of independence intent, as in the cases of the Veneto Region in 
Italy and Catalonia in Spain. Thus, the Italian Constitutional Court Judgment no. 118/2015, 
and the latest decision of the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal in the Catalonia saga (Decision 
no. 114/2017), will be analysed (respectively in paragraphs IV and V). This choice is mainly 
due because both constitutional judges have faced the same problems in dealing with an 
internal entity with intents on secession, and have both chosen analogous solutions, inspired 
by similar constitutional principles to those developed by the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
1998 decision.  
Last, some final considerations on the emergence of a constitutional tendency among 
constitutional judges, on the use of referendums for independence, will be developed in 
paragraph V. 
 
2. Secession, Constitution and Referendum 
 
Secession, as the “formal withdrawal from a central authority by a member unity” (Wood 
1981: 110) is an event through which new states are created. Part of constitutional theory 
considers secession as an extra ordinem fact, generally ignored by traditional international 
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doctrine and international lawIV and demonized by constitutional law. Constitutional legal 
scholarship has underlined how the idea of secession clashes with State and sovereignty 
conceptions elaborated in the XIX and XX centuries, in that supposed constitutional rights 
to secession are “manifestly absurd for the nature of the Constitution itself”.V In 1869 the 
US Supreme Court, in the case Texas vs. White,VI stated that “When […] Texas became one 
of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of perpetual 
union, and all the guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at once to the 
State. The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something more than 
a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was 
final. The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as 
indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no place for reconsideration 
or revocation, except through revolution or through consent of the States.”VII Secession has 
become considered as a taboo, and has almost become forbidden by constitutional law that 
has given prevalence and priority to the principle of unity of the State. 
According to the compact theory, however, secession is an inherent right related to the belief 
that – with specific reference to Southern States of the US – the union between states is 
made on a volunteer basis. Moreover, secession has been justified by the inherent-power 
argument, according to which States have the power to reassert their previous status of 
sovereignty and- as Calhoun argued (1992)– due to the absence of federal power (Neff 2015: 
407-401). 
The principle of unity started to lose part of its power when, in 1921, the Aland Islands 
asked for independence from Finland: in that case, the League of Nations stated that 
secession can never be unilateral;VIII the only case in which secession can be unilateral is when 
it represents a remedy to an injustice. From that moment onwards, secession started to be 
considered as a remedial right.IX The right of self-determination has been recognised since the 
Second World War, and it has provided the conditions under which secession can be 
legitimate under international law. According to art. 1 of the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.” Due to its wide formulation, this disposition also seemed to 
include the right to secede, but only for oppressed peoples (Ruggiu 2016: 75). As a matter of 
fact, contemporary international doctrine considers secession as an extreme remedy to 
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situations in which a State has committed a gross violation on the right to free self-
determination of a people, or other fundamental human rights of minorities, or other groups 
which are under its sovereignty. Secession as a remedial right is constituted when a State 
exercises a form of abusive sovereignty that, from an international point of view, would 
justify the “rebellion against tyranny and oppression” indicated in the Preamble of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a legitimate reaction. Here, secession is strongly 
related to the right of free self-determination of peoples in its external perspective: in this 
case, the right to self-determination is denied by the State, whose claim rests on the principle 
of State integrity and unity. However, rather than authorising the right to secession, the trend 
is to ask the State to stop committing the violation and to reestablish the status quo ante. Even 
if the trend is toward the prevalence of the principle of state integrity over secession,X as 
established in paragraph 7 of the United Nation General Assembly Resolution n. 2625 
(XXV), the State’s right to have its integrity respected is strictly conditional on the respect 
the State gives to internal self-determination, giving representation to the whole people, 
including minority groups (Murswiek 1993: 38).  
These had been the guiding principles during the decolonisation process; however, since 
the end of this process in the 1990s, secession claims have started to gain a new profile. First 
of all, they come from minority groups with historical, cultural and linguistic specificities. 
Secondly, these groups are part of consolidated democratic States within which they already 
have specific political autonomy: the aim of their independence claims is to regain lost 
sovereignty. Thirdly, they do not seek to use the referendum as an instrument to participate 
in government or policy making decision, but rather they use the popular consultation 
instrument to give space to a minority will.  
At the moment, very few Constitutions explicitly recognize a right to secession (the 
Constitutions of Ethiopia,XI LiechtensteinXII and Saint Kitts and NevisXIII do so), while the 
Constitutions of Chad,XIV Djibouti,XV Mauritania,XVI SenegalXVII and UkraineXVIII all make 
specific reference to the need to proceed to a referendum in a secession process. This data 
reflects the predominant trend according to which Constitutions generally reject the 
possibility of local entities seceding and gaining independence, preferring the protection of 
the principle of State unity, as analysed in the following pages. 
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3. The Quebec intent of  secession: the decision of  the Supreme Court 
of  Canada in the Reference Re Secession of  Quebec [1998]XIX 
 
Tensions between Quebec and Canada’s central government have far-reaching origins, 
dating back to the foundation of the Federation. As a majority French-speaking province, 
Quebec has consistently pushed for the recognition of its ‘distinct society’, separate from 
that of the other Anglo-Saxon provinces, periodically threatening unilateral secession from 
the rest of the Canadian territory. 
The position of the Canadian government has been to leverage mono-national 
sentiments, which was considered the foundation of the 1867 British North America Act 
(BNAA) (Groppi 2006: 29-31), resulting from the compromise between the colonies, 
including those that were not part of the Federation at an early stage. This compromise was 
considered as the pactum societatis, whose rationale is to be found not in territorial collectivities, 
but rather in the consensus given by individual citizens to the Federation.  
The aim of the BNAA was ambiguous: on one side, the English-speaking founding 
fathers intended to create a great British North American nation; while, on the other side, 
French-speaking delegates wanted to protect their cultural diversity. Finally, the BNAA 
represented the birth of a political nationality based on the coexistence of different families 
(Russell 2004: 32 ff.). From that moment, Quebec was characterized by a strong social and 
political conservatism and a defensive nationalism.  
Change began with the Quiet Revolution, that characterised Quebec from the early 
1960s.The province went through a period of economic, political and cultural development, 
with the government of Jean Lesage, leader of the Liberal Party, and the support of the small 
bourgeoisie which cleaved to ideas of a social state and thus sanctioned the end of a 
traditional pattern of clerical immobilism (Clift 2014: 18 ff.). 
This was followed by a growing involvement of the province in the fields of labour, 
economics and education, with the consequent expansion of the bureaucratic provincial 
apparatus. This was also the time when a nationalist sentiment was revitalised, which changed 
the attitude of the French-speaking community that then began to defend their own interests. 
The Quebec government called for more powers, but at that time the federal union was 
never questioned.  
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Quebec refused to sign the 1971 Victoria Charter as it conceived of the idea of the 
Constitution as a pactum societatis, and not as a confederal pact (Behiels 2005: 23 ff.); moreover, 
it provided for the principle of regional equality of Canadian provinces, which implied a 
failure to recognise Quebec’s primacy with reference to social policy (Tosi 2006: 127). From 
the second half of the 1970s the first independent movements began to form. In 1976, the 
Parti Québécois – founded in 1968 and whose main purpose was to obtain sovereignty for the 
province – gained a majority in Quebec’s parliament (Pinard-Hamilton 1978) and launched 
a referendum to gain a mandate to negotiate with the rest of the country a new agreement 
recognising political sovereignty in Quebec, while maintaining an economic association and 
a monetary union between the two new sovereign entities. The referendum took place on 
May 20, 1980: almost 86% of the population voted but the referendum question was rejected 
by nearly 60% of voters, receiving little more than 40% of the consensus. The negative 
outcome of the referendum was in part determined by the No campaign carried out by the 
Federal Government, based on the promise that in the event of a negative outcome of the 
referendum, a process of renewal of the constitution would have begun. 
In spite of the negative outcome of the referendum, the Parti Québécois won the next 
year’s provincial assembly elections and re-established itself in government as an interpreter 
of the interests and will of the Quebec people, and hence the only official interlocutor with 
the central government.  
In 1982, the Constitution Act was approved and the Canadian Constitution was 
repatriated: for Quebec, the repatriation of the Constitution was an unlawful act, due to its 
unwillingness to adhere to the new constitutional pact. As a consequence, the province has 
utilised the guarantee instruments introduced with the reform much more frequently than 
the other provinces (including the notwithstanding clause provided in Section 33 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). Given the dissent, in 1986 the new Liberal 
Quebec government of Robert Bourassa laid down five essential conditions for consenting 
to the Canada Act of 1982 (Groppi 2006: 36 ff.).  
In 1987, a political agreement was signed at Meech Lake, which included the extension 
of all requests made by Quebec’s government to all provinces, apart from the recognition of 
the distinct nature of the Quebec community. The reform project was adopted by Quebec 
and gained the consent of six other provinces, but some political facts created a stalemate. 
The change of government in New Brunswick, Terra Nova and Manitoba called for few 
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points to be modified, but collided with Quebec’s refusal to make changes thus leading the 
Meech Lake agreement to fail (Breton 1992).  
In 1990, the Quebec Government established a parliamentary Commission (Commission 
Bélanger Campeau) in order to examine possible solutions for the constitutional political 
future of Quebec (Nemni 1993). The final report of the committee became the starting point 
for new negotiations between Quebec and the Federal Government: a series of 
intergovernmental conferences were convened and at the end of the meeting held in 
Charlottetown at the end of August 1992, the parties found a compromise on a new 
constitutional review text. The main idea of the text elaborated in Charlottetown was to 
reprise the Meech Lake solutions, to include the recognition of a veto power for Quebec, 
and of a special distinction in terms of French language and culture.  
When the Parti Québécois returned to power, the new Prime Minister, Jacques Parizeau, 
fulfilling the promises of the electoral campaign, launched a new popular consultation on the 
sovereignty of the Province. The government submitted to the Provincial National Assembly 
a draft law on the Quebec’s future (the Act Respecting the Future of Quebec). After just 
over a month, the people were called to the polls to express their vote on Quebec’s accession 
to the condition of sovereignty. While in 1980 the people were to decide on whether to give 
a mandate for negotiating an agreement with the Federal Government recognizing the 
sovereignty of Quebec, the 1995 referendum on sovereignty was no longer about delegation 
to intergovernmental negotiations; rather it was directed to know the Quebec people’s will 
on accession to sovereignty. Negotiations after the popular consultation were to be limited 
to a proposal for a new form of political-economic association between the two sovereignty 
entities (Canada and Quebec). Despite increasing popular support for the independence 
solution, the result of the referendum was once again negative. The referendum, in which 
almost 94% of citizens participated, was rejected with 50.6% of negative votes. After the 
negative result of the referendum, the central government sought to reduce preferences for 
independence, and the Federal Parliament approved a resolution recognizing the distinct 
nature of Quebec society.  
In 1996, the Federal Government, using the reference instrument, asked the Supreme 
Court to issue a reference on the legitimacy, in domestic as well as international law, of a 
possible unilateral secession of Quebec from the rest of Canada. In particular, the reference 
was based on three questions: the first requested the Court to determine whether the 
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National Assembly or the Government of Quebec could, in accordance with the 
Constitution of Canada, unilaterally proceed to the secession of the Province from the rest 
of the country. The second question questioned the judges on the provision in international 
law of such a right, and whether there is a right of self-determination that would give the 
Province the right to unilateral secession. In the third question the Federal Government 
asked the Court to determine which of the two regimes, the national or international, would 
have precedence in Canada in the event of a conflict between the two in relation to the right 
to unilateral secession of the province.  
The decision issued by the Supreme Court is relevant, not only for the arguments 
developed with specific reference to the questions referred by the Government, that have 
been deeply analysed by several authors (ex plurimis Gaudreault-DesBiens 1999) and because 
it “combines legal and constitutional questions of the utmost subtlety and complexity with 
political questions of great sensitivity” [Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, (1985) 1 S.C.R. 
721 (Manitoba Language Rights Reference), at p. 728], but also with specific reference to the 
topic this article is dealing with: the legal nature of a referendum on independence or 
secession and its possible legal effects.  
The analysis is conducted on the Court’s taking as reference the fundamental principles 
of the Canadian Constitution: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the principle of 
legality and respect for minorities, an understanding of which is necessary for both the 
interpretation of the written constitution, but also an understanding of the historical context 
and previous jurisprudential interpretations made in constitutional matters. In the light of 
some fundamental historical stages in Canadian history – such as the conferences of 
Charlottetown and Quebec in 1864, the 1867 BNAA, the attempt of secession of Nova 
Scotia amongst others (see further Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 33-48), the 
Supreme Court underlined how the federal principle is the key to all the needs expressed by 
the various political and cultural realities that have characterised and continue to characterise 
the whole Canadian legal system. The 1867 BNAA had given birth to a nation: federalism 
was the mechanism by which diversity could be linked to unity. Canadian constitutional 
history has demonstrated the ability of institutions to change and adapt to changing political 
and social needs of the country, always ensuring full compliance with the principle of legality 
and respect for democratic institutions and minority requests. Thus, the basis of Canadian 
federalism is the recognition of the diversity of the constituent units of the Confederation, 
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and the right of provincial governments to foster the development of their communities 
within their spheres of jurisdiction. This is a context in which, notwithstanding the possibility 
of cultural and linguistic minorities in Quebec pursuing their collective interests, the Court 
emphasizes the will, present throughout the whole history of the country, of all Provinces to 
protect not only their autonomy of government on local subjects, but also their respective 
cultural traditions (Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 55-60). 
Against this backdrop, the Court stated that the referendum, even though it has no direct 
legal effect and is therefore legally unfit for a unilateral secession, is in any case the expression 
of a democratic will, and in the case of the referendum in Quebec the will of a part of the 
Quebec people. Consequently, a referendum that brings a clear expression to the Quebec 
people should be given a considerable weight: it is the application of the principle of the 
clarity of the majority, meaning that the results of the referendum must not be ambiguous both 
in relation to the question submitted to the vote, and as to the level of support achieved 
(Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 86).  
Consequently, if there is a clear indication by a province of the will to pursue secession, 
the principle of federalism, coupled with the democratic one, binds each and every one of 
the parties of the Confederation to negotiate constitutional changes that are functional to 
the implementation of this will. The Constitution of Canada is the product of the sovereignty 
of the Canadian people, and that power makes it possible to make any constitutional change 
deemed appropriate within the Canadian territory (Reference Re Secession of Quebec, cit., para. 
87), thus rejecting the extreme hypothesis that the other Provinces and the Federal 
Government would have to passively accept the unilateral will of Quebec. A unilateral 
declaration of independence carried out at the margins of law and constitutionality, and 
possibly accompanied by a declaration of unconstitutionality of the Court, might well only 
be successful in the case of an entity which had effective control over the territory, and from 
the subsequent recognition of the international community. 
Consequently, the judges of the Supreme Court excluded that external and/or internal self-
determination might be established in the case of the intent of secession of Quebec: the only 
constitutional right granted to Quebec to satisfy their will to independence would have been 
to initiate the legal proceedings provided for in the Constitution for its revision. After the 
Supreme Court decision, the Clarity Act was approved, which set out the rules to be observed 
in negotiations between the federal government and a province that wants to secede.XX 
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Even if some scholars have been critical towards the Supreme Court decision for the 
poverty of theory in it (Choudry and Howse 2000), it represents an important step in the 
construction of a judicial constitutional tendency of progressive constitutional openness to 
secession with respect to the 186 US Supreme Court case in Texas vs. White. The principles 
elaborated therein have been adopted and further elaborated by other constitutional judges 
as shown in the following sections. 
 
4. The Canadian lesson on the Italian Constitutional Court: Judgment 
no. 118/2015 
 
In Italy it is also the case that there are territorial entities that aspire to greater political 
autonomy and, in some cases, to independence. According to Art. 116, para. 1 of the 1948 
Italian Constitution “Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 
and Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste have special forms and conditions of autonomy pursuant 
to the special statutes adopted by constitutional law.” The special status accorded to these 
five Regions by the Constituent Assembly is related to the historical and cultural legacy that 
characterises them, as well as their geographical position. Indeed, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol and Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste are Regions located on the 
Italian borders with Austria and Slovenia, Austria and Switzerland and Switzerland and 
France respectively; as for Sardinia and Sicily, both are islands.  
However, at the beginning of the 1990s, new regional movements for autonomy began 
to appear, progressively acquiring an important position in the political arena: the cases of 
the Lombardia and Veneto Regions. In particular, in 1991-1992 the Veneto Region, whose 
regional council was formed by a majority comprising left-wing parties [Democrazia Cristiana 
(Christian Democracy), Partito Socialista (Socialist Party), Partito Socialdemocratico (Social 
Democratic Party), and Partito Repubblicano (Republican Party)] approved the proposal 
presented by the Gruppo Socialista del Veneto (Socialist Group of Veneto) to launch a popular 
consultation asking whether the people of the region would have wanted to include Veneto 
among regions with special statutes.XXI The Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Left-wing 
Democratic Party), the Federazione dei Verdi (Federation of the Greens), two Venetian 
autonomous movements Liga Veneta (Venetian League) and the Union del popolo veneto 
(Venetian People Union), as well as the national hierarchy of the Partito socialista italiano 
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(Italian socialist Party-PSI), opposed this proposal. The President of the Council (at that 
time, Giulio Andreotti), challenged the regional law, which was annulled by the 
Constitutional Court with Judgments no. 470/1992. The Constitutional judge stated that ‘as 
long as [the regional consultative referendum] has no binding effect it cannot exercise its 
influence, direction and orientation, not only on the power of initiative of the Regional 
Council, but also in relation to the subsequent stages of the state legislative process, up to 
affect discretionary choices entrusted to the exclusive competence of central state organs: 
with the consequent violation of that limit already indicated by this Court for regional 
consultative referendum that refers to the need to avoid “the risk of adversely affecting the 
constitutional and political order of the state”’ (Judgment no. 470/1992, Considerato in diritto 
no. 4).  
A referendum on autonomy was again proposed in 1998, but once again the central 
Government (presided over by Romano Prodi) challenged the Regional Law on an 
“Advisory referendum on the submission of a constitutional law proposal for granting the 
Veneto Region special forms and conditions of autonomy” and the Constitutional Court 
annulled it with Judgment no. 496/2000 with similar reasons to those laid down in the 1992 
ruling. 
A third attempt was made by the Veneto Regional Council in 2001-2002, with the 
approval of a regional law on “Advisory Referendum on the submission of a constitutional 
law proposal for the transfer to the Veneto Region of functions state government in the field 
of health, professional training and education, local police.”XXII Once again, the central 
Government (under Giuliano Amato), challenged the law at the Constitutional Court, but 
this was subsequently withdrawn by the new Silvio Berlusconi government. 
A fourth attempt was made in 2014, with the approval of Regional Laws no. 15 on the 
“Advisory Referendum on the Autonomy of the Veneto” and no. 16 on the “Consultative 
Referendum on the Independence of Veneto”: the first launched a consultative referendum 
on the autonomy of the Region, while the second launched a referendum on independence 
for the Region.  
In particular, Law no. 15 envisaged a negotiation between the President of the Regional 
Council and the Central Government for ‘defining the contents of an advisory referendum 
aimed at knowing the will of the voters of Veneto to obtain further forms of autonomy in 
the Veneto Region’ (Art. 1). If negotiations had not reached an outcome within one hundred 
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and twenty days from the approval of the law, the President of the Regional Government 
would have been authorized to launch an advisory referendum to know the will of the voters 
of Veneto (Art. 2, para. 1), on five questions:  
1) Do you want that further forms and condition of autonomy will be attributed to the 
Veneto Region? 
2) Do you want a percentage of not less than 80 per cent of the taxes paid annually by 
Venetian citizens to the Central Administration to be used in the regional territory in terms 
of goods and services? 
3) Do you want the Region to keep at least 80 percent of the taxes levied on regional 
territory? 
4) Do you want the revenue from the funding sources of the Region not to be subject to 
destination constraints? 
5) Do you want the Veneto Region to become a special status Region?  
In the case that the referendum would have reached the quorum for its validity and that 
the majority of the votes would have been validly expressed, the President of the Regional 
Council would have proposed to the Regional Council itself a negotiating program to be 
conducted with the State and submitted a state bill containing paths and contents for the 
recognition of further and specific forms of autonomy for the Veneto Region (Art. 2, para. 
2).  
Law no.16 gave powers to the President of the Regional Council to launch an advisory 
referendum to know the will of the Veneto voters on the following question: do you want 
Veneto to become an independent and sovereign Republic? (Art. 1, para. 1). The President 
of the Regional Government and the Regional Council were entrusted with safeguarding the 
right of the Veneto people to self-determination (Art. 3) in every competent national and 
international arena. 
Both laws have been challenged by the Central Government before the Constitutional 
Court: Law no. 15 for violating Arts. 3, 5, 116, 117, 119 and 138 of the Constitution as well 
as Arts. 26 and 27 of the Statute of the VenetoXXIII and Law no. 16 for the violation of Arts. 
5, 81, 114, 138 and 139 of the Constitution.  
With Judgment no. 118/2015, the Court declared the unconstitutionality of the questions 
indicated in numbers 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Art. 2 of Law no. 15,XXIV while Law no. 16 was declared 
unconstitutional in toto.  
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According to the Court, the referendum is a link between the people and government 
institutions: it is not a form of spontaneous exercise of collective freedom of expression. 
Rather, it fulfills a function: to initiate, influence or counter public decision-making 
processes, mostly regulatory, even in cases where there is no immediate legal effect on the 
sources of law. These characteristics mean that a referendum can be launched by a Region 
on issues of interest of the regional community. But it also means that regional referendums 
can cover areas beyond the boundaries of regional subjects and territory, up to the point of 
interlinking with the national dimension.XXV At the same time, this does not mean that 
Regions can take initiatives - even of popular consultation - free in form, or beyond the limits 
set by constitutional provisions. The Constitution and Regional Statutes (as indicated in Art. 
123 of the Constitution) establish the regional referendum discipline framework within 
which each Region can move and define its own political autonomy:XXVI autonomy that must 
be carried out in harmony with constitutional principles and dispositions.XXVII 
Respect for constitutional principles and dispositions implies that even though each 
Region has the freedom and autonomy to establish the forms, ways and criteria of popular 
participation in the democratic control processes of its acts,XXVIII once these choices have 
been taken and consecrated in the Regional Statute, they apply to the subsequent regional 
activity, even legislative, given the fundamental character of the Regional Statute and its 
relationship with the regional laws drawn up by the Constitution in terms of both hierarchy 
and competence.XXIX 
In Veneto, regional referendums are regulated in Arts. 26 (abrogative referendum) and 
27 (consultative referendum) of the Statute:XXX the normative framework sets out that 
regional referendums on tax and budget laws, and implementing measures, are excluded as 
well as referendums on laws and regional acts whose contents constitute fulfillment of 
constitutional, international and European obligations. This limit has been part of the 
constant Constitutional Court case law, according to which regional referendums, including 
those of a consultative nature, cannot involve constitutional-level choices.XXXI According to 
the Italian constitutional judge, the referendum set out in Law no. 16 deals with fundamental 
constitutional choices that are obviously precluded to regional referendums according to the 
constitutional and statutory framework, and its jurisprudential interpretation. Moreover, the 
proposed referendum would have led to institutional overtures radically incompatible with 
fundamental principles of unity and indivisibility of the Republic. Indeed, according to Art. 
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5 of the Italian Constitution ‘The Republic, one and indivisible, recognizes and promotes 
local autonomies; implements in those services that depend on the State the fullest measure 
of administrative decentralization; and accords the principles and methods of its legislation 
to the requirements of autonomy and decentralization”.  
The unity of the Republic is one of those essential elements of the constitutional order 
that cannot be put under constitutional revision.XXXII Even if the republican order is also 
based on principles that include social and institutional pluralism and territorial autonomy, 
as well as an openness to supranational integration and international order, these principles 
must be developed within the framework of the unity of the State. According to the 
consolidated constitutional jurisprudence, pluralism and autonomy do not allow Regions to 
qualify themselves in terms of sovereignty or allow their governing institutions to be 
assimilated into those with national representation.XXXIII More importantly, the same 
principles cannot be exploited towards a fragmentation of the system, and cannot be invoked 
to justify initiatives aimed at asking voters, even for consultative purposes, on prospects for 
secession in view of the establishment of a new sovereign subject. A referendum initiative 
that, like the one in question, contradicts the unity of the Republic could never be translated 
into a legitimate exercise of power by regional institutions and thereby should be considered 
as an extra ordinem fact.XXXIV  
Following the Constitutional Court Judgment no. 118/2015, the President of Veneto 
issued a decree launching the referendum for October 22, 2017. The date is no mere 
coincidence: it is the 151th anniversary of the plebiscite of Veneto – held on 21 and 22 
October 1866 – which sanctioned the unification of the Venetian and Mantua provinces with 
the Kingdom of Italy. The referendum received a popular participation of 57.20% and 
received 98.10% of positive votes. Negotiations with the central Government will follow.  
 
5. The Canadian lesson on the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal: 
Judgment no. 114/2017 
 
An organised Catalan nationalist political movement has existed since the end of the XIX 
century, initially claiming simple autonomy for the region, later adopting a more radical 
independent position (Claret and Santirso 2014). However, its juridical and political 
structures find its origin in the Carolingian Empire (Gonzalez 2016: 119).  
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A first attempt to proclaim the Independent Catalan Republic took place in the 1920s 
but it was repressed by the Primo de Rivera right-wing regime (Scotoni 2001-2002: 400). 
When the monarchy fell in 1931, even though there was a significant weakening of central 
power, manifestations of autonomist expression were almost silent and a convergence with 
the central power was observed (Oleart 2014: 8). During the Civil War, the Catalans 
supported the republican forces, fearing another totalitarian regime; their defeat was heavy 
with severe economic and social harm. The Catalan question was considered as the major 
catalyst of the war (Gonzalez 2016: 121). After Franco’s dictatorship, Catalonia implemented 
a strong policy of cooperation with the government. The Spanish Parliament approved a 
Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia in 1979, re-established the Generalitat as the government 
of Catalonia, Catalan as the official language of the region, and reinstated the Catalan flag 
(Gonzalez 2006: 122). Thus, for more than thirty years, Catalan independence has not been 
a problematic issue. In the early 2000s, some independent parties began to rise, growing 
more and more, to the point of reaching a majority in the regional parliament in 2015.  
In March 2006, the Spanish Parliament adopted a new version of the Catalan Statute, 
which strengthened the autonomy of the Autonomous Community, and which in its 
Preamble defined Catalonia as a nation within the State. The new statute also established the 
right and duty of Catalan citizens to understand and speak the two official languages, Catalan 
and Castilian. In July of that same year, the Popular Party of Mariano Rajoy (at that time in 
the opposition) filed one of seven challenges against the new Catalan Statute in the 
Constitutional Tribunal, defining the text – in particular the definition of Catalonia as a 
Nation - as a threat to the unity of Spain. 
The Constitutional Tribunal decision arrived four years later, in 2010 (Judgment no. 
31/2010, of June 28), annulling part of the Catalan Statute, stating that reference to Catalonia 
as a nation has no legal value and that the Constitution recognizes nothing but the Spanish 
nation. It also denied the use of the Catalan language as the first language in Catalan 
administrations and the media.XXXV The decision of the Court triggered the reaction of the 
Catalans and a month later the first popular demonstrations began. 
On November 9, 2014, Catalonia organized a symbolic consultation, which was not 
recognized by the government of Madrid, and was found unconstitutional the Constitutional 
Court.XXXVI At the referendum, the favorable vote for independence reached over 80%, but 
participation was modest; turnout was only 36% of the voting population. On September 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
123 
27, 2015, regional elections took place. These had been perceived of as a plebiscite for or 
against independence. Separatist parties (from both the right and left wing) obtained 47.8% 
of the popular vote, and for the first time formed a majority in the Catalan parliament. The 
new separatist Parliament approved a series of normative acts, whose aim was to build the 
road to independence: Resolution 1/XI on “The beginning of the political process in 
Catalonia as a result of the election results of September 27, 2015” and its Annex, approved 
on November 9, 2015; Resolution 263/XI, by which the report and the conclusions of the 
Study Commission of the Constituent Process was ratified (declared unconstitutional and 
void by the Constitutional Tribunal with Judgment no. 259/2015, of December 2 and 
Decision no. 24/2017, of February 14).  
However, all the decisions issued by the Constitutional Tribunal in this respect were 
ineffective.  
On September 6 and 8, 2017 the Catalan Parliament approved two Laws proposed on 
August 31, 2017 by Junts pel Sí and the Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP). Law no. 19/2017, 
on the “Self-Determination Referendum”, launched a new referendum on self-
determination, and Law no. 20/2017, on “Law of legal and foundational transience of the 
Republic”, provided for the founding of the [Catalan] Republic, conditional on the results of 
the referendum to be held on October 1, 2017. The Laws were approved, in wide violation 
of the Catalan Parliamentary Regulation; the order of the day was altered to urgently include 
the proposals; and all the guarantees of the opposition to present amendments were 
eliminated. The proposed laws were prevented from being submitted to the Council of 
Statutory Guarantees, and they were approved in a day, without the chance of a proper 
parliamentary debate.  
Both Laws have been challenged to the Constitutional Tribunal for the serious problems 
they pose from a constitutional and legal point of view, as well as for the respect of the 
democratic rule of law.XXXVII Both Laws have been suspended by the Constitutional Tribunal, 
which has declared Law no. 19/2017 unconstitutional with Judgment no. 114/2017, issued 
on October 17, 2017. First of all, Law no. 19 has been promulgated with an atypical formula 
that has no precedents: the reference of the promulgation by the President of the Generalitat 
on behalf of the King (as provided for by Article 65 of the Catalan Statute) as the Ordinary 
State Representative in Catalonia (Article 67.6a), is omitted and the only reference is that it 
is known to all citizens that the Law has been approved by the Catalan Parliament. Similar 
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objections can be made regarding the Preamble of the Law: it refers to some of the Catalan 
Parliament’s resolutions adopted in application to the right of self-determination. These 
Resolutions had already been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal: for 
example, Resolution 5/X, which adopted the “Declaration of sovereignty and the right to 
decide of the people of Catalonia” (declared unconstitutional and null by the Constitutional 
Tribunal Judgment no. 42/2014, of March 25); Resolution 306/XI, on the “General Political 
Orientation of the Government” (declared null, also in what now matters, by the 
Constitutional Tribunal Decision no. 24/2017, of February 14). Linking in this way with 
previous actions of the institutions of the Generalitat, the regional legislature sought to finalise 
its secession process from the Spanish State, which had given rise, in successive phases, to 
many decisions of unconstitutionality by the Constitutional Tribunal in respect of the so-
called “constituent process” in Catalonia.XXXVIII 
In the first instance, the contents of the challenged law are abnormal as a sovereignty of 
the Catalan people was proclaimed (Art. 2), differentiated from Spanish sovereignty; for 
according to Art. 1, para. 2 of the Spanish Constitution, sovereignty belongs to Spanish 
people. Moreover, the Catalan Parliament was identified as the representative of that 
sovereignty (Art. 3, para. 1), and Law no. 19/2017 is provided with legal supremacy on any 
other rule that could contradict it (as provided in Art. 3, para. 2, in the second additional 
provision and in the first final provision). This supremacy is configured as unconditioned and 
it that would affect the Spanish Constitution and the same Catalan Statute of Autonomy. 
The foundational basis of Law no. 19/2017 does not reside in the Constitution and in the 
Statute of Autonomy either: rather, they reside in the right to self-determination of people 
(Art. 3, para. 3), considered as “fundamental and inalienable for the people of Catalonia” 
(Art. 3, para. 2); the right to self-determination of people is claimed to be part of the current 
legal system (Art. 3, para. 3), being recognized as “the first human right” (Preamble of Law 
no. 19/2017) based on international treaties and Arts. 96 and 10, para. 2 of the Spanish 
Constitution.  
Similarly to the Italian Constitutional Court’s Judgment no. 118/1995, the Spanish 
Constitutional Tribunal has also dealt with the topic of which matters can be submitted to a 
regional referendum - even if only consultative - and the legal consequences of that.  
In the Spanish constitutional order, the State has exclusive competence on referendums. 
This competence extends, in accordance with the constant jurisprudence of the 
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Constitutional Tribunal, not only to the authorization for such consultations (as provided by 
Art. 149, para. 1, no.32 of the Spanish Constitution), but also to their establishment and 
regulation. In the Spanish legal system, the referendum is considered to be the channel for 
the direct participation of citizens in public affairs. It is a participation with a political nature 
that is the subject of a fundamental right (Art. 23, para. 1 of the Spanish Constitution) whose 
development and regulation corresponds only to an Organic Law (Art. 81, para. 1 of the 
Spanish Constitution) and, more specifically, to that provided for in Art. 92, para. 3 of the 
Constitution for the regulation of the “conditions and procedure of the different modalities 
of referendum provided for in the Constitution”. In accordance with constitutional norms, 
only the State is competent to regulate the launch of a referendum, “whatever the modality 
or territorial scope on which it is projected” [Constitutional Tribunal Judgment no. 31/2015, 
of February 25 (Fundamento Jurídico 6.A)]. Autonomous Communities are conferred only with 
a competence of additional intervention [Constitutional Tribunal Judgment no. 51/2017, of 
May 10 (Fundamento Jurídico 6.a)].  
However, there are some material limits to regional referendums. Among others, 
fundamental issues that were resolved in the constituent process, such as the definition of 
identity and the unity of title of sovereignty, are removed from the decisional capacity of 
constituted powers [Constitutional Tribunal Judgment no. 51/2017, of May 10 (Fundamento 
Jurídico 5 c) and d)] and should be submitted to the constitutional review process 
[Constitutional Tribunal Judgment no. 90/2017, of July 5 (Fundamento Jurídico 6, also citing 
previous decisions of the Court)]. Thus, an Autonomous Community cannot launch a 
referendum that goes beyond the framework of its own competences, or which affects 
fundamental issues resolved by the constituent process, and that are removed from the 
decision-making capacity of the constituted powers [Constitutional Tribunal Judgment no. 
103/2008, of September 11 (Fundamento Jurídico 4) and Constitutional Tribunal Judgment no. 
138/2015, of June 11 (Fundamento Jurídico 3)].  
In the specific case of Law no. 19/2017, Catatonia’s government had called for a 
referendum without prior State authorization, and launched a referendum neither provided 
for in the Constitution nor in Organic Law no. 2/1980. Moreover, its explicit aim was to 
violate the essential principles of the Spanish constitutional order: national sovereignty, that 
resides with the Spanish people; the very unit of the Nation, constituted in a social and 
democratic State of law; and the supremacy of the Constitution itself, to which all public 
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powers are subject and also, therefore, the Parliament of Catalonia (Arts 1, para. 2, 2, 1, para. 
1 and 9, para. 1 of the Spanish Constitution).  
In addition, the Court emphasised, similarly to the affirmation of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, that “the Constitution is not the result of a pact between historical territorial 
instances that preserve rights prior to the Constitution and superior to it, but a norm of the 
constituent power that is imposed with binding force in its scope”XXXIX. The premise of the 
sovereignty of the people of Catalonia marked the referendum of binding self-determination, 
that Law no. 19/2017 regulated and convoked, as unconstitutional for being irreconcilable 
with the unit of the Spanish Nation on which the Constitution is based (Art. 2 of the Spanish 
Constitution). According to the Tribunal, if such a consultation were to have been held in 
the conditions intended, that unit would have been legally aggrieved; for even if the vote had 
not implied the independence of Catalonia, that unit of the Nation, and that of the State in 
which it is constituted would have been canceled irremissibly. The principle of unity means 
that all Spaniards, as free citizens and equal in rights, are the only ones that, hypothetically, 
could be called upon to decide on the permanence and destiny of the State (Art. 168 of the 
Spanish Constitution);XL they are the only holders of the constituent power, and a decision 
that could affect the whole nation, such as the secession of an Autonomous Community, 
cannot be granted to only a fraction of the Spanish people, as Law 19/2017 purported. The 
whole Constitution (also, therefore, its Art. 2) is not a perpetua lex:XLI it is, without exception, 
susceptible of reconsideration and revision in law.XLII  
Finally, in much the same way that the Supreme Court of Canada had, in 1998, excluded 
the existence of a right to external and/or internal self-determination of the Quebec people, 
the Spanish constitutional judge stated that none of the “peoples of Spain” (as indicated in 
the Preamble of the Spanish Constitution), had the “right to self-determination”, considered 
by Law no. 19/2017, as the right to promote and consummate its unilateral secession from 
the State in which Spain is constituted. All the evidence shows that such a right is not 
recognized in the Constitution.XLIII The inclusion of the right of self-determination, as 
interpreted by Catalonia with Law no. 19/2017, would mean that the act of sovereignty of 
the State in contracting international treaties, obliging Spain to recognize such rights under 
such conditions, would have entailed the paradoxical renunciation of that same sovereignty. 
These hypothetical commitments would have declared unconstitutional under the 
unconditional supremacy of the Constitution.XLIV 
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6. Final Considerations 
 
Part of Constitutional law considers secession as an extra ordinem fact. For a long time, it 
has considered it as an unconstitutional fact, even though some secession and independence 
was gained through the use of force. Over time there has been a progressive development 
of Constitutional approaches, where those aiming for secession have started to use a 
constitutional instrument: the referendum. This evolution has been possible thanks to the 
development in international law of the idea of secession as remedial right, part of the right 
to free self-determination of oppressed peoples. Thanks to the right of self-determination, 
the decolonization process found its justification and international legitimation and many 
oppressed peoples were allowed to gain independence.  
The closed nature of constitutional law to the question of self-determination finds its 
justification in the protection of the principle of constitutional unity. In the XIX century, the 
unity of the State was considered as an almost absolute value; Constitutional law has 
progressively started to admit the possibility of secession; but only under certain conditions. 
The Canadian Supreme Court in the decision Reference Re Secession of Quebec has indicated 
which these conditions are, establishing a solid constitutional framework that has generated 
a constitutional tendency, progressively confirmed by other judges (in the cases of the Italian 
Constitutional Court and the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal). This tendency is 
characterized for three main elements. First of all, there is a constitutional tendency in 
considering the Constitution as a pactum societatis between all the individuals. In consequence 
any change to the constitution considered as a pactum societatis must be agreed between all 
citizens, including the possible secession of part of the territory that is inadmissible, such as 
a unilateral secession or a secession based only on the will of people territorially involved in 
the secession.  
Secondly, there is a common constitutional trend toward the idea that the referendum is 
an instrument to allow people to take part in government or public policy decisions. It can 
also be an instrument capable of expressing a minority will, but this will cannot produce 
binding legal effects on the majority. If the minority will is clear – where clear means, as stated 
by the Supreme Court of Canada, that the results of the referendum must not be ambiguous 
in relation to the question submitted to the vote, as well as to the level of support achieved 
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- it can be considered as a starting point of a constitutional process to renew the pactum 
societatis.  
Lastly, there is a constitutional consensus toward the configuration of the right to self-
determination of people as a non-absolute right. Rather, it is conceived of as a fundamental 
right for people in a state of oppression but outside of these circumstances, the principle of 
State unity prevails over itXLV. 
 Inter-American Academy of Human Rights. 
I The reference is to popular consultations made under the vigilance of the League of Nations in contended 
territories: see Butler-Ranney (1978).  
II An independence referendum was held in Nevis on 10 August 1998 in order to secede from the Federation 
of Saint Kitts and Nevis. Although it was approved by almost 62% of voters, it was not valid because it needed 
a two-thirds majority to succeed.  
III See infra, paragraph II.  
IV According to a neutralistic approach, mainly sustained by traditional international doctrine, secession is 
considered as a de facto phenomenon, generally not explicitly authorized or prohibited by law (Quadri 1968: 423 
ff.; Arangio-Ruiz 1971: 132 ff.).  
V According to Barbera “[…] a constitutional right to secede is manifestly absurd for the very nature of the 
Constitution [...]. The Constitution, any Constitution, being a pact to guarantee the political unity of a state, 
excludes secession by its very nature. The political pact underlying the Constitution applies to that particular 
people, to that specific territory. You can change everything you want, always remaining in the constitutional 
legality [...] but you cannot create two political communities, mutilate the territory without violating the 
Constitution” (Miglio and Barbera 1997: 177 f.). See also Bluntschli, who considers secession as a hypothesis 
of State extinction (1881: 253 ff.) and Jellinek, who underlines the ontological incompatibility of the hypothesis 
of a variation of the political organization with the very idea of the state assumed as a sovereign entity 
representative of a virtually perpetual socio-political reality (1949: 296 ss.).  
VI Texas vs. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869) 
VII Texas vs. White, cit., 726. Emphasis added.  
VIII See Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Council, Doc. B7 21/68/106, 1921.  
IX The basis of secession as a remedial right can be traced back to jusnaturalism and late middle age 
contractualism (Althusius 1614) as a legitimate instrument against the tyrannical government (Margiotta 2005: 
31 ss.; Tosi 2006: 12-22). But it has been with Locke theorization that this idea has had a further and more 
complete development (Locke 1982: 227 ff.). See also Mancini 2012. 
X As demonstrated by the praxis developed in the Nineties in different States as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, 
Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Chechenia and outside Europe in Tibet, Sudan, Comoro Island and Sri Lanka.  
XI Art. 39, para. 1 of the 1994 Constitution of Ethiopia: “Every nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has 
an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession”. 
XII Art. 4, para. 2 of the 1921 Constitution of Liechtenstein (modified in 2003): “Individual communes have 
the right to secede from the State. A decision to initiate the secession procedure shall be taken by a majority of 
the citizens residing there who are entitled to vote. Secession shall be regulated by a law or, as the case may be, 
a treaty. In the latter event, a second ballot shall be held in the commune after the negotiations have been 
completed”. 
XIII Art. 113, para. 1 of the 1983 Constitution of Saint Kitts and Nevis, according to which “1. The Nevis Island 
Legislature may provide that the island of Nevis shall cease to be federated with the island of Saint Christopher 
and accordingly that this Constitution shall no longer have effect in the island of Nevis”. 
XIV Art. 219 of the 1996 Constitution of Chad (modified in 2005): “No cession, no exchange, no addition of 
territory, is valid without the consent of the People expressed by way of referendum”. 
XV Art. 62 of the 1992 Constitution of Djibouti (modified in 2010): “No cession, no acquisition of territory is 
valid without the consent of the people who decide by means of referendum”. 
XVI Art. 78 of the 1991 Constitution of Mauritania (modified in 2012): “[…] No cession, no exchange, no 
addition of territory is valid without the consent of the people who pronounce themselves by way of 
referendum. […]”. 
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XVII Art. 96 of the 2001 Constitution of Senegal: “[…] No cession, [or] no addition of territory is valid without 
the consent of the population interested. […]”. 
XVIII Art. 73 of the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine (modified in 2014): “Issues of altering the territory of Ukraine 
are resolved exclusively by an All-Ukrainian referendum”. 
XIX Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 25 S.C.R. 217.  
XX See Romero Caro 2017 (in this Special Issue). 
XXI Legislative resolution adopted by the Veneto Regional Council on March 5, 1992, on “Advisory Referendum 
on the Submission of a State Bill for Amending Provisions on the Regime of the Regions”.  
XXII Regional Law no. 12/2002, on “Consultative referendum on the implementation of a Constitutional Law 
proposal for the transfer to the Veneto Region of State functions on health, professional training and education, 
local police”. 
XXIII Statute of Autonomy of the Veneto Region approved with Regional Law no. 1/2012.  
XXIV The Constitutional Court declared the unconstitutionality of the questions provided in Art. 2, no. 2, 3, 4 
and 5 for violating Arts. 26 and 27 of the Statute of the Veneto Region and of Art. 123 of the Italian 
Constitution, because they were related to tax matters. The Court underlined that these provisions violated the 
constitutional principles in the field of coordination of public finances since they affect the bonds of solidarity 
between the regional population and the rest of the Republic. In addition, the possibility that the Veneto Region 
was included among the regions with special statute affects fundamental constitutional choices that cannot be 
subject to regional referendums. 
XXV Constitutional Court Judgments no. 496/2000; no. 470/1992; and no. 256/1989. 
XXVI See also Judgment no. 80/2012. 
XXVII Ex plurimis see Judgments no. 81 and 64/2015.  
XXVIII It implies the possibility of introducing new types of referendums also in line with those laid down in the 
Constitution (Judgment no. 372/2004). 
XXIX Constitutional Court Judgment no. 188/ 2011. 
XXX See supra nota n. XXII. 
XXXI Constitutional Court Judgments no. 365/2007; no. 496/2000; no. 470/1992. 
XXXII In this sense see Italian Constitutional Court Judgment no. 1146/1988.  
XXXIII Italian Constitutional Court Judgments no. 365/2007; no. 306 and no. 106/2002.  
XXXIV On the Italian Constitutional Court Judgment no. 118/2015 see Conte 2015 and Tega 2015.  
XXXV On the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal Judgment on the Catalan Statute see Ibrido 2011.  
XXXVI See Spanish Constitutional Tribunal Judgments no. 31/2015 and 32/2015, both of February 25.  
XXXVII Both laws and Decrees no. 139/2017, of September 6, of the Generalitat of Catalonia, convening the 
Self-Determination Referendum of Catalonia and no. 140/2017, of September 7, on complementary rules for 
holding the referendum on self-determination, have been suspended by the Constitutional Tribunal, after being 
challenged by the Government under the provisions of Art. 161, para. 2 of the Spanish Constitution. 
XXXVIII Among the most recent see Spanish Constitutional Tribunal Judgment no. 90/2017, of July 5 
(Fundamento Jurídico 3.d). 
XXXIX Constitutional Tribunal Judgment no. 76/1988, of April 26 (Fundamento Jurídico 3), and in the same terms 
Constitutional Tribunal Judgments no. 42/2014, of March 25 (Fundamento Jurídico 3), in which the Spanish 
Constitutional Tribunal makes an explicit reference to the Canadian Supreme Court Reference on the Quebec 
intent of secession; 259/2015, of December 2, Fundamento Jurídico 4.b); and 90/2017, of July 5 (Fundamento 
Jurídico 6). 
XL Spanish Constitutional Tribunal Judgment no. 103/2008, of September 11 (Fundamento Jurídico 2), according 
to which only citizens, acting necessarily at the end of the reform process, can have the supreme power, that 
is, the power to modify without limits the Constitution itself. 
XLI Every one of the constitutional provisions are susceptible of modification, but for this it is necessary the 
respect of the framework of the procedures of reform of the Constitution, since the respect to these procedures 
is, always and in any case, inexcusable [Spanish Constitutional Tribunal Judgment no. 138/2015, of June 11 
(Fundamento Jurídico 4), and jurisprudence there cited]. 
XLII The Spanish Constitution admits and regulates its total revision [Art. 168 of the Spanish Constitution and 
Spanish Constitutional Tribunal Judgment no. 48/2003, of March 12 (Fundamento Jurídico 7)]. 
XLIII Spanish Constitutional Tribunal Judgment 42/2014, of March 25 (Fundamento Jurídico 3.b) and Spanish 
Constitutional Tribunal Decision no. 122/2015, of July 7 (Fundamento Jurídico 5). 
XLIV See Art. 95 of the Spanish Constitution and Art. 27, para. 2, let. c) of the Organic Law of the Constitutional 
Tribunal; Spanish Constitutional Tribunal Judgments no. 100/2012, of May 8 (Fundamento Jurídico 7); no. 
26/2014, of February 13 (Fundamento Jurídico 3); and no. 215/2014, of December 18 (Fundamento Jurídico 3.a). 
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XLIV See also Fasone 2017. 
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Abstract 
 
Since it was passed, the Clarity Act has been at the core of any secessionist debate in 
Canada and abroad. Although contested at home, the Clarity Act has earned worldwide 
prestige as the democratic standard that must be observed when a secessionist debate arises. 
In the last fifteen years Spain has experienced successive debates about the need to 
establish a mechanism of popular consultation to address secessionist claims in the Basque 
Country and Catalonia. Most political actors in favour of such consultations have 
expressed their will to import the Canadian Clarity Act as a tool to settle disputes on how 
to conduct a referendum. However, this deification of the Canadian example is, for the 
most part, based on a misreading of the Secession Reference, only taking into account 
certain passages while ignoring others. The emphasis tends to be made on the quantitative 
clear majority test, disregarding other factors. Hence, the aim of this paper is to study the 
causes of this deification of the Clarity Act in Spain, and its influence on the treatment of 
secessionist claims that the country is currently experiencing. 
 
Keywords 
 
secession, referendum, Clarity Act, Canada, Quebec, Spain, Catalonia 
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1. Introduction 
 
Constitutional interpretation is not an easy task, and particularly so when courts have to 
deal with what Dworkin refers to as hard cases.I In these situations, when the choice of 
norm to apply is not clear, or when there are legal vacuums, resorting to foreign 
experiences can shed some light on the issue and help legal operators to solve the case. 
Facing a secessionist challenge that puts into question the unity of the state is, without 
any doubt, one of the hardest cases on which a Court might have to decide. Most 
Constitutions are silent on the matter, while some include clauses that declare the 
indissoluble character of the nation and the indivisibility of the territory.II Therefore, the 
lack of positive legal materials to inform Court’s decisions poses a big challenge that might 
be solved by referring to the practical wisdom of foreign judgments (Choudhry 2006: 4).  
Although Chouhdry focuses his approach on judges and tribunals, the migration of 
constitutional ideas also has an impact in the political arena. This migration might not just 
be between courts, but also from one Parliament to another. Secession is a complex matter 
that in its own intrinsic nature combines both the legal and the political (Mancini 2012: 
483-487);III hence, any answer to this problem has to include both elements. 
Since the restoration of democracy in 1978, Spain has experienced several secessionist 
claims, with those coming from the Basque Country and Catalonia having a higher degree 
of intensity. The Spanish constitutional framework does not contemplate the possibility of 
holding a referendum to address such claims. This possibility has been rejected by the 
Constitutional Court according to article 2 of the Spanish Constitution, which affirms that 
sovereignty resides with the Spanish people and, as a consequence, not with the 
Autonomous Communities.IV 
Regardless of this theoretical consideration about the indivisibility of sovereignty, some 
political actors have turned their attention to the Canadian experience in order to find a 
legal framework to address these secessionist claims. After the narrow victory of the ‘NO’ 
camp in the 1995 referendum, the Canadian federal government decided that it was time to 
clarify the ground rules governing secession. Following the Reference Re Secession of 
Quebec,V the Clarity Act was passed in 2000 with the aim of resolving some of the 
uncertainties created by the Supreme Court Reference. 
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Although contested by Quebec´s sovereigntists, and also by some domestic and foreign 
scholars,VI the Clarity Act has earned prestige worldwide as the democratic standard that 
must be observed when a secessionist debate arises, and Spain is no exception. In the last 
fifteen years, Spain has gone through several debates on the need to establish a mechanism 
of popular consultation, to address secessionist claims in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia. Most political actors in favor of these consultations have expressed their will to 
adopt the Canadian Clarity Act as a tool for settling disputes over how to conduct a 
referendum.VII 
If a bill such as the Clarity Act were to be implemented in Spain, would it help clarify 
the rules governing secession, reducing current tensions, or on the contrary would it make 
secession more likely? The Canadian example is a good lens through which to look, but it 
remains to be seen whether the consequences might be the same as on the other side of the 
Atlantic. 
 
2. The Clarity Act in the Canadian constitutional system: a matter of  
dispute 
 
In 1995 the unity of the Canadian federation was in question. The referendum on 
sovereignty was the epilogue of a period of tensions –a “constitutional odyssey” in 
Russell´s words– between Quebec and the federal government that started in 1982 with the 
patriation of the Constitution without the consent of Quebec´s National Assembly and 
continued with the failure of the constitutional rounds of Lake Meech (1987) and 
Charlottetown (1992).VIII The ‘NO’ camp won by a margin of less than 55,000 votes (about 
1.1% of the electorate), with the highest turnout to date in the history of the province of 
93.52%. 
This near-death experience led the federal government to refer the matter of the 
unilateral secession of Quebec to the Supreme Court. After years of constitutional 
disillusionment, the Supreme Court was called to settle the issue and decide if Quebec had 
a right to secede under domestic or international law.IX In its reference the Supreme Court 
enlarged on the Constitution, which was described as a living tree,X by identifying a series 
of unwritten rules that include, “the global system of rules and principles which govern the 
exercise of constitutional authority in every part of the Canadian state”.XI The Court 
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highlighted four fundamental principles: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the 
rule of law and respect for minorities. These principles work in symbiosis, meaning that 
none of them can trump or exclude the others.XII 
The operation of these overlapping principles allowed the Court to conclude that 
Quebec had no right to unilaterally secede from Canada under domestic or international 
law.XIII Nevertheless, the interaction of the same principles generated a duty to negotiate in 
good faith in the event of a clear expression of will of the people of Quebec that can only 
be derived from a clear majority on a clear question as a result of a qualitative evaluation.XIV 
As Tierney (2004: 263) notes, the Court´s conception of the term “unilateral” was very 
narrow, being understood as secession without prior negotiations. This consideration, 
together with the principles of federalism and democracy, resulted in the creation of an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith the practicalities of secession, as the rest of Canada 
could not refuse to enter these negotiations after a clear expression of the desire to pursue 
secession from the population of a province.XV 
With the intention of giving legal entrenchment to the Secession Reference, the federal 
government introduced the Clarity Act.XVI According to Stéphane Dion, the Crown 
Minister responsible for the act, the bill was needed because the government of Quebec 
had refused to commit itself to the Court´s opinion (Dion 2000: 21). In Dion´s view, the 
interpretation of the Secession Reference made by the Parti Québécois (PQ) was 
incomplete. It merely focused on the obligation to negotiate, disregarding the notions of a 
clear majority and a clear question. The preamble of the bill stated that its purpose was to 
clarify the circumstances under which the government of Canada would enter into 
negotiations after a provincial referendum on secession. For that reason, the Clarity Act set 
the rules that must be observed before the federal government enters into any kind of 
negotiations with a province that wants to secede. According to section 1, the House of 
Commons has 30 days after the official release of the question to determine whether it is 
clear. In this process, the Commons would have to consider if the question would result in 
a clear expression of the will of the people of the province on whether the province should 
cease to be part of Canada. It must be noted that the Supreme Court did not greatly 
elaborate on what it understood as a clear question. It merely stated that it should be free 
of ambiguity and that it was a matter for the political actors to determine.XVII 
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In addition, the federal government also limited the options that could be presented to 
the electorate, by establishing two types of questions that would not satisfy the clear 
expression of will requirement of the Act.XVIII This provision had the intention of 
preventing the federal government from entering into negotiations following questions 
such as those used in the 1980 and 1995 referendums (Haljan 2014: 367-368). It was also 
influenced by opinion poll data suggesting that there was an important degree of confusion 
among the electorate about what a victory of the ‘YES’ camp would actually have meant 
(Keating 2001: 98-101). In this regard, Murkens (2002: 52) questioned if this provision 
reflected the opinion of the Supreme Court, for the Reference contained no mention of a 
prohibition of asking about future arrangements with the rest of Canada.XIX But, as this 
issue was for the political actors to determine, nothing prevented the federal government 
from defining the clarity of a question according to these parameters.  
In respect of the majority needed in any referendum, the Clarity Act established that 
the House of Commons should take into account the size of the majority of valid votes 
cast in favour of the secessionist option, the percentage of eligible voters voting in the 
referendum and any other matters or circumstances it considered relevant. The Clarity Act 
did not establish any threshold or minimum level of support required to consider that the 
result constituted a clear expression of the will to secede. The Court left the issue of the 
clarity of the majority for the political actors to determine, but it made two important 
remarks that need to be highlighted. The first one is that the clear majority has to come 
from a qualitative evaluation;XX the second was that democracy, and the Canadian 
constitutional system, are more than simple majority rule.XXI From these two premises it 
can be inferred that a simple majority could not be considered to constitute a clear 
majority, and that other factors such as the total number of voters or the territorial 
distribution of votes also need to be taken into account. 
As mentioned above, there have been competing interpretations of the opinion of the 
Court in the Secession Reference between federal and provincial governments (Dumberry 
2015: 370-379). In response to the Clarity Act –which made it almost impossible to achieve 
secession under Canadian law (Pelletier 2001: 526-527)– the National Assembly of Quebec 
enacted Bill 99, containing Quebec´s interpretation of the Secession Reference.XXII It 
conferred the inalienable right to freely decide the political regime and legal status of 
Quebec on the Quebec people, with no external condition having effect on a referendum 
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unless determined by Quebec institutions. Bill 99 also stated in section 4 that the winning 
option would be the one that obtained 50% + 1 of the votes cast. Despite this, Monahan 
(2000: 4-5) recalls that there seemed to be a feeling among Quebeckers that a clear majority 
was needed to be able to proceed with secession. 
As we can see, some provisions of Bill 99 directly conflict with the regulation made by 
the federal government in the Clarity Act. Although this controversy was referred to the 
courts years ago, thus far no ruling has been issued.XXIII To date, a third referendum is not 
on the agenda, as the PQ has committed itself not to hold one if they return to power as 
the winning conditions are far from being a reality.XXIV 
 
3. The Spanish vision of  the Clarity Act 
 
3.1. The process of idealization  
The Canadian example has become a common recourse in the Spanish political arena 
in the last ten to fifteen years. The 5,686 kilometers that separate Ottawa from Madrid, 
together with the different cultural, political and constitutional realities of both countries, 
have not been an impediment for the Canadian model to become configured as a leading 
exemplar in respect of secessionist claims. Interest in the Canadian model came firstly from 
academia, where scholars mainly focused on two particular features of the Canadian 
constitutional system: the role of multiculturalism,XXV and the Quebec question, being the 
latter the element that has had the biggest impact on the Spanish political landscape.XXVI 
Interest in the Canadian experience switched to the political arena following the 1995 
referendum. The referendum and the subsequent reference issued by the Supreme Court 
were presented as examples of a true democratic culture. For the political forces pushing 
for a higher degree of national recognition, or even secession, those events proved the 
democratic nature of secessionist aspirations in a modern state. If Canada, one of the most 
advanced and democratic countries in the world, was divisible in allowing Quebec to gain 
independence in the event of a favorable result in a referendum, any country that wanted to 
be called democratic would have to do the same. This axiom translates into the proposition 
that to be democratic, a country has to allow any subunit to secede in the event of a 
favorable referendum on the subject.XXVII 
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In Spain, admiration for the Clarity Act is widespread among the left of center and 
nationalist political parties as a standard that must be met in order to classify a 
constitutional system as democratic. The mantra of a “clear majority on a clear question” 
has been repeated for years without further explanation of what it really means or how 
would it be implemented in Spain. For its supporters, no true democrat could be opposed 
to the Clarity Act, as this instrument is the only viable tool to know the true will of the 
people on the question of secession. Hence, this Act results in a test of maturity for any 
system that defines itself as democratic. 
This simplistic approach contains a reductionism of the Secession Reference to the 
obligation to negotiate, following the example of Quebec´s sovereigntists. The Spanish 
nationalist forces have identified those notions of the Canadian experience that are most 
favorable for their cause, presenting them as the “Canadian parameter”. The first one 
implies that it is possible and legitimate for a territorial subunit to conduct a referendum on 
secession. In Spain, referendums can only be called with the approval of the President, 
following article 92 of the Spanish Constitution. This legal difference between the two 
constitutional systems, together with the absence of a constitutional clause concerning the 
unity of the Canadian state, have been underestimated by some of the advocates of the 
Canadian experience. The second notion that has been highlighted by some of the 
advocates of this model is the duty to negotiate discussed above.  
As López Basguren (2005: 12-14) remarks, these forces have consciously ignored 
important parts of the Canadian reality, creating their own vision and presenting it as if it 
were the Canadian model. This political discourse has benefited from the inaction of other 
political actors as, surprisingly, political parties opposing secession did not challenge this 
interpretation of the Canadian experience until some years ago. These parties left the 
monopoly of the “Canadian parameter” to the nationalist forces, which took advantage of 
this to create their own Canadian narrative.  
As has been said above, the level of admiration for the Clarity Act varies across the 
political spectrum. In general terms, it is higher among parties that consider themselves to 
be to the left of center. These political formations have tried to find a balance between the 
principles of democracy and legality that could result in the recognition of the possibility of 
holding a referendum on secession within the current constitutional framework. Parties 
from the center to the right usually prioritize the principle of legality, stating that there 
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cannot be democracy without respect for the rule of law and the constitutional order. 
Among nationalist parties the interest in the Clarity Act is also high, but with a different 
perspective. These formations, especially those in Catalonia, tend to emphasize the value of 
democracy, as the centerpiece of their political discourse. They have created the term 
“derecho a decidir” (right to decide) that basically hides within it a right to self-determination 
(López Basaguren 2016: 166-171). In their view, the democratic principle must prevail over 
others, as there is no bigger power that the will of the people expressed in a referendum. 
This conception entails a notion of hierarchy among constitutional principles, democracy 
being a value superior to the others, an aspect that was expressly rejected in the Canadian 
Supreme Court Reference.XXVIII 
In the first group, we find the traditional position of the PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de 
Catalunya), the sister party of the Socialists (PSOE) in the Autonomous Community of 
Catalonia. For this formation, the Clarity Act is a federalist tool that can be used to address 
secessionist claims. The PSC defends a federal reform of the Spanish Constitution, a 
Clarity Act being an alternative in the event of that reform failing (Pascual 2016a). For the 
leader of the PSC, Miquel Iceta, the Canadian Clarity Act lacks clarity, as it does not specify 
which question and majority must be considered as clear (Pascual 2016b). In his view, a 
Clarity Act has the virtue of encouraging agreements between the parties in conflict making 
secession less likely due to the requirement of a reinforced majority on a clear question. 
Although these postulates have been defended for years by the PSC, they have been 
abandoned in the last months as they created major tensions with the PSOE.XXIX The 
importation of the Clarity Act would mean the acceptance of the possibility of holding a 
referendum on secession, an aspect that is rejected by the majority of the PSOE.XXX 
However, for some socialist MPs like Odón Elorza, the enactment of a Spanish Clarity Act 
would make possible the combination of the principles of democracy and the rule of law 
(Elorza and Escudero 2015). In his proposal, Elorza structures the process in three tiers. 
To begin with, the Parliament of the Autonomous Community that wished to secede 
would have to approve a resolution in favor of a referendum by a reinforced majority. 
Secondly, the law would envisage that the central Government is obliged to call a non-
binding referendum on the issue, establishing the clarity of the question and the thresholds 
that would be needed to consider the result as clear. If these majorities were accomplished, 
the result would trigger good faith negotiations between the parties, in order to proceed 
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with the separation via an amendment of the Spanish Constitution (Elorza and Escudero 
2015). 
In this proposal, we can clearly see the influence of the Canadian example, with some 
important variations. In the Canadian case, the question and the result are valued a 
posteriori. In Canada, the provincial government sets the wording of the question and the 
Commons have 30 days to determine its clarity before the referendum, while in this case 
the wording of the question would be decided by the national government, as the 
competent body to call the referendum. The number of votes that would constitute a clear 
majority would also be established before the referendum, in contrast with the Canadian 
case where it is a matter that has to be decided by the House of Commons after the vote. 
Center right parties such as the People´s Party (PP) and Ciudadanos are totally opposed 
to secession and to the possibility of holding a referendum, an aspect that they consider as 
a breach of the constitutional order (Tudela Aranda 2016: 479). For these organizations a 
Clarity Act is not a viable instrument to reduce secessionist tensions because it would 
legitimate secessionist aspirations and could result in the dynamic of a neverendum.XXXI 
The nationalist parties represented in the Spanish Parliament tend to be favorable 
towards a Clarity Act, or at least, to their own interpretation of it. The Basque Nationalist 
Party (PNV) has expressed its position in favor of the act, as it would allow the democratic 
expression of the people through a referendumXXXII. The PNV also notes that the notion of 
clarity should be developed and included in the law, in order to reduce the possibility of a 
conflict over the interpretation of the results of an eventual referendum. The Catalan 
sovereigntists, particularly PDECat (formerly CiU), used to take great interest in the 
Canadian case, frequently drawing parallels between Quebec and Catalonia. Their interest 
in the Clarity Act was high in the past, but has fallen in the last couple of years since they 
started to push for unilateral secession. As has been mentioned, their focus was on the 
democratic principle, from which they derived a right to self-determination. In their offers 
to the national government, in order to agree on the terms of a referendum, the Catalan 
parties –grouped in a collation called Junts Pel Sí (Together for Yes)– centered their agenda 
in the negotiation process after the vote, disregarding the notions of clarity. A good 
example of this was the unofficial referendum that they called in 2014 that will be discussed 
further below.  
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
143 
The postulates of the new left-wing party, Podemos, are difficult to classify in the 
typology of these groups. Although the party has a strong leftist ideology, it has formed 
alliances in the Basque Country, Galicia and Catalonia with other formations with a strong 
nationalist component. As a result, its position regarding secession tends to differ from one 
territory to another. Their national leader, Pablo Iglesias, has stated that they support the 
derecho a decidir, in line with other nationalist political parties, but without any breach of 
constitutional legality.XXXIII During the Basque electoral campaign in 2016, Podemos 
proposed a Basque Clarity Act to regulate any future referendum that redefined the status 
of the Basque Country. This bill would include provisions regarding the wording of the 
question and the size of the majority needed with the objective of reducing uncertainty and 
increasing the transparency of the process (Gorospe 2016). The legal instrument proposed 
by Podemos only concerned the Basque Parliament, without any further explanation as to 
how the result would be implemented, or if it would trigger any negotiations with the 
national government. This proposal seemed to be an effort to attract nationalist voters 
during the campaign as, so far, this political formation has not introduced any bill related to 
the issue and it seems that they do not plan to do so in the near future. 
 
3.2. Getting it wrong: reality versus mythXXXIV 
As we can see, the deifying of the Canadian example is, for the most part, based on a 
misreading of the Secession Reference, only taking into account certain passages while 
disregarding others. The emphasis tends to be placed on the quantitative clear majority test, 
discussing what percentage should be established as the threshold needed to trigger 
negotiations to allow secession. The Canadian Supreme Court referred to this test not just 
as a quantitative matter, but also as a qualitative evaluation. This last consideration is 
almost absent in the Spanish literature or in the political discourse, as if it never existed. 
The question that thus arises is the following: why is qualitative analysis absent for the 
much praised “Canadian parameter” in the Spanish debate? In my view, the answer lies in 
the fact that this analysis could become a counter argument for those in favor of secession. 
To take qualitative elements into consideration, we have to take a closer look to aspects 
such as the distribution of support of the secessionist cause across the territory, the 
presence of minority groups or the degree of turnout in the event of a referendum. These 
three aspects tend to perform a role that does not play in favour of the secessionist 
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movement. Taking the vote for nationalist parties as an indicator of support for the 
secessionist cause, we find that there is a substantial difference in popular support for this 
option between certain parts of the territory (e.g. Álava and its capital, Vitoria, in the 
Basque Country or the cities of Badalona and Tarragona in Catalonia).XXXV The presence of 
minority communities, like the linguistic minority in the Val d´Aran in northwest Catalonia, 
cannot be disregarded, as their interests need to be preserved.XXXVI Turnout is also an 
important element, as part of the population could express their rejection of the 
secessionist option by abstaining, if they consider the consultation to be illegal or 
illegitimate.XXXVII In the event of a referendum on secession, qualitative aspects like these 
could have a decisive role in considering whether the result is clear or not. 
Another point that is often misunderstood is the obligation to negotiate. In Spain, this 
duty tends to be characterized, particularly by those in favor of the derecho a decidir, as an 
obligation for the rest of the state to allow the subunit to secede. Hence, for these actors, 
the negotiation should be about the details of secession and not about secession itself, an 
aspect that they take for granted. This interpretation clearly contradicts the opinion of the 
Supreme Court in the Secession Reference. For the Court, the conduct of the parties in the 
negotiation process should be governed by the same principles that gave rise to the duty to 
negotiate.XXXVIII Those principles imply a rejection of the proposition that there is a legal 
obligation to accede to secession, as this would mean that the subunit would dictate the 
terms of the proposed secession, thereby nullifying the process of negotiation.XXXIX At the 
same time, the federal government could neither refuse to enter into negotiations, nor 
conduct them in such a way that would suppose a complete denial of Quebec´s rights, as 
this would give some legitimacy to the demands for a unilateral process. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court created a duty to negotiate in good faith, excluding the extreme positions 
of both parties, although this duty might indeed result in the secession of the territorial 
subunit. 
In Spain, there seems to be a high degree of confusion between the obligation related 
to the means, the negotiation process as created by the Supreme Court, and an obligation 
related to the objective, which is the one desired by Quebec´s sovereigntists. The 
negotiation process is not about the logistics of secession, as is commonly understood in 
Spain, but about the whole issue of secession. The content of the agreement that would 
result from these negotiations, or even the failure to reach one, is an issue for both parties 
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to determine without either ruling out the possibility of secession, or taking it for granted. 
The confusion existing in Spain about the duty to negotiate could have its roots in the fact 
that the Canadian model has long been defended by nationalist parties that were the first to 
present the “Canadian parameter” as a solution to their secessionist claims. As they were 
the pioneers in recurring to the Canadian experience in the political arena, their 
interpretation has become dominant. 
It is also interesting to note that the misreading of the Secession Reference, and the 
misinterpretation of the Canadian experience, is not limited to politics. The Spanish 
Constitutional Court, in its STC 42/2014 judgement, briefly cited the opinion of the 
Canadian Supreme Court on the issue of Quebec´s secession in support of its own 
rejection of the possibility that an Autonomous Community could unilaterally call a 
referendum of self-determination (Fossas Espadaler 2014: 287-288). This prohibition, 
together with the conclusion that a region cannot secede unilaterally, was inferred from the 
principle of sovereignty.XL The recourse of the Spanish Constitutional Court to the 
Canadian experience is confusing, because sovereignty is not among the principles used by 
the Canadian Supreme Court and, as a consequence, the comparison is not accurate 
(Ferreres Comella 2014: 581). Furthermore, Canada’s Supreme Court did not question the 
legality of the first step –the referendum– but the legality of the final act of purported 
unilateral secession.XLI The Canadian Supreme Court declared that unilateral secession 
could not be the result of a unilateral referendum, but did not rule on the constitutionality 
of the referendum itself. Hence, it is not possible to draw parallels with the Canadian 
experience on the referendum issue, because this aspect was not controversial in Canada as 
provincial competence to call the referendum was taken for granted.XLII 
All things considered, it seems clear that Spain’s Constitutional Court misconstrued the 
Canadian reality, and referred wrongly to it as a comparative argument to justify the 
unconstitutionality of the Catalan Declaration of Sovereignty and the subsequent 
referendum (Fossas Espadaler 2014: 284; Solozábal Echevarría 2015: 46). By doing so, the 
Constitutional Court made the same incomplete interpretation that politicians often do, a 
mistake that should be avoided by the maximum interpreter of the Constitution.  
Returning to the Clarity Act and its impact on secessionist processes, it should be 
recalled that the biggest virtue of the act is that it establishes a set of rules to address a 
referendum on secession. These rules should have an impact on the body that wants to 
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hold the referendum, as it would need to respect them in order to be able to enter into 
negotiations in the event of a victory of the secessionist option. This reasoning should lead 
us to think that those political parties that have tried to call a referendum on the issue in 
Spain would have abided by them, in order to increase their legitimacy and gain support for 
their cause. However, their defense of the virtues embodied in the Clarity Act has been 
limited to theoretical considerations, but not to their political action. So far, there have 
been two attempts to hold referendums on issues like secession, sovereignty or redefining 
the political status of an Autonomous Community. 
 
3.2.1. Ibarretxe’s plan and the status of the Basque Country 
The first case was the project of a new Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country 
passed by the Basque Parliament in 2004. This project, commonly known as Plan Ibarretxe 
after the political leader of the Autonomous Community at the time, was presented as a 
legal document inspired by the Canadian model. The Basque Government often mentioned 
the Canadian experience during its defence of the plan, and the Preamble of the proposed 
Statute of Autonomy included “the compromise of not exercising unilaterally the right to 
self-determination” and “the obligation to negotiate with the Spanish State”.XLIII These two 
formulations were clearly borrowed from the opinion of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
the Secession Reference, but they were manipulated in order to meet the political needs of 
the political parties supporting the new legal framework.  
Article 13 of the proposed statute regulated the possibility of holding a referendum on 
a new political relationship between the Basque Country and the rest of Spain.XLIV 
According to the provision, an absolute majority of the total of valid votes would be 
considered as a clear expression of will. In practice, that meant that the plebiscite could be 
won with just 50% + 1 vote. In a consultation with two options to choose, yes or no, the 
absolute majority is equal to the majority of votes as the winning option is always going to 
have a support over 50%. Therefore, this article established the simple majority rule as the 
winning formula. This formula fails to respect any notions of clarity based on the Canadian 
model, as it could in no way be considered a clear majority. Again, the qualitative parameter 
of the majority test was absent, making it evident that this element is absent from the 
“Canadian parameter” as used in Spain. 
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Furthermore, the same article added that in the event of such support being achieved, a 
negotiation process should be started in order to materialise the will of the people. That 
legal provision implied that negotiations must lead to a change in the political status of the 
Basque Country, as a sort of automatic process with no other options or issues to be 
discussed. This conception of the negotiation process was also very different from the one 
envisaged by the Canadian Supreme Court. The Court characterised the negotiations as 
difficult, highlighting that their result was uncertain and for the political actors to 
determine. The almost automatic result envisaged by the Basque Parliament was closer to 
the position of the Parti Québécois, which also thought that the only possible outcome of 
negotiations was for the secession of Quebec. 
Although the whole process was inspired by the Canadian experience, the provisions of 
the proposed Statute of Autonomy related to the referendum were based on a biased 
reading of the Secession Reference. The articles regarding the formula for victory, and the 
subsequent negotiations, were incompatible with notions of clarity that inspired the Clarity 
Act. Also, the reference to the “Canadian parameter” seemed to be a mere marketing 
strategy in order to give a comparative legal basis to the project of reform. In any case, the 
project failed in early 2005 when the Spanish Parliament rejected it with an overwhelming 
majority of 313 to 29, with two MPs abstaining. 
Three years later the Basque Government again recurred to the Canadian experience to 
find a legal basis for a new formulation of the derecho a decidir, but the plan failed after the 
Constitutional Court, in STC 103/208, rejected this formula (Ridao 2014: 103-105).XLV 
 
3.2.2. Catalonia and the 9N consultation 
Recourse to the Canadian process as a factor of legitimacy has also been a feature in 
Catalonia. In this region, the political struggle tends to be about the possibility of holding a 
referendum on secession. In this context, the “Canadian parameter” is presented as a 
model of democracy. For those who share this view, the 1980 and 1995 referendums in 
Quebec are examples of the true democratic nature of the Canadian constitutional system, 
as it allowed the consultation of the Quebec electorate on the issue of sovereignty. 
Following this reasoning, the rejection by the central government of the possibility of 
holding a referendum shows a lack of democratic culture that legitimatizes the recourse to 
unilateralism.  
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In 2014, the Catalan government called for a referendum on the political future of 
Catalonia. As it was declared unlawful by the Spanish Constitutional Court, the Catalan 
government –with the aid of thousands of volunteers– conducted a participatory process 
designed to be like a referendum. This participatory process took place on November 9 
2014 and consisted of a double question in which the second part was subordinated to the 
answer given in the first one. Those questions were originally designed for the referendum 
that was suspended by the Constitutional Court, but were carried over into the 
participatory process. These were: 
 
a) Do you want Catalonia to become a State? (Yes or No) 
 
If the answer is in the affirmative: 
 
b) Do you want this State to be independent? (Yes or No)XLVI 
 
As we can see, the questions were anything but clear. The first concerned the 
possibility of Catalonia becoming a State. There was no mention of what was understood 
by the term State. It could be inferred from the second question that answering yes to the 
first one did not imply voting for secession as this issue was reserved for the following 
question. Therefore, if that State was not independent, what would be meant by voting yes 
to the first question and no to the second? This could include a wide range of possibilities 
that were not specified in the ballot, and could not be determined alone by the people of 
Catalonia, as a federal reform of the Spanish Constitution, or the establishment of 
confederation or an associated state.XLVII The ambiguity of the question and its lack of 
clarity also had consequences in the process of interpreting the results (Castellá Andreu 
2014: 232). There were three possible ways of filling the ballot (no, yes/yes and yes/no) 
plus the option of just answering one question and leaving the other blank. The issue of 
secession was contained in the second question, but the results had to be interpreted in 
relation to the first question, adding complexity to the process of evaluating the existence 
of a clear majority. Also, as there was no official census, no turnout figure could be 
calculated, an aspect that rendered it impossible to take into account the qualitative aspects 
of the result.XLVIII 
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The participatory process conducted in Catalonia in 2014 perfectly illustrates the biased 
and partial interpretation that tends to be made of the Canadian experience in Spain. Some 
parts of the “Canadian parameter” were used as a tool to increase the legitimacy of 
demands for a referendum, while others, notably those related to the Clarity Act, were 
ignored, as they were not convenient for the secessionist cause. The participatory process 
did not meet any of the notions of clarity established by the Canadian Supreme Court and, 
hence, would not have satisfied the requirements of the Clarity Act. 
 
 
4. Migration and its limits: lessons from the Canadian experience 
 
The two examples discussed above are illustrations of how, in Spain, the Canadian 
reality has been distorted in order to serve the interests of certain political parties. The 
Canadian experience is a compact that contains several elements that cannot be separated 
from each other. The selective use of some of those elements, while ignoring the others, 
has been common in Spain for some time. 
The Canadian experience offers plenty of lessons that could be useful to address the 
secessionist claims that Spain is currently experiencing, but they need to be put in context 
within the constitutional reality. In my view, becoming obsessed with importing foreign 
ideas to solve domestic problems is a mistake. Canada is a good comparative case to study 
how other countries have reacted to secessionist tensions in their own territory, but the 
Canadian model cannot be separated from the Canadian constitutional framework. The 
foundations of some of the elements of the Canadian experience that have been frequently 
quoted by the Basque and Catalan nationalists reside in the constitutional structure of the 
Canadian system, which is very different from the one present in Spain. 
First of all, Canada is a federal entity while Spain, although it presents some federal 
elements, is a decentralized state where the subunits are not sovereign bodies.XLIX One of 
the myths that are often cited by those in favor of the derecho a decidir is that the Canadian 
government agreed to the referendums in Quebec. If we take a closer look at the Canadian 
Constitution we will see that the power to conduct referendums is absent.L Canada follows 
the British model with a Westminster system of government, and the figure of referendums 
is considered alien to the British tradition, as these systems are based on the doctrine of 
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parliamentary sovereignty (Dicey 1915: 78). In contrast, as was said above, referendums are 
regulated by the Spanish Constitution and must be called by the central Government. 
A second feature is that Canada lacks a constitutional clause declaring the territorial 
integrity of the state. The absence of this constitutional provision allowed the Supreme 
Court to declare that Canada is divisible under certain circumstances.LI These 
circumstances are those regulated by the Clarity Act, notably the existence of a clear 
majority on a clear question regarding the secession of a province from the rest of Canada. 
As Stéphane Dion has stated in several of his conferences in Spain, a mechanism of the 
type established in the Clarity Act is incompatible with the existence of a constitutional 
clause declaring the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation.LII 
Regarding secession, the Canada-Quebec dynamic is an anomaly, a democratic 
exception, which cannot be considered as a general trend.LIII The anomaly of the Canadian 
case does not, however, mean that it is not a valuable experience. The Canadian model was 
useful in Canada in a particular political context. Although there is no clear evidence that 
the Clarity Act has contributed to settling the issue of Quebec´s independence, it was a 
turning point on the issue of secession. For the first time, the Canadian federal government 
acknowledged the possibility of entering into negotiations regarding the secession of a 
province, but it conditioned them to the existence of a clear majority on a clear question. 
The establishment of these conditions also had an influence on the secessionist camp, as 
the legitimacy of their cause was subordinated to the achievement of these conditions. 
Otherwise, the process would be considered as unlawful and the international recognition 
of the state would be compromised due to the unilateral nature of the process of secession. 
The Canadian model is useful as a comparative example, but it has to be taken as a 
compact in order to be able to learn from the experience. Focusing on just one aspect, or 
making biased interpretations as some politicians do in Spain, is a mistake. Contrary to the 
general perception in Spain, the Canadian experience has more to offer to the federalist 
cause that to those pushing for secession. It underlines some of the weaknesses of the 
secessionist strategy, especially when it is confronted with a clear legal framework to 
respond to a secessionist challenge. 
In 1980 and 1995 the federal government was on the defensive, always having to react 
to the movements of the secessionists. After the traumatic experience of the 1995 
referendum the federal government went on the offensive and settled the terms of the 
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quarrel with the Clarity Act. In Canada, but also in Spain, the secessionist parties are the 
champions of ambiguity, and attempt to take advantage of such situations to pursue their 
ends, disregarding any legal notion, with the defense of the democratic principle as their 
justification (Tornos Mas 2014: 47-48). Thanks to the Clarity Act, the secessionist 
movement can no longer claim that their democratic rights are violated or that their will is 
not respected. The disappearance of ambiguity and its replacement with the notion of 
clarity is one of the biggest lessons of the Canadian experience. The notion of clarity, and 
the subsequent duty to negotiate in good faith, have deactivated the unilateral path to 
secession, and the recourse to ambiguous questions aimed at influencing the electorate, 
together with the defense of the simple majority rule as a model of democracy. These 
instruments, defended by the Parti Québécois in 1980 and 1995, are no longer accepted. 
Since the Clarity Act, secessionists must abide by the procedure established in that act; 
otherwise the federal government will refuse to enter into negotiations on secession (Dion 
2014: 34-36). 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Once the impact of the Clarity Act on the Spanish political system has been assessed, a 
debate about the effect of such an act in Spain arises. What would be the consequences of 
the implementation of a Clarity Act in Spain? Would they favor the unity of the state or, by 
contrast, would they help the secessionist cause? 
Trying to measure the impact of the transplant of the Clarity Act into the Spanish 
constitutional system is no easy task. The choice of the metaphor of the transplant instead 
of that of migration is no casual coincidence.LIV Implementing an act such as the Canadian 
Clarity Act in the Spanish legal system is a very invasive operation with a high risk of 
rejection. Although its values are useful, the nature of the Clarity Act is very different from 
the legal foundations of the Spanish constitutional system.  
Transplanting the Clarity Act would imply important concessions by the central 
government. First, it would mean that holding a referendum on secession is possible, a 
scenario that has been denied by all governments to date. To overcome this difficulty, we 
could imagine a political compromise between the central government, and its counterpart 
in the Autonomous Community, to hold a referendum in order to know the will of the 
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people regarding the issue of secession. The transfer of the competence to conduct 
referendums to the autonomic government has also been suggested as an alternative.LV 
Secondly, it would also imply that article 2 of the Spanish Constitution relating to the 
indivisibility of the state should be amended, or at least reinterpreted, in order to make 
Spain divisible.LVI 
As these two considerations seem highly unlikely in the current political context, the 
impact of a Clarity Act should be limited to the values that the Canadian experience 
contains, but not to the act itself. Notions of clarity could be useful in the context of a 
non-binding referendum authorized by the central government to know if the people of an 
Autonomous Community want to cease to form part of Spain. Applying this concept to 
the wording of the question would assure that the result represents the true will of the 
people, and that it has not been influenced by a biased stetting of the question as in 2014 in 
Catalonia. 
As has been said above, the concept of a clear majority is the one that has had the 
greatest impact upon the Spanish political landscape. An ambiguous formulation like the 
one in the Clarity Act is unlikely in Spain, as most actors have expressed their preference 
for a complete regulation of the issue. An illustration of this, although it was not an 
enlarged majority, is the aforementioned provision of the project of Statute of the Basque 
Country regarding a referendum on its political relationship with Spain. 
Setting the minimum required percentage in favour before a referendum could help to 
evaluate if its result is clear or not, as there would be clear rules to decide what would 
constitute a clear majority. But this presetting of a clear majority entails the risk of 
subordinating the whole process to this issue, thereby conditioning the final result. As 
much as the wording of the question can influence the electorate, the presetting of a 
majority threshold can do so as well. If the achievement of that enlarged majority seems 
unlikely some voters could be tempted to vote for that option in the hope that it would 
translate into a higher degree of autonomy. Also, this factor could exacerbate secessionist 
tensions with the intention of mobilizing the electorate in order to achieve the required 
level of support. As a consequence, this could make secession more likely.  
The duty to negotiate is also an important value that should be taken into account. 
Negotiations are an essential element of politics, and any effort to address a threat of 
secession must involve such a process. Contrary to the conceptualisation that those in 
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favour of secession tend to make, this duty does not comprise an obligation to negotiate 
the details of secession, but an obligation to negotiate the whole issue that might, or might 
not, lead to secession. If we take it in broader terms, this value enshrines an obligation to 
address the problem of secession, an obligation to recognise that there is a part of the 
population that is discontent with the political arrangement currently in place, and that 
desires a change. This negotiation could result in the amendment of the Constitution in 
order to accommodate certain national or regional sensibilities. In this sense, the duty to 
negotiate could be seen as a test of the maturity of any democratic system, which has to 
adapt to address certain challenges even if those put into question the constitutional 
framework in place. This conception of the duty to negotiate is useful, even for those 
political forces that are opposed to secession, and that often do not pay much attention to 
the Canadian model. As said before, the Canadian experience contains more lessons against 
the secessionist cause than in favor, but they have been silenced due to the lack of interest 
of these political actors.  
All things considered, it would be good for Spain to develop its own framework to 
respond to secessionist challenges, instead of copying the Canadian experience. Even 
though transplanting the Clarity Act does not seem a good choice, its inherent notions are 
a good starting point, but they need to be adapted to the constitutional architecture of the 
Spain. Enacting a legal framework to address secessionist claims will help to reduce 
tensions between both levels of government, delegitimising the recourse to a unilateral path 
to secession. It will also enhance cooperation between governments, as the political agenda 
would not be focused only on secession. 
The aforementioned values of the Canadian experience have helped to decrease the 
uncertainties and ambiguities of the process and could be useful in the drafting of a 
Spanish model. Furthermore, by articulating its own legal framework Spain could 
implement elements such as a cooling down clause that are not present in the Canadian 
experience.LVII This clause would prevent the neverendum dynamic that was mentioned 
before. Other elements like the requirement of a higher quorum than for ordinary 
constitutional amendment or sub-territorial ratification could also be considered.LVIII 
Nevertheless, an exclusive focus on the issue of referendums is a mistake, as there are 
other factors that need to be assessed. The lessons of the Canadian experience are useful 
with regard to the matter of referendums and the legitimacy of unilateral secession, but 
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there is a bigger picture. If Spanish institutions want to redirect the situation and reduce 
support for sovereignty in Catalonia, they must address other issues such as the distribution 
of competences, the distribution of finances, and an acknowledgment of national 
sensibilities in the Constitution. Secession is a hard case, and there are no easy ways to 
resolve it. Bold actions and a comprehensive legal framework are good tools to begin with 
but their utility is doubtful if there is no political will to find a compromise. 
                                                 
 PhD Candidate, University of the Basque Country (Spain). LLM in Constitutional Law at the Centro de 
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid (Spain) after graduating in Law and Business Management at 
the University Carlos III of Madrid. His main research interests are Canadian federalism and the politics of 
secession. He is the author of ‘Senado y sistema federal en Canadá: ¿imposibilidad de una reforma deseable?’ 
(Revista de Estudios Políticos, 2016). Email: franciscojavier.romero@ehu.eus. This paper was presented at the 
Symposium on The Constitution of Canada: History, Evolution, Influence and Reform, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, 
24 May 2017. The author would like to thank the conveners for their work and hospitality in Pisa. 
I Vid. Dworkin (1975) & (1978): 81. For Dworkin, hard cases are those that are not easy to solve for the judge 
because they cannot be resolved by the use of an unequivocal legal rule, set out by the appropriate body prior 
to the event. In these cases, principles play a crucial role in order to help the judge to settle the case. The issue 
of secession constitutes a hard case as there is no rule, unequivocal or not, to decide the case. Because of this, 
the Canadian Supreme Court recurred to the implicit principles that underlie the Constitution to establish a 
mechanism to address the secessionist demands of part of the Quebec population. 
II The indivisible character of the state is present in the constitutions of France (articles 1 and 89), Italy 
(article 5), Brazil (article 1), Mexico (article 2) or Norway (article 1). Even a state born out of secession like 
Kosovo defines itself as indivisible according to article 1.1 of its constitution. In this sense, we can also recall 
a passage of the United States Supreme Court in Texas v White US 700, 725 (1869) affirming that “the 
Constitution […] looks to an indestructible union, composed of indestructible states”. 
III As Mancini (2012: 481) notes, secession is at once the most revolutionary and the most institutionally 
conservative of political constructs. This duality reflects the complexity of this phenomenon as it could 
constitute a great challenge to state sovereignty, but it also can be an incentive to reinforce the latter in order 
to avoid the dismemberment of the state.  
IV The Spanish Constitutional Court ruled in the STC 42/2014 that “la Constitución atribuye con carácter exclusivo 
la titularidad de la soberanía nacional al pueblo español” [The Constitution exclusively attributes the ownership of 
national sovereignty to the Spanish people], rejecting the consideration of the Catalonian people as sovereign 
as it constitutes only a fraction of the Spanish people. 
V Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, hereafter Secession Reference. 
VI The Parti Québécois and the Bloc Québécoishave openly criticized the act since its passing. In 2013 the BQ filed 
a motion to repeal it, but it was rejected by 283 to 5 in the House of Commons. Scholars like Pérez Tremps 
(2004: 53-55), Taillon (2014: 13-59), Rocher and Verrelli (2003: 220-232) and Haljan (2014: 379-380) have 
also stressed the ambiguities of the Clarity Act. 
VII Several political parties have expressed their support to the idea of importing the Clarity Act. This is the 
case, among others, of the PNV (Congreso de los Diputados 2014: 40), the PSC (2016a: 9) or JxSí, the 
collation between CiU and ERC, (Hernàndez and Tomàs 2016). 
VIII Russell characterizes as a constitutional odyssey the quest to bring the Constitution home from the United 
Kingdom –patriation– and the subsequent efforts to integrate Quebec back in the constitutional consensus 
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mandate to negotiate without soliciting a direct expression of the will of the population of that province on 
whether the province should cease to be part of Canada; or (b) a referendum question that envisages other 
possibilities in addition to the secession of the province from Canada, such as economic or political 
arrangements with Canada, that obscure a direct expression of the will of the population of that province on 
whether the province should cease to be part of Canada. 
XIX Although the Secession Reference does not contain a prohibition of asking about future arrangements, 
the notion of a clear expression of will seems to be in conflict with subordinating the answer to a future event 
that could or could not happen. 
XX Secession Reference para 87. 
XXI Secession Reference paras 73-76. 
XXII “An Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Québec people and the 
Québec State”, (2000, chapter 46). 
XXIII The judicial process started in 2001 when Keith Henderson, the leader of the Equality Party, impugned 
six articles of the Bill 99. Due to administrative problems the process was delayed for several years. In 2013 
the government of Quebec and the federal government intervened to express their respective positions on 
the matter. Again, for administrative reasons, the ruling has been delayed and it should be rendered in 2018. 
XXIV This policy was initiated by Lucien Bouchard when he became PM of Quebec in 1996, who affirmed 
that he would not call another referendum until the winning conditions –conditions gagnantes– were met, in 
other words, until the support for sovereignty was high enough to guarantee a victory of the secessionist 
option (Globe and Mail: 1999). The recently elected leader of the PQ, Jean-François Lisée, has also 
committed himself to this idea (Radio Canada: 2016). 
XXV Related to this topic vid. Relaño Pastor (1999: 63-86), Oliveras i Jané (2001: 243-279) and Ruiz Vieytez 
(2006: 9-29). 
XXVI As an example of this interest, vid. Bilbao Ubillos (1999): 83-118, Pérez Tremps (2004) and López 
Basaguren (2013): 53-92. 
XXVII The former president of the Generalitat of Catalonia, Artur Mas, recalled this axiom by affirming that 
“Canada has much more respect for Quebec than Spain for Catalonia” Vallespin (2011). 
XXVIII Secession Reference p. 221. 
XXIX The reference to the Canadian model and the Clarity Act was erased from the PSC political manifesto in 
their XIII Congress held in Barcelona the 4th and 5th of November 2016. Vid. PSC (2016b: 12-13).  
XXX PSOE (2017): 38. 
XXXI The Canadian writer Josh Freed coined the term neverendum in relation with the repeated referendums in 
Quebec. He recalls the idea that once the first referendum has been held, subsequent referendums will be 
called until the victory of the secessionist option. 
XXXII Europa Press (2014) – Bilbao, 11thApril 2014. 
XXXIII Europa Press (2017) – Madrid, 1st March 2017. 
XXXIV The expression “Getting it wrong” is taken from Paul Romney´s book: Getting it Wrong: How Canadians 
Forgot Their Past and Imperilled Confederation. In that book, Romney explains how Canadians once regarded the 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
156 
                                                                                                                                               
Confederation as a compact of peoples, the English and the French, but with the passing of time that 
conception evolved into a centralist myth of the origins of Confederation.  
XXXV In the Catalan elections of 2015, the secessionist coalition JxSí obtained 39.59% of the vote. This figure 
fell to 24.55% and 29.39% in the cities of Badalona and Tarragona, respectively. In the Basque elections of 
2016 the PNV obtained 37.65% of the vote, while in the capital, Vitoria, it obtained only 25%. In the 
province of Álava the vote for the winning party was 29%. 
XXXVI Around 30% of the population of this valley in the Pyrenees Mountains has Aranese, an Occitan 
language, as their mother tongue.  
XXXVII As it was the case in the unilateral, and thus illegal, referendum on secession held on October 1st 2017 
by the Catalan Government despite it was suspended by the Constitutional Court. 
XXXVIII Secession Reference para 90. 
XXXIX Secession Reference para 91. 
XL STC 42/2014 – Fundamento jurídico 3. 
XLI Secession Reference par 86. 
XLII Vid. note 49 below. 
XLIII The original text, in Spanish, was “el compromiso de no ejercer unilateralmente el derecho de autodeterminación y el 
reconocimiento explícito de la obligación de abrir un proceso de negociación y pacto con el Estado”. 
XLIV The Basque government envisaged the Basque Country as a free state associated to Spain, in similar 
fashion to the sovereignty-association proposed by the Parti Québécois in 1980, and the new economic and 
political partnership in 1995. 
XLV This plan was articulated through Law 9/2008, which contained provisions for a non-binding referendum 
to ask for a mandate to negotiate with the terrorist group ETA, and to conduct negotiations to design a new 
legal framework for the derecho a decidir. The preamble of the law made explicit references to the Secession 
Reference as a factor of legitimacy. As the referendum had an impact on sovereignty it was rejected by the 
Constitutional Court as it was a matter for the whole Spanish nation to decide on, not just a fraction of it. 
XLVI As the questions were originally designed for the referendum, they were included in the Decree 
129/2014 of the Generalitat of Catalonia that was enacted under the provisions of the Law 10/2014. The 
Constitutional Court suspended both norms after they were challenged by the Central Government. 
Following the ruling of the Constitutional Court the Catalan Government decided to carry on the 
participatory process with the same questions designed for the referendum. 
XLVII It should be noted that any change in the Spanish Constitutional framework regarding the territorial 
organization of the state must obtain the approval of the Spanish people in a referendum. 
XLVIII The census was elaborated on a case-by-case basis with data of the electors that voted. Some 
organizations opposed to the secession process claimed that there cases of fraud due to this issue. 
XLIX The federal nature of Canada was contested by Wheare (1963: 19-20), who described the Canadian 
constitution as quasi-federal, although he conceded that it was predominantly federal in practice. This 
statement is based on a literal reading of the Constitution, in particular those provisions regarding the power 
of disallowance and the federal appointment of lieutenant governors which conferred powers to the federal 
government that could undermine the authority of the provinces. However, this idea was rejected by the 
Supreme Court in the Secession Reference (para 55) highlighting the undisputed federal nature of Canada 
given the fact that these powers has been abandoned. This idea is shared by Hogg (2007: 5-19) and Monahan 
(2013: 84-85). In relation to Spain, it has been described by Watts (2009: 55) and Moreno (2007: 95-97) as “a 
federation in disguise” because of the federalizing nature of the internal logic of the Estado de las Autonomías. 
L Quebec enacted its Referendum Act, chapter 64.1, in 1978 under the provincial residual clause regarding 
matters of merely local or private nature in the province of section 92.16 C. 1867. 
LI Secession Reference para 84. 
LII Conference at the Barcelona Bar on April 11th 2013 entitled “Secession and Democracy”. 
LIII In fact, in addition to the Canadian case, just two constitutions in the world, Ethiopia (article 39.1) and 
Saint Kits and Nevis (article 115), contain provisions regulating the right to secession.  
LIV In relation with the metaphor, vid. Ewald (1995): 489-51, Nelken and Feest (2001) and Pegoraro (2013): 
33-80. 
LV The Government of Catalonia requested the transfer of this competence in 2014 through proposition 
125/000013, but it was rejected by the Spanish Parliament. It must be noted that in its ruling 103/2008 the 
Constitutional Court considered that holding a referendum on secession is against the Constitution as the 
sovereignty belongs to the nation. Any consultation in that sense needs a previous reform of the Constitution 
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in order to be compatible with it. 
LVI As Aláez Corral (2015): 151-157 recalls, there are not any material limits on the Spanish Constitution and, 
therefore, its complete amendment is possible. For that reason, this article should not be considered as an 
impediment to include a secession clause in the Spanish Constitution.  
LVII A cooling down –enfriamiento in the Spanish doctrine– clause refers to the entrenchment of a clause that bans 
the holding of a new referendum on secession for a period of time after one has been held with the aim of 
preventing a dynamic of continues referendums on the issue. This clause settles the debate for a period, 
allowing the electorate to reflect of the issue without the passions of the political debate.  
LVIII See Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forest), 2004 SCC 73. This territorial counting of the 
votes could be a tool to address the issue of different degrees of support for secession among the territory of 
a given Autonomous Community. The requirement of an enlarged majority would not just apply to the final 
result, but also to the result in each province that integrates the Autonomous Community that wants to 
secede. These elements have a qualitative nature in line with the reasoning of the Canadian Supreme Court. 
This instrument could also be used to protect minorities that are not concentrated in a sub-unit, like those 
resulting from immigration. In this sense, vid. Saénz Royo (2016: 145-148). 
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Abstract 
 
The Canadian constitution is to some extent characterised by its focus on equality, and 
in particular gender equality. This development of women’s rights in Canada and the 
greater engagement of women as political actors is often presented as a steady linear 
process, moving forwards from post-enlightenment modernity. This article seeks to disturb 
this ‘discourse of the continuous,’ by using an analysis of the pre-confederation history of 
suffrage in Canada to both refute a simplistic linear view of women’s rights development 
and to argue for recognition of the Indigenous contribution to the history of women’s 
rights in Canada.  
The gain of franchise and suffrage movements in Canada in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century are, rightly, the focus of considerable study (Pauker 2015), This 
article takes an alternative perspective. Instead, it examines the exercise of earlier franchises 
in pre-confederation Canada. In particular it analyses why franchise was exercised more 
widely in Lower Canada and relates this to the context of the removal of franchises from 
women prior to confederation. 
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women’s rights, pre-Confederation, franchise, indigenous women, constitutions 
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1. Introduction 
 
Canada has an international reputation as a standard setter in relation to women’s rights 
(CEDAW 2003: Para 16) and the Canadian constitution is to some extent characterised by 
its focus on equality, and in particular gender equality (FAFIA and NWAC 2015: 9).I The 
development of women’s rights in Canada and the greater engagement of women as 
political actors is often presented as a steady linear process, moving forwards from post-
enlightenment modernity. In this view rights acquisition and political engagement are 
linked to ‘Western’ ideas of progress, and closely associated with ‘Western’ models of 
development (Fraser 1999; Friedman 1995). This presents a view of history that Foucault 
terms a ‘… discourse of the continuous…’ (Foucault 1982:12). This perspective on history 
has been criticised by postmodern scholars and particularly by feminists. (Foucault 1982; 
Scott 1988). Amongst other things feminist critique notes that it can place women’s rights 
and non-western cultures in an oppositional relationship leading to the paternalistic 
treatment of indigenous womenII (Green 2007). In addition an alignment of women’s 
rights with the experience of middle class white women’s emancipation crafts an 
understanding of gender discrimination and shapes the context of women’s rights in a way 
which fails to take into account the significance of class and race, and other cleavages 
(hooks 2000; Crenshaw 1989). This can be seen in Canada itself where general views of 
women’s rights fail to recognise the very serious problems of rights ‘enjoyment’ for 
Indigenous women. For example Indigenous women are over represented as victims of 
violence in Canada and underrepresented in political positions (Palmater 2016). These 
disparities in the enjoyment of rights have been presented as an anomaly and, because they 
did not fit a picture of the steady development of women’s rights in Canada, were blamed 
on the dysfunctionality of indigenous communities themselves rather than any failing 
within the Canadian state (Palmater 2016). This article seeks to disturb this discourse of the 
continuous,’ (Foucault 1982: 12) by using an analysis of the history of suffrage in Canada to 
both refute a view of women’s rights as developing through simplistic linear progression 
and by arguing for recognition of the Indigenous contribution to the history of women’s 
rights in Canada.  
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The gain of franchise and the development of suffrage movements in Canada in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century are, rightly, the focus of considerable study 
(Pauker 2015), This article takes an alternative perspective. Instead, it examines the exercise 
of earlier franchises in pre-confederation Canada. In particular it analyses why franchise 
was exercised more widely in Lower Canada and relates this to the context of the removal 
of franchises from women prior to confederation. Existing literature both references and 
provides some discussion of the phenomenon of women’s early franchise in Canada 
(Bradbury 2012; Garner 1969; Cleverdon 1950; Campbell 1989). This article draws on the 
existing secondary literature and uses contemporary primary sources to provide context for 
both the exercise of and the exclusion from franchise in the pre-confederation period. 
Distinctively, this article refutes the orthodox explanation given by The History of the Vote in 
Canada (Elections Canada 1997) and by John Courtney (Courtney 2004), that the higher 
incidences of voting by women in Lower Canada were due to the absence of the Common 
Law. Alternatively it is suggested that any difference is due among other factors, to the role 
of women, and particularly indigenous women, in the development of Lower Canada. The 
context of women’s explicit exclusion from franchise in pre-confederation Canada is also 
analysed through this new perspective. The article argues for the significance of this legal 
history to current theory and debate on the political and legal contexts of development of 
women’s rights, particularly in the context of indigenous women’s rights in Canada.  
The next section (2) sets out the recorded incidences of women’s voting in pre-
confederation Canada and challenges the orthodox reasons given for the higher incidence 
of voting in Lower Canada. Section 3 provides out an alternative explanation for the 
difference in political culture while section 4 analyses the removal of these early franchises 
from women. The section goes on to link these legal changes to change in the context of 
the imperial project and the nature of colonialism. Section 5 concludes by arguing that this 
‘lost’ history has a contemporary resonance on understandings of women’s rights in 
contemporary Canada. 
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2. Pre-Confederation Canada 
 
2.1. Charting Franchise Exercise 
The history of women’s suffrage in Canada, might appear to support a view of rights 
acquisition as a linear development. For example Edwards v. A.G. Canada ([1930] A.C. 124), 
the Persons Case, is presented as one of those defining constitutional moments along the 
way of a steady progression of women’s rights. Yet within the ‘Persons Case’ itself we can 
also read illustrations of the historical complexity of women’s fluctuating positions in 
society and the more diverse origins of respect for women’s equal worth. Edwards v. A.G. 
Canada ([1930] A.C. 124), held that women in Canada had a constitutional right to stand for 
Senate. Lord Sankey rejected an originalist interpretation and instead found that the 
Canadian Constitution was a ‘living tree’ (Edwards v. A.G. Canada [1930] A.C. 124: 136) 
capable of growth and reinterpretation in line with changing social circumstances.III The 
reasoning in this case seems to fit the understanding of rights acquisition as linear. Yet in 
obiter statements Lord Sankey found that women had exercised franchise without explicit 
grant, noting that ‘In Quebec, just as in England, there can be found cases of exceptional 
women in exceptional instances.’ (Edwards v AG Canada [1930] AC 124). In fact the 
evidence shows that these instances were numerous and frequent.  
Women in Lower Canada voted under the Constitutional Act 1791 Georg.II Cap. 
XXXI (Shortt and Doughty 1918: 694). A Plan For a House of Assembly attached to a petition 
presented by Anglophones in 1784 called for the British to set up an elected assembly in 
Lower Canada in which ‘None but males shall either Vote or represent.’ (Shortt and 
Doughty 1918: 510). The petitioners desire to limit the vote to men might be viewed as 
suggestive that women at the time were politically active and would otherwise have 
expected to vote. Nevertheless when the assemblies for Lower and Upper Canada were 
established and voting qualifications were set out in the Constitutional Act 1791 in section 
XX there was no reference to sex as a qualification. The vote was given to ‘persons,’ 
provided they had the requisite property qualification, age and citizenship as set out in 
section XXII.  
One of the earliest direct records of women voting in Canada is of Mrs Papineau and 
her female friends accompanying her son to the Polls in 1809, and announcing proudly that 
she would be voting for her son (Cleverdon 1950: 214). This was recorded in the press at 
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the time. Further evidence exists through petitions regarding elections. In 1820, the 
provincial parliament of Lower Canada upheld a petition challenging the validity of 22 
married women’s votes (Garner 1969: 157). Interestingly it was not the gender of the 
voters per se that was found to invalidate the votes. It was the married status of the 
women, together with the fact that their husbands had already exercised votes based on the 
same property, which rendered their votes void (Garner 1969: 157). Therefore the 
reasoning suggests that where the property qualification was fulfilled women’s votes were 
acceptable. Cleverdon also notes that at this time and through the 1820s voting by women 
a Three Rivers was ‘commonplace.’ (Cleverdon 1950: 215). 
Further petitions presented in 1828 provide a record of women voting and reveal a lack 
of any “strong antipathy” towards women’s votes in this period (Cleverdon 1950: 215). 
One petition from ‘divers electors’ concerned the refusal of the returning officer to take a 
widow’s vote at an election in Quebec Upper Town. The petition asked the Assembly to 
invalidate the election of the candidate Mr. Andrew Stuart for this reason (Cleverdon 1950: 
215). Supporting this petition, an assembly member, seconded by another, opined that, if 
the widow’s vote had been denied, then the election was surely invalid (Cleverdon 1950: 
215). A second petition, presented to the House of Assembly of Lower Canada at the same 
time argued in the opposite way (Doughty and Story 1935:519). Amongst other electoral 
irregularities the petition suggested that the “votes of women, married, unmarried and in a 
state of widowhood were illegally received.” (Doughty and Story 1935: 521). Both petitions 
were laid aside until the next session, when the assembly decided to take no action in 
relation to either (Cleverdon 1950: 215). There was no duty to keep polling records but 
some were kept and noted both the sex and the ethnicity of voters. So that in 1825, 27 
First Nations women from Ka were recorded as voting in an election in Huntingdon 
County, Lower Canada (Bradbury 2012: 263).  
The highest numbers of recorded votes came in the years prior to the first legislative 
attempt to exclude women from the franchise. In elections in 1832 records show that 71 
women came forward to vote over 4 days in an April by-election in an Montreal East, 61 of 
the votes were accepted (Parliamentary Report, Lower Canada 1833: 26th January 185). 
Later that month in the by-election of Montreal West that went on for 23 days 225 women 
approached the hustings. Of these 216 women came forward to vote, 199 women had their 
votes accepted for the election and 17 were refused. (Parliamentary Report, Lower Canada 
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1833: 26th January 187; 23rd February 94). These records were preserved through the report 
of a parliamentary inquiry into the election which was significant since the Riot Act was 
read (Jackson 2009). Garner states that there were no recorded instances of women voting 
in Lower Canada after 1834 (Garner 1969: 158), but Bradbury notes that further recorded 
instances exist until 1844 (Bradbury 2012: 261).  
Some records also exist for Upper Canada, most notably after Upper and Lower 
Canada had been combined as the United Province of Canada in 1841. In an 1844 election 
in the County of Halton, 7 women’s votes were accepted. James Durand of Dundas a 
Reform Party Candidate put in a petition to the Assembly in relation to the election. One 
of the 12 complaints he listed was that the Returning Officer and several of the Deputy 
Returning Officers ‘...allowed divers women, in all to the number of 7 on the aggregate 
Poll, to vote for Mr James Webster’ his rival (Assembly 1844 2 December 8 Victoria). The 
whole election was won by only 8 votes overall so these 7 were key votes. The investigation 
into this election went on until 1846 and Mr Durand brought 6 women as witnesses to one 
of the hearings. Ultimately the select committee found that none of the evidence was 
sufficient to invalidate the election and the costs had to be paid by Durand (Journal of the 
Assembly 6 May 1846: 214-215). 
In other parts of pre-confederation Canada some recorded instances of women voting 
exist but are much less frequent, and these were more often successfully contested at the 
time. Jennings believes the earliest women’s votes recorded were six women’s votes at 
Winston County Nova Scotia in 1793 (Jennings 2015). Garner also cites two further 
examples, which suggest that women’s right to vote was recognised in Nova Scotia even if 
it was not deemed to be customary (Garner 1969: 156). In the first cited instance a 
candidate sought to challenge his opponent’s use of female votes again on the basis of their 
property qualification rather than sex. He dropped his challenge when told that any 
investigation would centre on the property qualification of the candidates, not those of the 
voters (Garner 1969: 156). The second instance occurred at a general election in Annapolis 
County, when the Tories rounded up 26 eligible women supporters to vote. They were 
defeated when the Reform Party got wind of this and found 40 similarly qualified women 
of their own (Garner 1969: 156). It was suggested, by Garner writing in 1969, that in New 
Brunswick women did not try to exercise the vote at all. He could find no examples 
(Garner 1969: 156). Later research by Gail Campbell and Elections Canada cites one 
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instance where a vote was accepted (Campbell 1989; Elections Canada 1997), and Kim 
Klein discovered evidence of dozens of women attempting to vote in controverted 
elections (Klein 1996: 72). The votes were accepted by the clerks even though “instructions 
that guided the conduct of New Brunswick’s earliest elections stipulated that voters must 
be male.” (Klein 1996: 71) It was only afterwards when these were challenged and were not 
allowed to stand. The fact remains that they were cast (Klein 1996:74) and the clerks 
accepted them on the basis that all the women were feme sole and had the requisite 
property qualification (Klein 1996: 73). This difference in formal rules and the acceptance 
of women’s votes by people on the ground is not uncommon. Where discretion was given 
to ordinary people it was often exercised in relation to customary understandings of the law 
and in a manner which might be at variance with the tenor of elite debates (Klinghoffer 
and Ellis 1992; Markoff 2003). This can be illustrated in the acceptance of votes by polling 
clerks and lower officials, even in cases where higher authorities later overturned them. 
 
2.2. Lower Canada a Distinctive Position? 
Across pre-confederation Canada, there are many more reported instances of women 
voting than the “... exceptional women and exceptional instances” noted by Lord Sankey in 
Edwards v Att. General ([1930] AC 124 at 132). Does Lower Canada stand out as an 
exceptional area? 
Existing research findings vary, and new materials are still being brought to light, but 
currently held records give more frequent instances for women voting in Lower Canada 
than elsewhere in pre-Confederation Canada. This marked difference between the 
‘recorded incidences’ of women voting in Lower Canada as compared to Upper Canada, 
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island seem beyond doubt. This is not 
just because of preserved records but also because Lower Canada was recognised as 
distinctive by contemporary sources at the time. 
For example in Lower Canada itself the issue of women’s voting was openly discussed. 
Joseph Papineau made a great show of accompanying his mother to the polls in 1809 and 
openly encouraging women to come forward and vote (Elections Canada 1997). It might 
also be inferred, that a different culture of political behaviour for women existed in Lower 
Canada, from the fact that the press in other provinces commented often unfavourably on 
women’s political behaviour there. In 1820 in the New Brunswick popular press the 
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involvement and acceptability of women ‘s political activity was noted and it was suggested 
that if Lower Canada was not careful it would develop into a “Petticoat Polity” (Klein 
1996: 71). This suggests then that this very visible political activity of women in Lower 
Canada was not the norm throughout pre-confederation Canada.  
What, then, explains the difference between the frequency and acceptability of voting 
by women in Lower Canada compared to other Provinces? The History of the Vote in Canada 
and John Courtney suggest that this difference in voting patterns is linked to the operation 
of French civil law in Lower Canada; in comparison with the Common Law operating in 
the other provinces (Elections Canada 1997; Courtney 2004). There are, however, two 
problems with this explanation. First, it is not clear that, before the case of Chorlton v. Lings 
(1868-69) L.R. 4 P.C. 374), that the Common Law did exclude women per se from voting. 
Second there is no evidence that French Civil Law produced better results anywhere else. 
The former will be argued further in section 2.3 and 2.4 and the latter at 2.5.  
 
2.3. Did the Common Law Exclude? 
In Chorlton v. Lings Chief Justice Bovil in 1868 in the Court of Common Pleas held that 
the law was, and always had been clear that women were subject to a legal incapacity and 
could not vote (Chorlton v. Lings (1868-69) L.R. 4 P.C. 374). He noted references to 
aristocratic women voting on occasion but suggested, that these women might have been 
acting as returning officers. In conclusion Bovil considered that even if these women were 
voting in their own right, “these instances” were “of comparatively little weight, as 
opposed to uninterrupted usage to the contrary for several centuries.” (Chorlton v. Lings 
(1868-69) L.R. 4 P.C. 374: 383). I argue though that the Common law was far from 
crystallised in the earlier historical periods which Bovil referred to (Brooks and Sharpe 
1976), instead he ‘reasoned backwards’ (Atiyah 1986) and applied the mid-nineteenth 
century developing notions of who and what women were, to earlier periods of time in 
order to justify denying women the vote.  
This next section looks first at the context of women as political and legal actors under 
the Common Law and then at evidence of franchise itself. Modern historians have 
produced much good direct evidence of the involvement of both aristocratic or propertied 
women (Stretton 1998; Prest 1991; Bailey 2002; Froide 2005; Bradbury 2012; Pearlston 
2009, 2011; Harris 1990) and ordinary womenIV as political and legal actors through the 
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medieval and modern periods (Power and Postan 1997; Clark 2005, 573; Pollard 1920: 
153). This is not in itself evidence of franchise exercise but it was an absence of evidence of 
legal and political activity which in the past made many historians think franchise exercise 
was unlikely, although Pollard is unusual in stating he is open regarding its ‘extent’ (Pollard 
1920: 153).  
Women’s petitions in the seventeenth century show the extent of women’s 
participation in the political life at that time, and their sense of entitlement to be involved 
(Harris 1990; Thomas 1958). For example in 1641, “Gentlewomen, tradesmens’ wives, and 
many others of the female sex” forced the House of Commons to accept their petition by 
attending in ever greater numbers and saying, as they stood at the doorway of the 
Commons, that “it was as good to die here as at home.” (Cobbett 1807: cols 1072-1076). 
In 1649 another women’s petition, this time arguing for the release of Levellers imprisoned 
without trial in the Tower of London, was met with the response that women should not 
“meddle in things they could not understand.” (Brailsford and Hill 1976: 317). In response, 
ten thousand women signed a second petition and a thousand women marched it to 
Parliament. This second petition complained about the treatment of the first petition, 
stated women’s right to share in the freedoms of the Commonwealth, and asserted their 
equal interest with men in the “beliefs and security contained in the Petition of Right and 
the other good laws of the land.” (Brailsford and Hill 1976: 317). When womens’ right to 
petition was challenge in 1829 a House of Commons Speaker’s Ruling confirmed that 
women, whether single or married, were competent political actors in relation to petitions 
(Pickering 2001: 382). 
The well-kept records of Protestation Oaths in the seventeenth century also give a 
good sense of both the acceptability and the expectation for women to be political actors. 
The requirement to swear an Oath of Allegiance to the Parliament and the protestant 
religion were required to be sworn in 1641 (House of Commons Journal vol. 2 30 July 
1641) and set out in gender-neutral language (Mendelson and Crawford 1998: 398). 
Mendelson and Crawford note that in some places, like West Sussex, women were 
excluded altogether, in others only single or widowed women were included; while 
elsewhere all women were listed (Mendelson and Crawford 1998: 149), sometimes these 
including the names even of those who refused to swear (Froide 2005: 149). The later 
“George Oaths,” (Oath Act 1715 1 George 1 c.13; and Oath Act 1723 9 George I c.24) 
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required people of requisite civic status to swear allegiance to the King. Again there were 
great regional variations, but in some places up to a third of the signatories were women 
(Froide 2005:149). 
 
Direct evidence of franchise itself needs to be placed in the context of the changing 
nature of franchise. Until the sixteenth century, attendance at the infrequently convened 
parliaments was seen as “an unpleasant incident of feudal service” (Pollard 1920: 153). The 
privilege of not attending, or of sending proxies, was sought after: the question was not “a 
matter of who is anxious to serve but of who is obliged to attend.” (Pollard 1920: 153).V As 
it became desirable to have a representative in Parliament, the variety of franchises 
available at the local level proliferated. This general complexity in itself complicated the 
question of whether any particular ‘person’ let alone female persons held franchise (Pollard 
1920: 156; Seymour and Frary 1918: I: 70; Anderson 2010: 430).VI  
The extent of the franchise was also sometimes actively misrepresented for political 
reasons (Hirst 1975: 29). Coke (Coke 1669), for example, was cited in Chorlton v Lings as 
authority for women’s exclusion from the franchise at common law (Chorlton v. Lings (1868-
69) L.R. 4 P.C). Yet, it is suggested that he misrepresented the position in relation to 
women (Stopes 1894: 101). Coke was present when the Privileges Committee decided cases 
which confirmed that women were entitled to exercise the vote, and he was criticised for 
amending interpretations of law to suit his own political ends (Hirst 1975: 29). Coke’s 
contemporaries, William Hakewill and D’Ewes, stated that women, when femes soles, were 
under no legal incapacity (Hirst 1975: 18–19).VII  
Women were recorded as participating in the “cry,” where the crowd roared its choice, 
and the “view,” where hands were raised at both the election at Westminster, and in 
Worcestershire, in the elections for the Long Parliament of 1621. These informal methods 
seem to have allowed lower class women, without property or status, to vote (Hirst 1975: 
19). 
Even in the period after the Restoration of the Monarchy in 1660, when it is suggested 
that to some extent women’s public activity was “closed down” (Mendelson and Crawford 
1998: 428), the legal right of qualified women to vote was still recognised. For example 
women at a Richmond election in 1678, were prevented from exercising the vote in person 
but they were conceded their right to deputise male proxies (Mendelson and Crawford 
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1998: 347). The use of proxies through discreet temporary transfers of Burgage rightsVIII 
became accepted practice for qualified women in the Eighteenth century Burgage-tenure 
constituencies (Hirst 1975: 18).  
Two later case reports of an election for a SextonIX in 1738 (Olive v Ingram 93 E.R. 
1067; Olive v Ingram (1738) 2 Str. 1114) also provide evidence of the eighteenth century 
understanding of the extent of women’s franchise under the Common Law. Both a male 
candidate and female candidate stood for Sexton, each received votes from women electors 
and the female candidate, Sarah Bly, was elected. The male loser disputed the result and the 
King’s Bench was asked whether the Common Law allowed women to stand for election 
as Sextons, and also whether it allowed them to vote for the appointment of a Sextons. 
The case was heard on three different occasions before the Court accepted that women 
could both vote and stand. If you only read the English Report of the case you might think 
that this was the first time that women had participated in such elections, but an alternative 
report written up by Strange, the Solicitor General who acted in the case, casts a different 
light. He stated that he did not feel it proper to argue against women standing as Sextons 
since there are many “cases where offices of greater consequence had been held by women 
and there being many women Sextons now in London.” (Olive v Ingram (1738) 2 Str. 1114: 
1115). 
The case was politically sensitive. Lee, the Chief Justice, had initially indicated that the 
case was of wide significance, and he cited the cases of Holt v. Lisle or Coats v. Lisle, and 
Katherine v. SurreyX as authority for the right of women to vote in parliamentary elections 
when they were femes soles. By the final hearing, however, the Court was very careful to 
state that its decision should not be taken as authority for parliamentary franchise. Despite 
this statement, though, both Lee C.J. and Page J. gave obiter comment to the effect that they 
believed that women’s parliamentary votes were also good votes (Olive v Ingram 93 E.R. 
1067: 1068).  
 
2.4. Common Law: In Colonial Contexts 
Final support, for the proposition that the Common Law provided no absolute bar to 
women’s franchise before the mid-nineteenth century, comes from the colonial experience 
itself, and particularly from the experience of colonies established prior to the nineteenth 
century. English Common Law was often cited as authority for the right of propertied 
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women to vote in Canada. For example the Petition to the House of Assembly Lower 
Canada in 4th December 1828 in favour of women’s votes, argued that “property and not 
persons is the basis of representation in the English Government” and, that “the same 
principle is carried into our own constitution.” (Doughty and Story 1935: 519). 
Similarly in the colonies which later became the United States of America, it was 
understood that, if women were to be excluded from franchise, then this must be done 
explicitly through state or federal constitutional mechanisms (Keyssar 2000). Ratcliffe notes 
that in accordance with traditional British terms, voting was on the basis of property and 
non-dependent women who were responsible for family property could vote (Ratcliffe 
2013: 220). It was only after the American revolution that most states disenfranchised 
women by setting maleness as a voting qualification (Ratcliffe 2013: 229). A debate on 
women’s franchise prior to the 1776 constitution in New Jersey referred to the “time 
honoured right of femes soles to represent their own property”, and did not exclude them 
(Klinghoffer and Elkis 1992: 193). In 1790 the Assembly passed a Bill setting out franchise 
qualifications which explicitly referred to voters as both ‘he’ and ‘she.’(Turner 1915: 167) 
Women’s franchise remained in New Jersey until 1807 (Ratcliffe 2013: 244).  
 
2.5. Was French Civil Law More Conducive to Women’s Franchise Exercise? 
The other reason given more frequent exercise of Franchise in Lower Canada is the 
existence of French Civil Law (Elections Canada 1997: 24). Once again I argue that this 
does not seem to be a likely reason. Although community property systems under the 
coutumes were said to favour women, there is no evidence that French Civil Law was usually 
any more supportive of women’s formal political participation than was the English 
Common Law (Hanley 1998). Women voted in the eighteenth century revolutionary period 
in France, but this was short lived, and their deliberate exclusion from subsequent 
franchises was heavily criticised by French women at the time (Proctor 1990; Kingdom 
1990). In no other colony with French legal coutumes was a difference in political behaviour 
apparent. For example Corsica had a tradition from ‘time immemorial’ of women voting in 
local elections in the shepherd’s villages whose remoteness made them like ‘little republics.’ 
(Gregory 1985: 19) This tradition was continued in the Paoli constitution from 1755- 1769, 
but when France took over in 1769 women’s rights to vote were removed (Nardo 2014: 7). 
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3. Lower Canada a Distinctive Culture? 
 
3.1. Alternative Reasons for Higher Exercise of Franchise 
Section 2 identified Lower Canada as distinctive in terms of the frequency and 
acceptability for women exercising franchise. The section also refuted arguments which 
suggested that this was either because of the absence of the English Common Law or the 
presence of French Civil law. Rather than looking for explanations in the European 
heritage of its law this section argues that differences in Lower Canada are more likely to 
be related to specific local factors, and to its distinctive cultural development. In Lower 
Canada it is argued that the settlers adopted some ‘traits from the aboriginal world” to 
create a distinctive culture that was “resistant to hierarchy” and “driven by egalitarianism” 
(Elections Canada 1997: 19). In ‘two generations they became a distinct society readily 
distinguishable from sojourners.’ (Elections Canada 1997: 19). This paper argues there are 
three factors, including the contribution of First Nations culture to early Canadian society, 
which are significant in creating these differences in manifestation of women’s political 
autonomy. This section will look at these factors in turn.  
 
3.2. Role of Women in Establishing New France 
First women played an unusual influential and significant role in developing the colony 
of New France. They administered hospitals and schools and religious communities and 
were viewed with great respect (Noel 1991). General Murray’s report for the British 
Government on the state of the government in Quebec in 1762 made a number of 
observations on the contribution of women to the colony (Murray 1918). Murray noted the 
many ‘communities of women’ and the institutions for teaching girls to read and write. He 
found these communities of ‘Women’ to be ‘... much esteemed and respected by the 
people’ (Murray 1918). A later report from Finlay to Sir Evan Nepean the first Permanent 
Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, noted that while the educational 
standard overall were poor, the females had ‘ ... a great advantage over the males in point 
of education’, since the sisters had taught girls to read and write as well as sew and knit 
(Finlay 1918). He saw this lack of education in males as a potential issue for the success of 
any future elections and local assembly (Finlay 1918), but of course it placed women in a 
good position to participate. 
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3.3. Distance of Lower Canada from Changing Conceptions of Gender 
Second as a factor was the relative distance of Lower Canada from the development of 
“modernity” in Europe. The European settlement of New France began at time when 
“ideas about women’s role were surprising flexible in western Europe” (Noel 1991: 30). 
Subsequent contact with Europe was minimal, so that the changes in European society 
were not transferred to, and paralleled in, Lower Canada. Settlers became “Canadianised” 
and differentiated themselves from the French Sojourners who came to the colony and did 
not adopt settler life (Noel 1991: 30). Further, Lower Canada never received the same flow 
of emigrants as the other Canadian provinces or European colonies. For example the 
province was not flooded with refugees following the American war of Independence. One 
of the results of this was that the liberalism that swept Europe with its notion of “separate 
gendered spheres” was late in coming to Lower Canada (Choquette 1997: 298). Markoff 
notes that women in other ‘frontier settlements’, most distant from the centre and its social 
control, also evidenced stronger political activity (Markoff 2003). In Lower Canada, 
colonial life, carried on at a distance from the political centre, and in circumstances which 
demanded greater mutuality than in other places, created challenges to contemporary 
European norms about the nature of relations between men and women. Eighteenth 
century, European sojourners found women in New France to be well educated, and to play 
a role unequalled in any other “country or colony” in relation to the leadership, “financing, 
immigration, and defences that played a major role in the colony’s survival” (Noel 1991: 
29). Women were noted for exercising their “initiative … in business and commerce, ” and 
it was noted in eighteenth century in Quebec that women-only assemblies elected 
midwives, and may also have had other functions (Noel 1991: 29). 
 
3.4. Influence of First Nations Culture 
Thirdly, the different nature of Lower Canada was not due only to its remoteness from 
the colonial centres, first of France and then England, and the distinctive authority and 
efforts of the women who were founders, but also to its closeness to an alternative to 
European culture.  
Good contact with indigenous communities was initially essential to the success of the 
colony, and of the trading companies, when European settlement commenced in the 
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sixteenth century.XI Sylvia Van Kirk in her monograph Many Tender Ties, argues that the 
knowledge and craft skills of indigenous women, and their ability to mediate between two 
different worlds, became crucial to both the survival of the settlers and the success of the 
fur trade(Van Kirk 1983). Although much of Van Kirk’s work relates to developments in 
Western Canada, the fur trade was administered from Montreal and Quebec and Van Kirk 
records the bringing in to society in Lower Canada, traders wives and children of 
indigenous Canadian origin. The French government also encouraged marriages with 
dowries and land grants, hoping that it could assimilate the indigenous populations and 
make them ‘French’ (Martin 2007). Intermarriage between European settlers and 
indigenous people thus became usual, and was encouraged at a local level by Champlain, 
one of the founders of New France (Fischer 2008). This acceptability of interrelationships 
between the two communities was compounded by the fact that there were few French 
women in Quebec in the early seventeenth century only five were counted in Quebec in 
1632 increasing to 65 in 1636 as a result of an influx of immigration(Fischer 2008: 467). 
The French government later provided dowries for the Filles de Roi – the women sent in the 
late seventeenth century to boost French immigration (Noel 1991), but comparatively few 
women travelled out to Lower Canada until the nineteenth century (Choquette 1997). First 
Nations women were also more numerous than men in the area where New France was 
established, diseases, like smallpox, brought by Europeans, had a greater impact in taking 
the lives of men than women (Devens 1992: 27). Many First Nations groups viewed 
interrelationships as a way of fostering good relations with other communities (Martin 
2007), and relationships were often based on affection rather than mere practicalities 
(Backhouse 1991: Chapt 1). In Lower Canada a distinct Métis (mixed) community 
developed, and still exists. Instead of French assimilation of indigenous people the French 
and other European settlers became ‘Canadianised’ (Elections Canada 1997: 19). It is 
argued that this is significant because indigenous culture and the relative autonomy of 
indigenous women provided an alternative model for all women’s lives in the colony.  
There are many different accounts of women’s life in indigenous societies. 
Contemporary ethnographic accounts by the Jesuit missionaries, and many colonial 
historians, were critical of the egalitarian nature of the indigenous societies, and particularly 
of the economic role of women (Devens 1992: 25). These accounts must be understood 
through the barrier to comprehension created by the white patriarchal system of the 
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observers (Williams 1989: 1023). So that many of these accounts portrayed the lives and 
economic activity of indigenous women as “drudgery.”XII Yet other contemporary sources 
provide keys to a much more positive interpretation. Champlain one of the founders’ of 
New France noted women’s sexual freedom and autonomy yet rationalised this according 
to his own mores. He reasoned that a woman by taking ‘many lovers’, and ‘keeping 
company with whoever she likes’ was ‘ … engaging in a form of courtship and marriage…’ 
selecting a ‘partner who pleases her most’ to ‘live together to the end of their lives’ (Fischer 
2008: 145). Baillargeon also suggests that the autonomy and independence of Indigenous 
women was ‘…manifest in the free exercise of their sexuality.’(Baillargeon 2014:4) Divorce 
was eminently acceptable. Devens cites a seventeenth century governor observing that ‘ ... 
when a woman wishes to put away her husband she has only to tell him to leave the house 
and he goes without another word.’ (Devens 1992: 26). 
 Reviewing and evaluating many of the contemporary sources, Leacock suggests that, 
while life was hard, women were full political participants in their communities and lived 
more autonomous lives than their European counterparts (Leacock 1980). Egalitarianism 
was based on mutuality and gendered checks and balances (Williams 1989). Women 
worked hard, but they ultimately “retained control over the products of their labour.” 
(Leacock 1980: 25) In many groups while ‘Chiefs,’ such as they existed,XIII were male, they 
were chosen by the women and could be removed by women if necessary.XIV A 1842 law 
‘text book’ written by Doucet sets out the laws of the Huron and Iroquois ‘Indians,’ 
arguing that they were very similar to the Lycians – an ‘empire of women’ (Doucet 1847: 
15). He suggested real authority lay with Huron and Iroquois women (Doucet 1847: 10), 
who often fought and provided a strong resistance to the attempts of missionaries to assert 
‘masculine authority’ and ‘French social organisation’ in New France (Devens 1992: 25). In 
some groups Matrons selected the new chief after consultation (Doucet 1847: 15) and 
women both choose and were sometimes appointed as representatives to act under 
‘Chiefs.’ (Doucet 1847: 16) Doucet noted that ‘Women are always the first to deliberate.’ 
(Doucet 1847: 16). 
The Clio Collective suggest that European women ‘considered their own position to be 
more enviable’ than that of the indigenous women they lived so close to because they 
believed the onerous work done by those women ‘outweighed their influence in the 
Councils and family clans.’(Clio Collective et al 1990). Yet there was positive contemporary 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
177 
recognition and evidence of indigenous influence on the political expectations of women 
within New France. Frances Brooke, for example, an English sojourner who came to New 
France in 1763 as the wife of a chaplain, noted the indigenous approach to women’s 
political activity with approval. She wrote the novel The History of Emily Montague while 
living in the Quebec garrison, and published it on her return to England in 1769 (Brooke 
1995). Boutelle notes that the novel argued for women’s rights, at one point Brooke’s 
principal male character draws unfavourable comparisons between the position of women 
in Huron society and that of their sisters in Europe, saying that the “sex we have so 
unjustly excluded from power in Europe have a great share in Huron government; the 
chief is chose by the Matrons…. We [men] are the savages who so impolitely deprive you 
of the common rights of citizenship.” (Boutelle 1986: 56). 
Across the American-Canadian border, there is much clearer evidence that First 
Nations Haudenosaunee women directly inspired and influenced early American feminists. 
In 1848 the first American women’s rights convention, composed of three hundred 
women and men took place in Seneca Falls, New York. Speeches demanded that women 
should have a ‘restoration’ of the right to vote, and should receive equal rights under the 
constitution (Stanton 1993). Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Matilda Gage and Lucretia Mott, who 
were a driving force in the convention and subsequent movement for women’s suffrage in 
the US, studied Haudenosaunee life and used it as an illustration of a society in which 
women already possessed the political freedoms which they themselves sought (Wagner 
2001, 2004). XV Later the National Woman Suffrage association drew parallels with the 
oppression of “Indian tribes” by the USA government, and of man’s treatment of woman 
(Wagner 2001: 93). Huadenausee men also argued for all men and women in the United 
States to be given the vote, as they were in their nation (Wagner 2001: 92).XVI  
 This section has provided an alternative explanation for the higher incidence of 
women’s exercise of franchise in Lower Canada. It has argued that rather than looking to 
the European legal heritage of the colony we should look to local reasons for the seemingly 
greater political autonomy of women, and in particular recognise the influence of 
indigenous culture.  
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4. Nineteenth Century Exclusions 
 
4.1. 1832 Reform Act in Britain 
The exclusion of women from franchise did not occur simultaneously in either Britain 
or the different parts of British North America and the changes to the British franchise did 
not seem to have been the influence for all of the changes to franchise in pre-confederation 
Canada. Yet the process of introducing gender qualifications for new voting categories in 
Britain and excluding women from franchises in pre-confederation Canada coincided with 
fears about unrest and the security of empire in both Britain and North America, assertions 
of rights to self-rule and were also reflected in the changing ideologies around gender 
relations and notions of difference that developed in the course of the nineteenth century.  
In relation to Britain the first formal reference to sex only came in with Representation 
of the People (England and Wales) Act 1832 (2 & 3 William IV c. 45). Although women’s 
votes were not directly debated it is noted in Hansard that the second reading of the final 
Bill presented to the House of Lords attracted unusual attention from propertied women 
coming to spectate (7 Parl. De, (3rd ser.) (1831) 1307).XVII 
The 1832 Act, limited the new categories, which greatly extended the franchise, to male 
voters. Also where there were newly created Boroughs, it was stipulated that voting applied 
only to ‘male persons.’XVIII The Act recognised the continued existence of the 40-Shilling 
shire franchise, and stated that this applied to any “person,”XIX rather than any ‘male’ 
person. Moreover, it further stipulated that any “persons” previously entitled to vote in a 
borough still in existence did not lose that right because of the Act. XX Following in the 
footsteps of the 1832 Reform Act, the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, XXI gave a 
statutory franchise for 178 boroughs, which stipulated that ratepayers must be “male 
persons” in order to qualify. The Reform Act did differentiate between ‘persons’ who were 
entitled to vote under the old categories and ‘male persons’ who were the only people 
entitled to vote under the new categories. The new categories gave a greatly reduced 
property qualification and extended class of people able to vote. Any exercise of the old 
franchises by propertied women was minor at that time, but the prospect of including 
women in these wider franchises would have been a very different matter. The association 
made between political action by women without real property and anarchy was 
longstanding (Mendelsdon and Crawford 1998: 388; Proctor 1990).  
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4.2. Exclusions in Pre-Confederation Canada 
While that there was no attempt to impose a uniform electoral qualification on 
‘colonies’ after the 1832 Act, Orders in Council for pre-confederation Canada reflected the 
differentiation of different types of qualification in Britain and stipulated that for new 
franchises or newly established electoral districts the voting qualification must be male 
(Quebec Gazette Friday 8th June 4340 vol. 69).  
In the pre-confederation British North American provinces exclusions occurred at 
differing times. In Lower Canada an attempt to exclude came in 1834 and then was 
successful in the United Province of Canada in 1849. In other provinces formal exclusions 
started in 1836, when Prince Edward Island extended some categories of the franchise but 
limited these new categories to male voters (Laws of Prince Edward Island, An Act to 
Consolidate and Amend the Election Laws Cap. XXIV.); before this all Protestants could 
vote. In New Brunswick formal exclusion came in 1848 (Klein 1996: 75). XXII In Nova 
Scotia in 1843 a new Act further incorporating the town of Halifax set two different voting 
qualifications ‘male persons over 21’ and ‘any inhabitant householder’ with a property 
interest of ‘twenty pounds or upwards’ ( Garner 1969; 32) then a requirement that all 
voters be male was brought in in 1851 (Garner 1969: 154). British Colombia, established in 
1856, did not restrict the franchise on the basis of gender, but in 1870 prior to 
confederation with Canada it was forced by London to restrict the vote to male voters over 
the age of twenty-one who could read and write English, aboriginal peoples and US 
immigrants were also excluded (Garner 196:128- 9).  
 
It has been suggested that Canadian exclusions were a reaction to the Seneca Falls 
conference in America because of fears that this conference, calling for women’s rights, 
might generate similar demand from Canadian women (Markoff 2003, 89).Yet Seneca Falls 
is insufficient as an explanation for Lower Canada, where women’s voting had been both a 
social reality and widely accepted, and where deliberate and conscious exclusion took place 
prior to Seneca Falls. In Lower Canada the first attempt to exclude women came in 
Controverted Election Act 1834 C28 s. 27. This is significant not just for its timing but also 
because unlike other exclusions which were achieved by just stipulating that voters be male, 
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this explicitly excluded women by stating that they were not qualified. Section XXVII of 
the Act stated  
 
“Be it declared and further enacted by the authority aforesaid that from and after the passing of this Act, 
no female shall vote at any election for any county, City or Borough of this Province”  
 
For unconnected reasons the imperial government overturned the 1834 Act.  
The new Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada’s Electoral Act of 1849, 
which standardised electoral regulations in Upper and Lower Canada, followed the trend 
begun by the overturned Act of 1834 by using the same explicit language to consciously 
exclude women (The Province of Canada Act 1849, 12 Victoria c. 27). Section XLVI of the 
Act stated: 
 
“And it be declared and enacted, that no woman is or shall be entitled to vote at any such election 
whether for any county, riding, city or town.” 
 
It was said to be motivated by that controversial County of Halton election in 1844 (see 
2.1) in which 7 women voted against Durand (Elections Canada 1997, 28). The reformers 
never forgot this defeat and led the change in the law. Some conservatives like Sir Allan 
McNabb made a strong point of voting against the change (Martin and Wilson 2013).  
 
4.3. Distinctive Nature of Exclusions in Lower and Upper Canada 
The Acts in other areas of pre-confederation Canada modelled the British Reform Act 
of 1832 in creating a male qualification, but the 1834 Act in Lower Canada was drafted 
very differently and explicitly stipulates women’s exclusion from all elections. The 1849 Act 
in United Canada mirrored that 1834 approach so why these differences in tone in first 
Lower Canada and then the United Province of Canada? One factor is surely that is 
suggests further evidence that women were exercising the vote there. It also could be 
interpreted as a clear assertion that though referred to as a ‘petticoat polity’ previously, 
politics in the province were from then on to be a purely masculine preserve.  
Radical Patriote leaders like Papineau and Viger were initially very much in support of 
women voting (Garner 1969: 158; Elections Canada 1997: 22), though the traditionalist 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
181 
Patriotes were not. Despite his initial support Papineau is often given sole blame for this 
attempt in 1834 to remove the vote from women. It is claimed it was a part of his political 
agenda (Bradbury 2012: 227; Garner 1969: 158; Greer and Radforth 1992: 7).XXIII It is true 
that the Controverted Elections Bill which introduced the qualification was Papineau’s Bill 
but the amendment which removed the vote from women was put forward by John 
Neilson who had parted company with the Patriotes in 1830. It seems from the debate on 
the Bill that this amendment rather than being supported by Papineau was just something 
he ‘went along with’ in order to get his Bill through. In the debate Papineau initially said he 
was capitulating to his rival, Mr Neilson, on what he referred to as this “trifling point,” 
because there were more serious issues on which he wished to engage (Quebec Gazette 1834: 
Vol. 71, nineteenth January). Later when challenged in his change of approach Papineau 
claimed that he was concerned only to protect women from the increasingly violent 
eruptions at election (Garner 1969: 158). Papineau said that it was ridiculous to suggest that 
he had ever said that women who voted at elections were ‘guilty of indecency (impudicite)’ 
rather he had said that the scenes of women being dragged to the polls were indecent 
(Quebec Gazette Vol. 71, nineteenth January 1834).  
The election in question became infamous for its violence yet James Jackson contends 
that the election was not inherently violent and that there had been no need to read the 
Riot Act at this election; rather it was political move to close the polls because the Loyalist 
candidate was losing (Jackson 2009). Evidence to support this also comes from the voting 
record. Mr Goedlike noted that at the time Mr Culliver called the Special Constables his 
own wife went to vote for Bagg. He concluded that Mr Culliver must be extremely partial 
to the Loyalist candidate if he was prepared to send his own wife to vote for him when 
there was such danger (Parliamentary Report, Lower Canada 1833: 41).The implication 
being that Mr Culliver knew there was no danger to her at all and he actually had no reason 
to call the Special Constables.  
Evidence to the hearing on this election also suggests that women were not ‘dragged’ 
or pressed to attend the polls. One women whose vote was sought explained that she had 
not admitted visitors to her house in this period ‘to avoid troublesome people.’ She was 
laughing while she said this suggesting the quest for her vote was not intimidating. 
(Parliamentary Report, Lower Canada 1833: 53)  
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A further reason for the Patriotes failure to continue to support women’s votes may 
have been a belief that the Loyalists benefitted more from women’s votes. In the 1832 
West Montreal election, Loyalists only made marginally more use of women’s votes than 
Patriotes, 104 to 95 (Parliamentary Report, Lower Canada 1833: 41).Yet evidence given to 
the enquiry suggests that it was ‘believed’ if not actually the case that married women’s 
votes increasingly favoured parties other than the Patriotes. In the Parliamentary Report on 
the election, it was noted (p16) that that were differences in the practice of marriage 
contracts which affected property holding among women in Lower Canada. Mr Larocque 
giving evidence to the hearing said he was not sure whether women, in similar 
circumstances to those who voted for the Loyalist Mr Bagg, had been refused an 
opportunity to vote for the Patriote Mr Tracey but he noted that  
 
‘ ... it was so evident to all, that in admitting such persons to vote it was favouring Mr Bagg’s Party since 
it is very seldom that marriage contracts are made among the Canadians, which contain clauses for a 
division (separation) of goods between man and his wife. On the contrary, that often occurs among the 
English and Scotch Traders, who were all, with the exception of a very few Partisans, disposed in favour 
of Mr Bagg.’ (Parliamentary Report, Lower Canada 1833: 16)XXIV  
 
Significantly the exclusions can also be tied in to wider ideological changes and the 
claim both of the fitness of the Patriotes to rule in Lower Canada, and of the wider claims 
to independent rule of first the Province of Canada and then a Confederated Canada.  
Exclusions based on gender were also paralleled by exclusions based on race (Elections 
Canada 1997).XXV The linking of exclusions based on sex and race if contextualised within 
the changing ideology of empire also reveal a rationale for Patriote support for limiting the 
franchise to white male electors. Masculinist rhetoric grew in eighteenth-century Europe 
and was coupled with a discourse supporting the idea of separate spheres for men and 
women (Levine 2004: 9; Shoemaker 1998). Choquette has suggested that we can see in the 
passage of the first Lower Canada exclusion in 1834 an indication that liberalism, with its 
insistence in separate spheres for men and women, had finally made the transition from 
Europe to Quebec (Choquette 1997: 298).  
The treatment of women within a society was also used as an indicator of its 
masculinism and fitness to rule. It was “assumed that a critical function of society was to 
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care for and protect women, an idea which logically assumed that women would be defined 
by men and compared against male behaviours.” (Levine 2004: 6) Thus, as Levine has 
noted, in this period: 
 
“The British found equally faulty societies … where they saw women, as they understood it, caged and 
isolated and those … where women displayed what the British regarded as excessive independence. The 
behaviour, demeanour, and the position of women thus became a fulcrum by which the British 
measured and judged those they colonised. Women became an index and a measure less of themselves 
than of men and of societies.” (Levine 2004: 7) 
 
Contemporary criticisms of indigenous women’s position perpetuated the myth of 
European woman as a symbol for civilisation, and portrayed the independence of women 
as a sign of the inferiority of indigenous society (Leacock 1980; Devens 1992; Turpel 1993). 
Gender evidenced though either masculinism or effeminacy was used, not only to 
distinguish the different spheres of activity for men and women, but also to delineate and 
distinguish whole races and nations. Societies might be deemed “female” as a consequence 
of the colour, religion, or nationality of their people. Non-white, non-British, non-
Protestant societies were deemed “effeminate,” by the British who used this designation as 
a reason to refuse their claims for self-rule. The direct and explicit exclusion of women 
from the franchise, first in 1834 at a time of growing unrest in Lower Canada, and then 
again in 1849, fits into this wider picture and also explains the Patriote support for 
exclusion. 
 
In 1834 Patriotes were arguing for greater independence for Lower Canada and were 
resisting unification with Upper Canada. They needed to establish Lower Canada as a 
community with power to control their own affairs rather than as men subject to a 
‘petticoat polity’ and only fit to be ruled. The explicit colour and race distinctions added to 
franchise qualifications also emphasised this distance from those peoples ‘colonised’ or 
‘ruled’. As Upper Canada was flooded with Loyalists it became symbolised as English and 
“male,” while in comparison the distinctive Canadian culture of Lower Canada was aligned 
as “effeminate”XXVI because of its association with France, Ireland (King 2007) and 
indigenous interests. In this time of heightened tensions any association by the Patriotes 
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with women’s franchise would only increase their designation as effeminate and any 
incidence of women voting strengthen the designation of Lower Canada as “female.” The 
distancing of French–Canadian politicians like Papineau from women’s rights to vote prior 
to the Lower Canada rebellions, suggests an attempt to assert the masculinism of French–
Canada in the context of the application of these distinctions, and the threat of Unification 
and control by an English majority.  
Lord Durham’s Report discussed the inferiority of the non-English peoples in Lower 
Canada and suggested that governance problems were due to ‘...races not classes…’ 
(Durham 1973: 23) He recommended subjecting Lower Canada to ‘… the vigorous rule of 
an English majority…’ (Durham, 1973:150) This was acted on and the controversial 
process of unification of Upper and Lower Canada in itself brought an end Lower 
Canada’s claims for independence, by asserting the dominance of the culture of English 
dominated Upper Canada.XXVII  
De La Cour, Morgan and Valverde argue that while the consolidation of masculine 
power this period in the 1830’s and 1840’s was crucial to the formation of the Canadian 
state. Women in this period were not just excluded from politics but also experienced other 
exclusions. Exclusion ‘... from medicine, reproductive decisions through the criminalising 
of abortion, and others went hand in hand with a complex fragmentation of women as a 
group along racial, class and moral/ sexual lines.’(de la Cour et al 1992:184) They argue that 
the state became so successful in constituting ‘ itself and most of the public sphere as 
masculine,’ that it became unlikely ‘... anyone would even ask where the mothers of the 
confederation were, ...’(de la Cour et al 1992:184). 
This situation is a parallel of the situation in the former colonies in the US post-
independence. Delaware and New Jersey were the only two colonies not to exclude women 
immediately after the revolution. When New Jersey did remove women’s franchise in 1807, 
the limitation to ‘free white male citizens’ was justified as necessary to clarify that ‘aliens’ 
‘negros’ ‘slaves’ and ‘married women’ could not be included (Turner 1915: 184). Ratcliffe 
notes that as the USA became more ‘democratic’ in one sense in that it increased the 
numbers of men who could vote, but it also became more ‘ racist and sexist as women and 
backs were stripped of rights.’(Ratcliffe 2013: 247)  
These same arguments around unfitness for rule were exercised in the later nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century in debates around women’s suffrage in Britain. It was 
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said that if women gained the vote the British would be perceived as weakened and it 
would lead to rebellion in the ‘empire’ (Curzon 1908: Reasons 8, 9, and 15). A majority of 
women in suffrage movements in Britain and Canada adopted this view themselves. In 
Britain early feminist movements utilised the same rhetoric of ´the advancement of 
women’ that other imperial projects had used to justify the codification of law and 
interference in the lives of their colonial subjects and indigenous peoples (Midgely 2001). 
For example suffragists suggested that a failure to recognise women’s suffrage was 
incompatible with ‘civilisation’ (Midgely 2001: 4). Drawing on stereotypes of Other 
women, in Turkish ‘harems’ and in polygamous relationships, feminist tracts were ‘… 
imbued with analogy’ (Midgely 2001: 4) between the position of European women and 
those ‘subjugated’ non-European women. Improvements in women’s status, and the grant 
of female suffrage were ‘… presented … as the culmination of a European social progress 
from savagery to civilisation.’ (Midgely 2001: 6). In Canada the suffrage movement also 
held up ‘... idealised white women, in effect colonial ladies ...’ as worthy of franchise 
(Strong-Boag 2002: 80). Women’s suffrage was argued as ‘... part of a larger scheme of 
civilisation progress for white societies’ (Brydon and Schagerl 2005:194). 
In pre-confederation Canada once women’s voting rights were lost they were slow to 
be regained. Although women as a group in Quebec gained a right to vote in federal 
elections in 1919 they did not regain a provincial right to vote until 1944. Until its 
amendment in 1951 women of ‘Indian status’ were excluded from voting or standing in 
Band Elections by the Indian Act 1876 which imposed unequal status on relations between 
men and women designated as of ‘Indian status’ (Voyageur 2008). Until 1960 the Indian 
Act also stated that no ‘Indian’ (sic) person male or female, could vote in federal elections 
unless they renounced their ‘Indian’ status.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article has examined an alternative history of women’s suffrage, its exercise, and 
then the exclusion of franchise in the first half of the nineteenth century as Canada moved 
to self-rule and confederation. It concludes that the orthodox claims that Common Law 
‘convention’ prevented women from voting cannot be justified either by reference to the 
position in Britain or the British colonies including Lower Canada. Instead I have argued 
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that it was the 19th century adjudication in the UK and British North America which 
imposed a less favourable understanding of women’s position under the Common Law 
than had originally been the case. Until Chorlton v Lings exclusion of women from the 
franchise was only achieved in Britain and British North America, as in had earlier in the 
US through statutory bar.  
If it was not the case that the absence of Common Law convention led to higher levels 
of voting in Lower Canada what did? This article has argued that we see in this different 
behaviour a recognition of the higher status of women in Lower Canada. In part because 
of the significant contribution of the few European women who founded New France, and 
their commitment to women’s education. Also because the distance from first the French 
then British colonial centres meant that the ideological changes in the political centre which 
marginalised middle class women (Choquette 1997; Markoff 2003) might not have been 
adopted, or might have been slower to manifest themselves, than they were within areas of 
Canada that had received a big influx or people from the US. Finally and most importantly 
because more egalitarian Indigenous culture had a stronger influence in the settlement of 
Lower Canada, women’s political activity found greater acceptance and was reflected in 
higher levels of voting by women.  
These different cultural norms eventually gave way to the marginalisation of women 
which had occurred to some extent in Britain and in the USA, tied in part also to the desire 
to assert a particular masculinity. For in the nineteenth century British North America was 
a society moving away from being colonists subject to colonial rule and looking to gain 
independent control as self-governing colonisers. In this period clear lines were drawn to 
forge a difference between those ‘nations’ which were seen as less masculine, sometimes 
precisely because of women’s egalitarian position. This historical process then led to a 
worsening of women’s political status in the nineteenth century. 
It is important to recognise this history of exclusion: first, because it is important in the 
current period to recognise that women’s empowerment is not always coexistent with 
modernity; and second, to recognise the contribution of Indigenous culture in creating 
expectations in relation to women’s equality in Canada. Finally it is important because, as I 
discussed in the introduction, a flawed discourse about the location and source of women’s 
rights still has a resonance in Canada today. 
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 In the 19th century the response of the Canadian government to rapes of indigenous 
women was to blame those women as resistant to modernity and progress, and behaving in 
an ‘abandoned and wanton’ manner (Carter 2016: 347). This has been echoed in the 20th 
and 21st century as a response to the current problems experienced by Indigenous women. 
Levels of violence experienced by Indigenous women are 3.5 higher than those 
experienced by Canadian women classified as ‘non-aboriginal women.’(CEDAW 2016: 
Para 3) In contrast to violence against women classified as ‘non-aboriginal’ violence is 
much more likely to come from strangers rather than intimates and to come from outside 
Indigenous communities and ethnic groups. (Palmater 2015) Despite this the contrast in 
the enjoyment of rights by middle class ‘white’ Canadian women and Indigenous Canadian 
women is presented as a failure of assimilation and as the ‘persistence of the pre-modern’ 
in Indigenous societies (FAFIA and NWAC 2015, p. 18). International human rights 
committees recognise this approach as ‘institutional stereotyping’ (CEDAW 2016, Para 
205; IACHR 2014: Para 305-306) and victim blaming and instead locate the cause of this 
violence by state and non-state actors, in the ‘… lasting consequences of the sexual and 
racial discrimination against the Aboriginal Community [sic] during the colonial and post-
colonial periods.’(CEDAW 2016: Para 130). The analysis of the exercise of early suffrage as 
discussed in this article refutes the understanding of the history of women’s rights in 
Canada as purely linear and as located in the move to ‘modernity.’ It provides a powerful 
illustration to challenge this problematic discourse. 
                                                 
 Lecturer in Law in the School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex, United Kingdom. 
I For one example see the syllabus aimed at grade 11 for the History of Canada. Defining Contemporary 
Canada states that ‘The history of Canadian citizenship is characterized by an ongoing struggle to achieve 
equality and social justice for all.’  
https://www.edu.gov.mb.ca/k12/cur/socstud/history_gr11/cluster5.pdf. 
II The term Indigenous in the context of Canada includes, First Nations, Metis and Inuit peoples. 
III For full discussion of the background and consequences of the case see Robert Sharpe and Patricia 
McMahon, The Persons Case: The Origins and Legacy of the Fight for Legal Personhood (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2007). 
IV “Female participation in rural protest and street politics was disturbingly visible to contemporaries if not to 
subsequent historians.” (Mendelson and Crawford 1998, 388). 
V Note in Chorlton v Lings counsel for the appellant suggested that Coke had said that women could not be 
compelled to attend the “tourn.”  
VI Seymour and Frary also stated, writing in 1918, that it defies the modern historian. Stuart Anderson also 
notes the variation from borough to borough (Seymour and Frary 1918: I: 70; Anderson 2010: 430). 
VII Though D’Ewes considered that there were times when it was dishonourable for men to “make use of 
their voices.” 
VIII Burgage rights were rights to vote based on a ‘burgage hold’. This was a type of tenure requiring fees or 
services to be given to a landlord. They could be easily be transferred and bought and sold. The properties 
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often included residences and sometimes the residence was necessary to exercise the voting right. Holdings 
could be more unusual. Seymour and Frary note that one franchise in Droitwich was based on the burgage 
hold “ being seized in fee of a small quantity of salt water rising out of a pit.” (Seymour and Frary 1918: 72). 
IX A Sexton was an official in charge of church property, buildings and graveyards. In addition they 
sometimes rang the bell and buried the dead. 
X These cases are also cited in Stopes 1894, 95. Yet in Chorlton v. Lings it was stated that there were no printed 
reports of these cases.  
XI Quebec was not formally “founded” until 1608, but there was contact and settlement prior to this. 
XII Van Kirk suggests that the prejudices of the fur-traders meant that they greatly exaggerated the 
degradation of ‘Indian’ women (Van Kirk 1983: 8). 
XIII Devens notes that one of the criticism perceived by the Jesuits was the lack of centralised authority, 
societies were too egalitarian (Devens 1992).  
XIV Williams notes that this was case with the Iroquios (Williams 1989: 1040).  
XV Note also that the first Constitution of the Pitcairn Islands codified the existing practice of the Polynesian 
inhabitants when in 1838 it provided explicitly election by the ‘free votes of every native born on the island 
both male and female over the age of 18’(‘Pitcairn Islands’ 2017). 
XVI This mutual support was not exclusive to North America and was evident in some other nineteenth 
century suffrage movements, most notably New Zealand, where the movements for women’s rights and 
Maori rights shared some of the same leaders (Seuffert 2005: 512; Ballara 2017).  
XVII One of the issues discussed at this debate was whether women who could currently pass freeman 
franchise by marriage should be allowed to continue to do so (7 Parl. De, (3rd ser.) (1831) 1307). 
XVIII Section XXVII provides for ‘male’ persons with a 10 shilling freehold to vote in Boroughs. 
XIX S XVIII refers to “persons. 
XX An Act to Amend the Representation of the People Act 1832 2 and 3 William IV c. 45 section XVIII. 
XXI 5 & 6 William IV c. 76. 
XXII Though earlier instructions issued to polling stations stipulated that voters must be male (Klein 1996: 71). 
XXIII Garner refers to Papineau as ‘ vehemently in favour of disenfranchisement.’ (Garner 1969: 158). 
XXIV This conflicts with the perspective put by Cec Jennings who suggested that it was French Canadian 
women who were more likely to own their own property (Jennings 2015). 
XXV While property qualifications, and the status of “Indian land,” undoubtedly formed an indirect 
discrimination on the grounds of race, exclusions on this ground became explicit and widespread after 
Canadian confederation Only Nova Scotia had explicitly excluded “Indians” before confederation; this latter 
criterion excluding ‘Indians’ was brought in at the same time that universal white male suffrage was 
introduced in 1854. Length of residency and “Englishness” also became issues, in order to distinguish 
resident Canadians from French and Irish immigrants and Canadians of ‘other’ heritage. 
XXVI This association persisted so that Lower, writing a history in 1946, described French Canadians as “a 
feminine people, who should be wooed as a womanly woman.” (quoted in Martin 1995, 3). 
XXVII It also sees that other restrictions were placed on women’s rights as a result of this process. For instance 
Bettina Bradbury notes that an ordinance restricting the practice of more generous rights of inheritance in 
Lower Canada was passed prior to union between Upper and Lower Canada (Bradbury 2012: 131). 
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Abstract 
 
After a discussion of the impact of the principle of equality, entrenched in the Charters 
approved in Canada since the 1867 British North American Act, this essay then focuses on 
the related Supreme Court’s adjudications. A brief analysis of the case-law concerning gender 
equality is followed by the discussion of cases of Aboriginal and Muslim women with the 
aim of assessing whether intersectionality represents for these groups of women a source of 
double discrimination. Brief concluding remarks discuss the challenges deriving from the 
different options for accommodating the principle of equality with cultural rights. 
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1. Introduction: framing intersectionality in the Canadian context 
 
In the Fall of 2017 the eyes of the world turned on Canada for two, seemingly unrelated, 
instances: the first was the occasion of the New York ‘He for She’ meeting (20 September 
2017), where Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau spoke passionately in favour of gender 
equality, declaring his willingness to raise feminist sons. Then, on 18 October 2017, Quebec 
approved Bill 62, ‘An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in particular, 
to provide a framework for requests for accommodations on religious grounds in certain 
bodies’ actually prohibiting face-covering in public places, with a (not-so-implicit) reference 
to the Islamic veil. These events suddenly interrelate when we underline that they both deal 
with historical discrimination against women, and that both of them apparently wanted to 
support women’s emancipation. Nevertheless, behind this theoretical support, one should 
ask what kind of feminism had Trudeau in mind when he advertised his willingness to raise 
his sons as feminists as well as whether prohibiting the veil is a real tool for achieving 
women’s emancipation. 
Answering these questions is impossible without first recognizing that for a long time 
feminism has been a white, middle-class, heterosexual, Christian-formed, and able-bodied 
prerogative unable to tackle the fact that ‘gender does not exist in isolation but intersects 
with other identities like race or class, as well as embedded in practices and representations 
which, basically, refer to the organizing system of power relation in society’ (Bonifacio 2012: 
3).  
In reality, the idea of gender intersectionality has only slowly developed among scholars 
since Crenshaw’s seminal article demonstrated how Black women have been discriminated 
against by US Courts, failing to understand that specific issues concern this group of women 
because of both race and gender, and that specific remedies should therefore be implemented 
(Crenshaw 1989). The words of the district court in De Graffernreid v. General Motors 1976 
epitomised such incomprehension: ‘the plaintiffs are clearly entitled to a remedy if they have 
been discriminated against. However, they should not be allowed to combine statutory 
remedies to create a new “super-remedy” . . . Thus, this lawsuit must be examined to see if 
it states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, 
but not a combination of both’.I  
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This single-axis frame for anti-discrimination policies and gender discourses has been 
abandoned only very recently, a product of a progressively rising awareness that – 
paraphrasing Crenshaw again – neither representatives of cultural, ethnic and/or religious 
groups, nor feminists, can ignore the intersectional experiences of those whom the 
movements claim as their respective constituents.II  
This rising awareness impinged on the evolution of the Canadian legal system in matters 
of gender equality. In effect Canada faces two challenges, the first is the measures for 
overcoming the well-stablished patriarchal assumption of male superiority as everywhere 
else, while the second is the need to ensure the collective rights of Aboriginal peoplesIII and 
of minorities increasingly inhabiting the country due to migrationIV with gender 
mainstreamed human rights without infringing the tenets of the constitutional democracy. 
The presence of these groups – Aboriginal peoples and ethnic and religious minorities – has 
been governed according to policies that have progressively shifted from attempts of 
assimilation, as for instance demonstrated by the content of 1947 Canadian Citizenship Act, 
to the recognition of pluralism. Such a recognition was notably realised with the 1982 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, aiming at the preservation and the enhancement 
of the multicultural heritage of Canadians (sec. 27).V The Charter was also relevant for 
definitively stating the principle of equality (sec. 15) together with a specific provision 
entrenching gender equality (sec. 28). Despite these protections at the constitutional level, 
and the participation of Canada in the main international Charters promoting gender 
equality, when its implementation crosses with cultural, religious and traditional issues 
Canadian institutions still face difficulties in approaching them in respect of intersectionality, 
in order not to disperse the protection of gender rights in the bigger issues concerning 
collective rights.  
Therefore, this essay, relying on Gender Rebellion Feminism, defined by Paludi as 
feminism focusing on the ‘interrelationship among inequalities of sex, race, ethnicity, social 
class and sexual orientation’ (Paludi 2010: xv), discusses some cases of double discrimination 
predicated on the intersectionality with race or religion. Notably, after an analysis of the case-
law on equality – demonstrating the difficulties in overcoming a patriarchal approach when 
adjudicating on gender equality – the cases of Aboriginal and religious women are discussed. 
In this analysis, the approval of the 1982 Charter has been considered as a turning point for 
the legal framework as well as for the Supreme Court’s understanding of gender equality. 
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2. The principle of  gender equality in Canada 
 
Due to its origins as a British colony, from the establishment of the Confederation with 
the British North American Act – BNA (1867) to the 1931 recognition of self-governance 
inside the British Commonwealth, Canada has followed British legislation, according to 
which the status of women was also governed. Indeed, as far as the recognition of political 
and civil rights went, and in line with British legislation, women could theoretically (there is 
a lack of evidence of their actual participation) be included among ‘persons’ allowed to vote. 
However, according to the provisions of the 1791 Constitutional Act, this was subject to 
their demonstrating that they owned a property of a certain value; a status achievable only 
by widows and single women, but not by married women, as the law provided an automatic 
transfer of the ownership to the husband at the moment of the wedding. Similarly, since 
1809 Quebecois women owning properties were entitled to vote. The language of the 1840 
Act of Union was neutral as well, and since its entry into force women probably started to 
be more politically active – and therefore object to men’s request for a clarification of the 
legislation in their exclusive favour – as demonstrated by a complaint raised by a defeated 
Reform candidate who protested that seven women voted for his Tory opponent in Canada 
West (formerly Upper Canada) in 1844. Indeed, at the provincial level electoral laws were 
progressively amended in order to clearly exclude women from those eligible to vote.  
This decision was completely contrary to the tradition of the majority of Aboriginal 
communities, which based participation in decision-making according to rules indifferent to 
gender, and more akin to the ‘relevance’ of each individual inside the community. 
Nevertheless, the approach of excluding women from the public sphere was completely 
consistent with the tradition of that time in the colonial power. Therefore, the BNA, 
although ruling that voters’ eligibility was a provincial matter, denied women the right to vote 
by establishing it only for British (or naturalized) males over 21 years old.  
World War I partially changed societal behaviour, and women’s participation in the 
military effort was rewarded with a recognition of the right to vote in some Provinces, the 
first of which was Manitoba on 28 January 1916. Then, following the decision taken in 
London, on 20 September 1917, at the national level female relatives of any person in the 
military who was serving or had served with Canada or Great Britain during World War I, 
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and also women serving in the military, were allowed to vote. On 25 May 1918, the 
Westminster Parliament gave women the right to vote in a Dominion election, provided they 
were British subjects having attained legal capacity (21 years) and otherwise met the same 
qualifications entitling a man to vote. Therefore, in 1920 the Dominion Elections Act was 
amended to recognise all Canadians, male or female, over 21 as eligible voters in federal 
elections. Slowly, all Provinces adapted their legislation to the new federal law, the last being 
Quebec on 25 April 1940 (Cleverdon 1974). As described in detail below, this evolution was 
not accepted without resistance, and in 1929 a specific decision of the Privy Council was 
needed to recognise women’s voting eligibility. 
In spite of this recognition of gender equality in the enjoyment of the right to vote, 
women belonging to minorities continued to be considered as minors for a long time: Asian 
women were entitled to vote only on 16 June 1948, Inuit on 12 June 1951, and First Nations 
on 31 March 1960.VI It should be noted that Aboriginal women suffered discrimination even 
when compared with their Asian peers. In fact, Asian women obtained the right to vote in 
1948 together with Asian men, whilst Aboriginal women were excluded from the recognition 
as eligible voters granted to enfranchised men – including any person of Aboriginal descent 
– with the 1885 Dominion Franchise Act (in force until 1898), and had to wait for the 
abolition of race discrimination in order to gain the right.  
In a parallel process, in the Provinces’ reserved matters, a domino effect progressively 
introduced other tools for (white) women’s emancipation, without necessarily impacting on 
race discrimination.VII Legislation allowing for six weeks maternity leave was first passed in 
British Columbia in 1921; in 1922 Alberta passed the Married Women’s Property Act, giving 
married women the same legal capacity as men and thus allowing them to maintain their 
ownership rights even after the marriage; and in 1951 Ontario approved the Fair 
Employment Practices Act and the Female Employee’s Fair Remuneration Act, introducing 
the principle women’s movements claimed for ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’. Concurrently, 
Federal interventions introduced in 1925 the recognition of the right to divorce on equal 
grounds than menVIII and extended in 1953 to all the citizens of the Federation the principles 
already entrenched in the Ontario’s labour law in 1951.IX  
Despite the recognition of rights and the enactment of laws (almost) equalising women 
to men in the field of private law, at the time of the royal assent for the entry into force of 
the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960), sex still was not fully conceived of as an element of 
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possible discrimination. Indeed, although sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights recognized that rights 
should be protected ‘without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, 
religion or sex’, the then Minister of Justice Davie Fulton clearly stated in front of the ad hoc 
committee established for studying the Bill, that a distinction existed between the equality 
before the law on the basis of sex and the difference in status between men and women. 
Notably, he anticipated that sec. 1 ‘would not be interpreted by the courts so as to say we 
are making men and women equal, because men and women are not equal: they are different’ 
(Canada Special Committee on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom Minutes 1960). 
This approach entailed obvious consequences at the provincial level. For instance, when 
Ontario’s 1962 Human Rights’ Code entered into force, discrimination on the grounds of 
race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry or place of origin were prohibited, but not on the 
grounds of sex.  
Acknowledging the persistence of gender discrimination, in 1967 Prime Minister Lester 
Pearson established a Royal Commission on the Status of Women, a precursor to the 
Minister Responsible for the Status of Women established in 1981.  
In tackling the elimination of all discrimination in the country, the 1977 Canadian Human 
Rights Act definitively included gender among those discriminations prohibited by law, 
paving the way for the content of sec. 28 of the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedom. This section actually represents a specification of the prohibition of any 
discrimination already stated at sec. 15, for whose introduction in the Charter women 
strongly lobbied, and finally succeeded (MacLaren 1991). 
 
3. The Supreme Court’s adjudication on women’s rights 
 
Established in 1875, the Supreme Court was bound by the decisions of the Privy Council 
until 1933, for criminal appeals and 1949, for civil appeals. As for women, the existence of 
this further level of adjudication has proved quite beneficial, in opposition to the original 
patriarchal approach of the Canadian Supreme Court. Indeed, although in 1876 British 
common law rulings stated that ‘women are persons in matters of pains and penalties, but 
are not persons in matters of rights and privileges’, it was the Privy Council which finally 
intervened in recognizing women as persons in the legal sense. This came about in 1929, on 
the occasion of the Privy Council decision in Edwards v. AG for Canada, better known as the 
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‘Persons’ case, and originated from a Prime Minister’s request to the Supreme Court in the 
interpretation of sec. 24 of the BNA, in order to clarify whether the world ‘person’ 
mentioned in the section included female individuals. In spite of the Canadian Court’s 
decision in 1928 – conceiving women as less qualified than men and therefore ineligible to 
sit in the Senate – the Privy Council recognized their equality and eligibility rights thus 
derived (Sharpe and McMahon 2007).X 
Since the Supreme Court started its role of court of last resort, and despite the legislative 
recognition of equality, its adjudication has, for a long time, prejudiced women due to the 
test used for assessing the existence of a gender-based discrimination. Indeed, the Court 
relied on the idea that consistency of treatment would be enough to ensure equality, assuming 
that whenever women and men are treated the same procedurally, they would enjoy the same 
opportunities; furthermore, the Court assessed discrimination only when a clear preferential 
treatment for a category, used as a term of comparison, could be proven (Baines 2005b). The 
fallibility of such a test paradoxically emerged in the Bliss case,XI when the Court refused to 
recognise the discrimination existing against pregnant women in the 1971 Unemployment 
Insurance Act. The Court relied on the fact that ‘any inequality between the sexes in this area 
is not created by legislation but by nature’, and took non-pregnant women as a group of 
comparison for assessing the discrimination, instead of men. In the words of Justice Ritchie, 
writing for the Court, ‘if sec. 46 treats unemployed pregnant women differently from other 
unemployed persons, be they male or female, it is, it seems to me, because they are pregnant 
and not because they are women’; evidently the distinguished judges, and the whole Court, 
forgot that pregnancy is a condition that affects only women.  
After the entry into force of the 1982 Canadian Charter, the Court seemed to adopt a 
more protective approach for women’s rights, probably relying on jurisprudence more akin 
to the general protection of human rights that it was developing during that period.XII For 
instance, in 1987, a case originated from the lobbying activity of women to the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission for a recognition of the discriminative policies of the Canadian 
National Railway Company (CNR)XIII in hiring women. Here the Supreme Court, citing sec. 
41, 2a of the Canadian Human Rights Act, ruled that the CNR had to fulfil an employment 
equity program to break the cycle of systemic discrimination that included exclusionary 
hiring and promotion policies, as well as the harassment of female employees. This decision 
is noteworthy because the Court also stated that laws may be discriminatory, notwithstanding 
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the formal equal treatment they entail, if they produced unintended adverse effects on 
protected groups or individuals. This reflected an approach to discrimination already 
advanced in O’Malley,XIV when the Court recognized that discrimination may also derive from 
unintended effects of neutral practices, and recognized the effectiveness of affirmative 
actions in overcoming systemic discriminations. Focusing again on sexual harassment, in 
1989 the Court explicitly declared it as a form of discrimination exacerbating the gender 
inequalities already entrenched in the work-field.XV With reference to the actions aimed at 
restoring the gender imbalance, the Court also justified the protection of female hockey as a 
necessary measure to open athletic activities to women.XVI  
The Court overruled its previous decisions on the grounds of this new approach to 
gender discrimination, and radically reconsidered the rationale leading to them. 
Consequently, in Brooks,XVII the Court overruled the rationale on which Bliss was based by 
stating that complainants are not bound to demonstrate discrimination through a 
comparison with a more favoured group. In Turpin,XVIII the Court discussed the similarly 
situated test which led to the judgement in Bliss, and recognized that such tests failed to 
address some women’s claims and to ensure their constitutionally granted equality, because 
they posited situations in which men have no comparable needs. In 1999 the Court finally 
conceived of substantive equality as a direct derivation of sec. 15, which, in the opinion of 
the Court, has the aim ‘to prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom 
through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to 
promote a society in which all persons enjoy equality recognition at law as human beings or 
as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect 
and consideration’.XIX  
Furthermore, after the Charter entered into force, the Court protected women’s 
autonomy of the person. Indeed, in the Morgentaler case,XX the Court stated that the 
prohibition of abortion could have endangered women’s security, and only allowed 
provincial health laws to cover its regulation, clarifying the impossibility of their prohibiting 
it. It is worth mentioning here the opinion of the only woman sitting in the bench, Justice 
Bertha Wilson, which also focused on the limits the prohibition of abortion represented for 
women’s right to liberty, defined in terms of personal autonomy over important decisions 
intimately affecting an individual’s private life. However, some scholars argued that the Court 
annulled the law only because the parameters for allowing women to interrupt their 
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pregnancy were too narrow, therefore criticizing the fact that the Court does not ‘guarantee 
women the constitutional right to control our own bodies; from this perspective, societal 
transformation is not yet a reality’ (Baines 2005b: 56). The issue of abortion was also 
discussed in R. v. Sullivan,XXI when the Supreme Court had to deal with the case of two 
midwives convicted of criminal negligence for having caused the death of a foetus, and finally 
decided on acquittal as a foetus is not a person for the purposes of the Canadian Criminal 
Code.  
Although, according to the Court, stereotyping is among the elements against which sec. 
15 stands, gender stereotypes have affected its adjudications, at least in some casesXXII 
concerning ‘collaborative divorce’XXIII, where the Court demonstrated ‘an expectation that 
women should stick their agreements, no matter how unfair the consequences may be’ (Boyd 
2004). This patriarchal perspective was epitomised in the decision that the Court took in 
MurdochXXIV in 1975, when it denied a share of a farm property on a couple’s separation – 
despite the fact that the wife used to take care of it on her own for five months of the year 
– arguing that the wife was simply performing activities typical of any ranch wife, and which 
were not sufficient to create a beneficial interest in the property. Patriarchal echoes still 
continued to be evident twenty years later in the Thibaudeau decision.XXV Here the Court 
refused to declare a violation of the principle of gender equality in the provision of the 
Income Tax Act, forcing a mother to pay income tax on her child support payment, despite 
the fact that her ex-spouse could have deducted payments from his taxable income.XXVI  
In a final comment on Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on gender equality, it should be 
also noted that in several cases a claim for gender equality was raised by men. Here, the 
position of the Court seemed to support men’s claims, notwithstanding the possible 
consequences on women. A neutral approach, for instance, was used in the case of a man 
challenging the legislation protecting birth mothers from forcefully acknowledging biological 
fathers on birth certificate and including their surnames in the child’s surname. The Court 
decided that this protection, although aimed at ensuring women’s self-determination, 
discriminated against men in so far as it denied their aspirations to affirm biological ties and 
familial bonds across generations.XXVII Quite controversially, a gender-blind approach was 
used in adjudicating the claims on gender equality of men accused of sexual assaultsXXVIII 
(Baines 2012: 95). 
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4. Women belonging to minorities: the cases of  Aboriginal and Muslim 
women 
 
At the time of colonization, the rights and status of Aboriginal peoples was at first 
regulated through the 1763 Royal Proclamation, which guaranteed certain rights and 
protections for those peoples generically individuated as ‘Indians’ and established conditions 
for the government to acquire their lands. Evidently, this regulatory approach made the 
understanding of who could be considered as an Indian fundamental. The question was first 
regulated by the 1850 ‘Act for the Better Protection of the Lands and Property of the Indians 
in Lower Canada’, which defined as criteria for being an Indian the fact of having ‘Indian 
blood’, and therefore of belonging to the ‘Body or Tribe of Indians’. Accordingly, non-
Indians who ‘intermarried with such Indians’, people whose parents (one or both) would 
also have been considered Indians, and ‘all persons adopted in infancy by any such Indians’ 
were considered to be Indian. The recognition of the existence of these peoples did not mean 
a recognition of their fundamental right to exist and to have extended rights. Several laws 
aimed at enforcing their assimilation have, instead, been approved since the 1867 BNA, such 
as the Gradual Enfranchisement Act of 1869, which ‘reinforced’ the measures for enacting 
the voluntary enfranchisement already provided by the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857. 
These two acts were then consolidated in the 1876 Indian Act, establishing the Department 
of Indian Affairs, whose first action was the replacement of the Aboriginal structures of 
governance with tribes’ councils (or group’s councils), thus starting the erosion of Aboriginal 
traditions, and fostering assimilation.XXIX Although Inuit were never subjected to the Indian 
Act, since 1939 the federal government issued programs for (often forcefully) transforming 
them from their nomadic original tradition into a sedentary people, and for progressively 
assimilating them.XXX  
With the entry into force of the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, as said, 
sec. 15 introduced the principle of non-discrimination; sec. 25 also constitutionalised 
Aboriginal rights by clarifying that the content of the Charter cannot abrogate any of the 
acquired rights of Aboriginal peoples (Harder and Patten 2015). This group comprises Inuit, 
Metis and First Nations, according to the definition of autochthone population introduced 
in sec. 35 of the 1982 Constitutional Act, whose content also impinges on the placement of 
the treaties between the Canadian authorities and Aboriginal communities in the hierarchy 
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of sources of law. Indeed, according to sec. 35 such treaties now had the rank of 
constitutional norms, instead of that of ordinary laws as previously (Pentney 1988). It should 
finally be highlighted how the relevance of these provisions, with regard to the governance 
of Aboriginal peoples, shifted from a reasoning based on otherness/exclusion to one based 
on the implementation of equality (Ceccherini 2016).  
The consequences for women of regulations on Aboriginal peoples, as well as the 
effectiveness of their implementation with regard to gender equality, are discussed below, in 
order to underline the possible risks deriving from the intersectionality between gender and 
race in the case of Canadian Aboriginal women.  
Almost coevally to the Charter, in 1988 Canada also approved the Multiculturalism Act, 
which definitively affirmed multiculturalism as a foundational principle of the State, in 
accordance with an approach followed under the Premiership of Pierre Trudeau of the 1970s. 
In the same period, the Supreme Court intervened in its interpretation of multiculturalism, 
with reference to religious pluralism as a hindrance to the establishment of favourable 
treatments only for some religions.XXXI These interventions impinged on the evolution of the 
Canadian system, as they involved a new approach toward minorities, aimed at respecting 
their collective rights as a form of protection for the cultural heritage they represent for the 
country.  
Despite this framework establishing equality among religions and among believers, the 
intersectionality between gender equality and religious freedom raised critical challenges for 
Canada, and the way they were faced still gives rise to potential critique. Although questions 
of religious freedom are not limited to this group of women, only the case of Muslim women 
is considered here, as the consequences of intersectionality are exacerbated by an 
international environment intensifying attention toward Islamic symbols and religious 
practices. 
 
4.1. Aboriginal women 
Ethnically discriminated against for a long time along with their male mates, Aboriginal 
women started to suffer gender discrimination with the approval of the 1951 amendment of 
the Indian Act. Here, provisions confirmed the exclusion of women from voting in tribes’ 
councils, and ruled on the definition of the status of Indian by entirely attaching it to the 
marital condition. Moreover, a non-status woman who married a status-man would gain 
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status herself, but a status woman who married a non-status man lost her status, even when 
she was widowed or abandoned by her husband. As a partial compensation for the loss of 
their membership, women received a per capita share of the tribe’s capital funds (Weaver 
1974). Evidently, the aim of preserving tribes’ assets and reserves from the possible threat 
represented by non-Indian men marrying with Indian women given as a justification of the 
loss of status was nullified by the provision of such a compensation draining groups’ assets, 
to the point that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal PeoplesXXXII considered the 1951 
amendment as a ‘legal fiction’, apparently introduced for ruling the phenomenon of group 
exclusion and instead legalizing women’s discrimination.  
In 1969 Trudeau’s government released a White Paper, devoting special attention to the 
conditions of Aboriginal peoples, including women, and declared the intention of abolishing 
the Indian status and the Department of Indian Affairs and of entirely assimilating 
Aboriginals into Canadian society. Obviously, Aboriginals harshly contrasted the idea of 
assimilation, and issued a Red Paper, the content of which led to the withdrawal of the 
proposals in the White paper.  
The 1977 Canadian Human Rights Act did not affect the conditions of Aboriginal 
peoples due to the notwithstanding clause of sec. 67, and only in 1985, with Bill C-31, were 
remedies introduced with regard to the issue. This Act allowed women who lost their status 
through marriage to be reinstated as Status Indians and as group members; as for their 
children Bill C-31 confirmed their status too, but at the same time granted groups two years 
to enact their own membership codes. A group’s Code, therefore, could have excluded 
children – but not their mothers – from the group only when enacted prior to June 1987; 
otherwise, children were directly entitled to a full group membership. In an attempt to 
incentivize the recognition of the status of children, the Act linked the assessment of funding 
allocations to tribes, through the Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), to the 
demographic consistency of tribes (i.e. counting the number of status members of each 
group). Nonetheless, discrimination was maintained in the fact that the child of a woman 
whose status was reinstated under Bill C-31 would not be able to pass the status over to 
her/his children if the other parent was a non-status, according to the so-called ‘double 
mother’ rule. With the aim of remedying these persisting discriminations, and to align the 
Human Rights Act with the 1982 Charter, the 2008 amendment to the Act removed sec. 67 
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and clarified that regard given to Aboriginal legal traditions and customary laws should not 
be interpreted as giving the possibility of infringing the principle of gender equality.  
The discrimination women suffered due to the regulation of their status until the 2008 
reform still, however, affect their children. Indeed, in an on-going attempt to introduce 
further reform to the Indian Act, the government has individuated the issues: the cousins’ 
issue, concerning the differential treatment of first cousins whose grandmother lost her 
status having married with a non-status man before 17 April 1985; the siblings’ issue, 
concerning the differential treatment of children born out of wedlock of status fathers 
between 4 September 1951 and 17 April 1985; the issue of omitted minors, concerning the 
differential treatment of those minor children having lost their status when their mother 
(re)married a non-status men after their birth. The federal government is still dealing with all 
these issues.XXXIII  
The discriminative policies enacted by the federal government during the pre-Charter 
period were supported by discriminative decisions in the Supreme Court, the most notorious 
of which was issued in the 1974 A.G. Canada v. Lavell case.XXXIV Here, the Court held that 
the provision tying a woman’s status to that of her husband cannot be considered as a gender 
discrimination, despite evidence deriving from the fact that status-men kept their status if 
they married out. In fact, the Court refused to recognize a discrimination, confirming the 
decision of the first instance tribunal, because the group of comparison was individuated in 
non-status women, rather than on status-men. The issue of status was subsequently appealed 
at the United Nations Human Rights Commission, which in 1981 declared that Canada had 
violated article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with reference 
to the case of Sandra Lovelace,XXXV a Maliseet woman who had lost her status through 
marriage and was thus prevented by the government from returning to her community. Since 
then, a more protective approach has developed, involving lower Courts too, which 
prompted the on-going reforms of the Indian Act. This was the case of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeals in the 2009 McIvorXXXVI case, which highlighted existing discrimination 
against the descendants of Aboriginal women married to non-status men, and of the Québec 
Superior Court judge in the 2015 DescheneauxXXXVII case, who denounced the subtler forms 
of sexual discrimination persisting under the Indian Act.  
Besides the issue of having their status recognized on an equal footage to men, Aboriginal 
women had to face the challenge for having their interest groups conceived of as being equal 
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to those not explicitly lobbing for women. This was the case in Native Women’s 
Association,XXXVIII when the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) was excluded 
from the directly State-funded participation in the discussions on the Beaudoin-Dobbie 
Committee Report.XXXIX The NWAC therefore claimed that the State funded only male-
dominated groups, violating both freedom of expression and the right to equality, and 
applied to the Federal Court of Appeal, which refused to issue an order of prohibition but 
recognized that the federal government had restricted freedom of expression of Native 
women, infringing sec. 28 of the Charter. Nevertheless, in its decision, the Supreme Court 
stated that the exclusion of NWAC from directly funded associations did not infringe sec. 
28, as it does not impose on the government a positive obligation of consulting or funding 
anyone; moreover, the Court did not see any infringement of gender equality judging that 
the NWAC failed to demonstrate that the convened groups were unable to represent 
women’s points of view.  
Aboriginal women also failed to obtain recognition of their gender equality in decisions 
concerning the acquisition of properties, a topic on which the discriminative approach of the 
Court with broad reference to Canadian women has been already discussed. Notably, in 
Derrickson,XL the Court rejected the appeal of a wife claiming one-half of the interest in the 
properties her husband owned according to the land reserve provided by sec. 20 of the Indian 
Act, affirming that the Family Relations Act on which the woman based her claim could not 
apply to lands on reserve. However, recognizing the inequalities deriving from this exclusion, 
the Court introduced the possibility of awarding compensation in order to adjust the division 
of family assets between the spouses. Relying on this reasoning, in Paul v. Paul,XLI the Court 
also dismissed the appeal of a wife claiming possession of the family residence her husband 
owned according to sec. 20 of the Indian Act.  
Finally, it should be noted that some hindrances to the implementation of gender equality 
for Aboriginal women may derive from the establishment of means for alternative dispute 
resolutions, which in the case of Aboriginal peoples takes the form of ‘circles’ – generally 
composed of the victim and the accused, their relatives, a judge, the elders of the community 
and the remaining members of the community – aimed at providing restorative justice (Wall 
2001). This system has been criticized for the consequences it may entail on the protection 
of women from domestic violence, as the composition of the circles may reduce their self-
confidence and their ability to bear witness to the violence (Goel 2000), as clearly appeared 
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during the circle hearings that the Court of Quebec discussed in R. v. Naappaluk.XLII The 
Supreme Court addressed this point in the 1999 R. v. S.G.N. case, stating that, although the 
creation of circles in matters of criminal law is consistent with Canadian law, they cannot 
represent a means for reducing the protection that the Canadian legal system grants to 
Aboriginal women.XLIII On these grounds, in R. v. Morris,XLIV concerning the case of a man 
who beat and raped his partner, the Court of Appeal of British Columbia clarified that circles 
can be established only once the community clearly condemns crimes against women as well 
as any form of their subjugation. As a consequence, the Court overruled the decision of the 
first instance tribunal, based on the determinations of the circle, because of the ‘toxic 
atmosphere’ during the meeting of the circle. 
 
4.2. Muslim women 
As said, religious communities in Canada benefit from a legal framework based on 
multiculturalism, which accords them great margins of discretion in ruling some aspects of 
their lives according to religious precepts. In the recognition of a role for these precepts, 
however, lies the risk of endangering the implementation of gender equality and therefore 
specific attention must be paid to adjudications balancing the protection of religious 
freedoms with the protection of gender rights.  
Although the risks deriving from intersectionality between gender and religion concern 
women belonging to all religious communities, XLV it was decided here to pay specific 
attention to the cases of Muslim Canadian women, as the risks for their gender equality are 
twofold. On the one side, they may be endangered by a strict interpretation of the religious 
precepts of Islam, which could confine them to an unescapable position of subjugation. On 
the other side, a lack of protection may derive from stereotypes against Islamic culture 
consolidated since the affirmation of Orientalism (Said 1979) – which had consistent 
impacted on gender stereotypes (Yeğenoğlu 1998) – and through the wrongful interpretation 
of the theory of the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1993 and 1997) that has conceived of 
all Muslims as potential terrorists.  
The possibility of an overly strict interpretation of religious precepts with reference to 
women in the field of family law was at the centre of the complaints against the establishment 
of a Muslim Court of arbitration, according to the 1991 Arbitration Act of Ontario. Indeed, 
when in November 2003 the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice was established for applying 
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Islamic Law to the fields of family laws and inheritance, several Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs) rose up against the risks for women. Despite the results of the Boyd Report,XLVI the 
Provincial Government of Ontario intervened in 2006 by amending the Arbitration Act, and 
prohibited the establishment of religious courts. The Provincial Government seemed to 
understand the possible risks deriving from this kind of Court, where judges may decide to 
adjudicate following the general principles of law, gender equality included, or alternatively 
according to a strict interpretation of religious precepts, which in the case of an Islamic Court 
would have meant a literal interpretation of the Quran apparently justifying women’s 
subjugation, beating and never-ending control by male relatives. Given that no appeal can 
be made against the arbitration, with only minor exception, this control could have resulted 
in pressure on women in accepting to submit their claim to religious courts, thus losing the 
possibility to access other – and possibly more consistent – means for overcoming their 
status of discrimination.  
Conversely, gender stereotypes deriving from a consolidated fear of otherness may affect 
Muslim women when it comes to the most discussed symbol of their religious belonging: the 
veil. As the veil is clothing that only Muslim women are committed to wear – under certain 
interpretations of Islamic precepts – a clear case of discrimination in the enjoyment of the 
freedom of expression of religious behaviours, deriving from the intersectionality between 
religion and gender, can occur. 
This issue was notably raised for the first time in 1994, when several Quebecois schools 
decided to expel Muslim girls because of their refusal to remove the hijab when attending 
classes. Finally, in trying to regulate the issue, in 2010 the Provincial Government introduced 
Bill 94 to the Assembly in order to prohibit the full-face veil in public institutions. 
Notwithstanding both the reaction of those who hailed it as a modernist victory – such as 
the Quebec Council on the Status of Women or the Canadian Muslim Congress – and of 
those who conceived of it as having a specific discriminatory intent – such as the Canadian 
Council on American-Islamic Relations or the Canadian Council of Muslim Women – it is 
worth underlining that the Bill could have been attacked for unconstitutionality on the 
grounds of an infringement of the freedom of religion, and also for putting Muslim women 
under serious threat of gender discrimination (Fournier and See 2014: 275-292). It was 
probably for this reason that the Bill died on the order paper. However, Bill 62, mentioned 
above, was approved in October 2017 and has brought the ban back to life. Following the 
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same strategy already put forward in France in 2010 and in Belgium in 2011, full-face 
coverings have been prohibited in the name of state neutrality, without explicitly mention 
Islamic full-face veils. Such an omission is quite controversial, as it may turn into a 
prohibition of wearing big sunglasses, whilst at the same time permitting other religious signs 
to be shown, such as crucifixes, kippahs or the turban. 
While we are still waiting to see the role the judiciary will eventually play in the 
implementation of Bill 62, it is worth to remembering that, at this stage, the issue of the veil 
was only discussed for the first time before the Supreme Court in 2012,XLVII when, in a rape 
trial in Ontario ‘N.S.’ claimed her right to take the witness stand wearing the veil. ‘N.S’. was 
a woman accusing her aunt and her cousin of rape, who refused to remove her veil at the 
request of the defendants, who claimed that this garment would have concealed her facial 
expression, thus jeopardizing their right to full answer and defence. After a colloquium with 
her, the prosecutor forced ‘N.S.’ to remove the veil, taking the fact that she already removed 
it for her driving license photo as proof of her moderate adherence to the religious precept. 
As a consequence, ‘N.S.’ appealed to the Superior Court of Justice and then to the Court of 
Appeal of Ontario, which both refused to take a decision and affirmed the need of a case-
by-case decision to be taken by the prosecutor, although inviting the latter to deeply evaluate 
women’s religious behaviour. Consequently, ‘N.S.’ appealed to the Supreme Court for a final 
decision. However, the Court confirmed that this kind of decision cannot be taken according 
to a general rule and has to be assessed on a case-by-case evaluation pertaining to the 
prosecutor. 
The issue of the veil became relevant again in 2015, when a woman claimed her right to 
wear the niqab when taking her citizenship oath.XLVIII Notably, she challenged the content of 
sec. 6.5 of the manual for taking the oath, which since 2011 provided a duty for the 
citizenship candidates wearing face coverings to remove them during the ceremony in order 
to avoid the termination of their application for citizenship, on the grounds that the removal 
of the veil was not justified by reasons of security or of identity certification. Despite the 
government’s argument that removal was not mandatory, as the manual only offered 
guidelines, the Federal Court invalidated section 6.5 on the assumption of its mandatory 
nature, and affirming that it interfered ‘with a citizenship judge’s duty to allow candidates for 
citizenship the greatest possible freedom in the religious solemnization or the solemn 
affirmation of the oath’.XLIX  
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4.3. Concluding remarks 
Cultural traditions imbued with patriarchal traits represent the main hindrance to a full 
implementation of the principle of gender equality, even when this is a clearly stated aim in 
fundamental Charters, as has occurred in the case of Canada. Furthermore, this principle is 
notably endangered when it has to be balanced with the need to accommodate ethnic and 
religious minorities, whose understanding of it may vary greatly from ideas affirmed in liberal 
democracies. In Canada, this meant a rising tension between two prominent principles of the 
legal system: equality and multiculturalism. In fact, the way conflicting equalities should be 
reconciled has represented a highly debated point among scholars (Deveaux 2000: 523-525). 
Some have argued that liberal democracies should accord protection to cultural rights 
providing that compliance with them does not infringe the respect of individual autonomy 
and of equality (Okin 1997 – Kymlika 1997: 29-30); others have maintained that 
discrimination deriving from cultural traditions should be respected (Carens 1990) and 
ultimately only modified through dialogue and confrontation among groups and 
communities (Parekh 1996). Both these points of view, however, may be accused of 
approaching the topic from a very selfish and ‘western’ perspective, according to which there 
is a specific perception of equality to be protected, despite the fact that they propose two 
different paths to provide such protection. At the same time, it could be hard to abandon 
the perception of equality which might recognise a community’s option of carrying out 
discrimination in name of its specific culture, or even justify crimes with the so-called cultural 
defence,L given the fact that equality is a quintessential principle for ensuring the peaceful 
coexistence among people. In this regard, the cited cases of Aboriginal circles, and religious 
arbitration courts, demonstrate the risks potentially deriving from the inclusion of traditional 
means of adjudication in the legal framework, as they could be detrimental for groups 
representing a minority inside the minority, such as women or children. 
When dealing with the accommodation of cultural traditions with the principle of 
equality, it should not be ignored, however, the adverse (and unexpected?) impact that the 
Euro-North American approach produced. Again, the case of Canadian Aboriginals is 
noteworthy. Before colonization, these communities grounded gender differences on 
behavioural differences instead of biological ones (Native Women’s Association of Canada 
2010: 61), and were therefore deeply affected by the process of progressively equalizing 
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Aboriginal to European women, whose discrimination instead derived from a patriarchal 
position grounded on the pretence of biological differences. Disregarding this sociological 
element, Canadian authorities favoured the substitution of women with men in farming 
activities, maintaining that this would be more consistent with traditional European gender 
roles, and that the devotion of women to agriculture in Aboriginal communities was due to 
their subjugation to ‘lazy’ men only devoted to hunting. In fact, Europeans completely 
misunderstood that farming was considered a skilled activity by Aboriginals, and that it 
granted women a position of equality with men inside the community. Therefore, 
substituting men to women in farming actually lessened women’s relevance and fostered 
inequalities (Native Women’s Association of Canada 2010). This misunderstanding about 
Aboriginal gender roles resurfaced when the Supreme Court, deciding on the governmental 
duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests, ignored the 
recognized role of women in decision-making councils of Aboriginal communities, and failed 
to ensure their duty to consult with Aboriginal women.LI 
Despite failures like the one mentioned above, the Supreme Court’s activism has proved 
fundamental in the evolution of the interpretation of the principle of gender equality in the 
Canadian legal framework, from an initial lack of a consistent test for gender discriminations 
– i.e. in Bliss – to the awareness of the relevance of intersectionality (Jamieson 1978) – i.e. in 
Lavel. Notably, the Court has not only recognized that ‘equality, when constructed as 
sameness, perpetuates race and gender oppression’ (Monture and Okanee 1992: 237), but 
has also understood the risks of discrimination deriving from intersectionality between 
gender and religion.  
In this regard, gender stereotypes play a crucial role in fuelling the paradoxical idea that 
women are simultaneously agents of religious fundamentalism and victims of a male-
dominated religious society. The cases concerning the veil are illuminating, depicting women 
as stubborn opponents to the removal of the veil when required by public authorities despite 
the fact that it is just a patriarchal imposition.  
In order to overcome this paradox, the Canadian Court again had to face the vexata questio 
of the respect of formal equality in front of the respect of substantive equality, the former 
being satisfied from the imposition of an equal appearance between men and women and 
among women – everyone has to accede to the public service without showing symbols of 
religious belonging – whilst the latter being satisfied by the recognition of women’s right to 
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follow their religious (or any other) trappings, with of course the attendant possibility of 
introducing limitations when necessary in a democratic society. This clearly appeared in the 
(non)decision in ‘N.S.’, when the Supreme Court merely requested prosecutors to more 
carefully consider their motivations in the final decision, thus refusing to introduce a general 
precedent for balancing freedom of religion and rights to a defence, as it could have done 
following examples quoted by the Court itself. Although it is not clear whether this is an 
approach the Court will continue to follow, and as it entails the related risk of imposing the 
choice between the protection of gender rights and the guarantee of their religious rights on 
women (Scotti 2014), the positive effects of promoting a case-by-case evaluation should be 
highlighted. According to some scholars, in order to solve the issues connected to 
intersectionality the principle of anti-discrimination should be substituted with the principle 
of anti-subordination (Volpp 1996), better able to tackle the fact that what is deemed to be 
cultural is not undeniably accepted by all members of a community, and that every individual 
may have a personal interpretation of cultural precepts. On these grounds, the case-by-case 
analysis approach is considered beneficial, as it may allow for the effective assurance of 
substantive equality, avoid discrimination, and solve the possible issues raising from 
intersectionality. In a concrete application to the cases on the veil, therefore, the principle of 
anti-substitution will allow the taking into consideration of women’s multifaceted identity, 
instead of asking them to choose between their gender belonging and their religious 
‘membership’.  
The application of this principle, however, still deserves analysis and scholarly 
discussions, for the questions it still raises. For instance: taken to its extremes, could the case-
by-case approach frustrate the certainty of the law, in its meaning of general principles valid 
for all? If accommodation were made through case-by-case adjudications, might this 
endanger weaker women unable to access Courts, as the cases of circles or of arbitrary courts 
in Canada already demonstrated?  
As evident, the issue of gender intersectionality with race and/or religion should be 
handled with care, for it carries a risk of hierarchizing women, instead of ensuring a fair 
application of the principle of equality. Indeed, intersectionality must be conceived of as a 
tool for discussing discrimination with the aim of protecting women and their multifaceted 
identities, and not as a tool for justifying discrimination on the ground of those cultural 
elements that contribute to create the identity. 
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 Post-doctoral Researcher in Comparative Public Law at the Koç University Law School, Istanbul. 
I De Graffenreid v.General Motors, 413 F Suoo, 142 (E D Mo 1976) at 143.  
II Actually the doctine has evolved even further. La Barbera, for instance, assumed that the Crenshaw approach 
to intersectionality should be broadened in order to be intended as an attribute of gender, assuming the latter 
‘inherently made up by different conditions all of which simultaneously shape gender in a non-predefined way’ 
(La Barbera 2009). 
III It is worth remembering that lands currently belonging to Canada, whose name derives from the Huron-
Iroquois world Kanata (settlement), were originally sparsely inhabited by Aboriginal tribes then colonized by 
French and British since mid-XVIII century and unified in a Confederation with the 1867 British North 
American Act (BNA). Because of the colonisers’ ambition of creating a white and Christian country, Canada 
for long time had a legal framework discriminating Aboriginal peoples. It should be clarified that the noun 
‘Aboriginal’ is used here with reference to First Nations peoples – for long time individuated as Indians – Metis 
and Inuit; when different treatments were provided for them it is explicitly stated.  
IV It has to be noted that migration flows to Canada were composed of European people until WWII, whilst 
later on they were mainly composed of Asian, Caribbean and Latin American people. 
V In this evolution, a significant role was played by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 
which in 1969 recommended integration, instead of assimilation, as the main policy to be fulfilled by the federal 
government. 
VI It is worthy to note that, differently from Inuit and First Nations, Metis never experienced restrictions in 
their right to vote.  
VII The process however needed several years, as emerges from the consideration that the first recognitions of 
spouses’ equality occurred in the 1920s, but Quebec recognized it only in 1964.  
VIII See 1925 Marriage and Divorce Act.  
IX See 1953 Fair Employment Practices Act.  
X See Privy Council, Edwards v. AG for Canada, 18 October 1929.  
XI Bliss v. A.G. Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183. 
XII See: Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.); Winnipeg School Division 
No. 1 v. Craton, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150 (S.C.C.). 
XIII See Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian National Railway Company et al. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114. 
XIV See Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpson Sears Ltd, [1985], 2 SCR 536. 
XV See Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd, [1989] 1 SCR 1252.  
XVI See Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513 and Blainey v. Ontario Hockey Association 
(1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/716. 
XVII Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219.  
XVIII R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR 1296. 
XIX Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 at para. 51. Substantive equality was introduced in Law Society of British 
Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, but the test to be used for its safeguard is still contested by Supreme 
Court’s judges (see Quebec A.G. v. A., [2013] 1 SCR 61). On the evolution of the test and on its impact in cases 
concerning gender issue, see Baines 2012.  
XX R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.  
XXI R. v. Sullivan, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 489. 
XXII See Miglin v. Miglin, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, and Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550.  
XXIII It is based on the idea that spouses willing to terminate their marriage should find a settlement out of 
court. An approach that feminist scholars have criticized for the consequences this may entail on women (Bryan 
1999).  
XXIV Murdoch v. Murdoch, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423. 
XXV Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 627.  
XXVI It is worthy to note, however, that the failure of the claim raised a huge debate in the country persuading 
the government in introducing a new and fairer legislation on the point. 
XXVII See Trociuk v. British Columbia, 2003 S.C.C. 34.  
XXVIII See R. v. Hess and Nguyen, [1990] 2. S.C.R. 906; R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63; R. v. M. (M.L.), [1994] 2 
S.C.R. 3; A.(L.L.) v. Beharriell, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536; R. v. Carosella, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 80; R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 
668; R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330.  
XXIX It can be relevant to remember that, for instance, the Indian Act and the amendments progressively 
introduced to it, imposed on Aboriginal children a requirement to attend schools in the non-Aboriginal cities, 
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and forbad traditional ceremonies including dances, in a clear attempt of obliterating Aboriginal traditions 
among younger generations.  
XXX The assimilationist attempt was led in a very crude way, which completely ignored Aboriginal traditions. 
For instance, a campaign for individuating each member of the communities by imposing a single name – 
against the tradition according to which Inuit may have been known by several names throughout their lives 
and depending on context – was led by providing them with leather discs, originally to be worn on one’s person.  
XXXI See R. c. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1RCS 295.  
XXXII Composed of four Aboriginal and three non-Aboriginal Commissioners, it was established in 1991 with 
the aim of investigating and reporting back to the Government of Canada on a proposal for reforming the 
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. After public hearings and research studies, the 
Commission released a five-volume report in 1996. 
XXXIII Bill S-3, introduced in the Senate of Canada on 25 October 2016, is still under consideration.  
XXXIV A.G. Canada v. Lavell [1974] S.C.R. 1349. A.G. Canada v. Canard [1975] 52 DLR 548 was also relevant in 
that period for demonstrating the inconsistency of several provisions of the Indian Act with the Bill of Rights. 
XXXV Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, Communication n. 24/1977: Canada 30/07/81, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977. 
XXXVI See McIvor v. Canada, 2009 BCCA 153.  
XXXVII See Descheneaux v. Canada, 2015 QCCS 3555.  
XXXVIII NWAC v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627. 
XXXIX This was the name of the report issued in 1991 by the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the 
House of Commons appointed to consult with Canadians and report upon the process for amending the 
Constitution of Canada, which took into account also the rights of Aboriginal Peoples.  
XL See Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285. 
XLI Paul v. Paul, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 306. 
XLII R. v. Naappaluk, [1994] 2 CNLR 143.  
XLIII See R. v. S.G.N., [1999] 133 BCAC 277. 
XLIV R. v. Morris, [2004] 3 CNLR 295.  
XLV It could sound quite rhetorical to quote here the Markovitz case, when a Jewish man refused to consent to 
a divorce citing religious reasons (Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607). 
XLVI When CSOs and feminist groups – included the Canadian Council of Muslim Women – asked the 
Government to consider the possible discriminations against women a Sharia Court would have justified, the 
Government appointed Marion Boyd, provincial MP and feminist activist, as rapporteur on the topic. Her 
report, issued in 2005, suggested that the Government not amend the Arbitration Act.  
XLVII See R. v. N.S., [2012] 3 SCR 726. 
XLVIII See Ishaq v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] 4 FCR 297.  
XLIX The Conservative government in force at the time of the decision appealed to the Supreme Court, but the 
Liberal government, having meanwhile settled, dropped the appeal.  
L The possibility of cultural defense has been explicitly rejected as an option for defending the perpetrators of 
violence against women in the Istanbul Convention, elaborated by the Council of Europe and considered as 
the golden standard at the international level (see UN statement at 
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/3/the-istanbul-convention-strengthening-the-response-
to-ending-violence-against-women) as for the prevention of gender violence. It is worthy to underline that 
Canada participated to its elaboration as a non-CoE country, but has not yet signed it.  
LI See Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forest), 2004 SCC 73. 
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